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ABSTRACT 
DETERMINANTS OF THE GENERALIZED TRUST RADIUS IN SCRIPTED 
FRAGILE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES 
by Anthony Thomas Caito 
May 2018 
Trust between strangers does not come easily in collectivist societies governed by 
coercive institutions and subject to unstable market forces.  More than one-third of all 
states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little interest in explaining the 
variability of generalized trust among them; instead fixating on social capital, the 
consequence of the expansion of generalized trust, putting the cart before the horse and 
leaving unexamined many of its causes.  The enhanced accuracy of the reconfigured 
World Values Survey trust question has generated new research opportunities to address 
this concern.  This dissertation advances the trust literature through identifying, 
measuring, and explaining the full social effect on generalized trust in fragile states 
through group proximity and civil society power differential.  Sociological 
institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework for modeling 
and explaining structural social effects leading to the improbable expansion of 
generalized trust in the highly scripted fragile sub-Saharan African states of Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.  These purposefully deviant and least likely test cases are 
examined using within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions 
through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, affirming or confirming most 
hypotheses.  The expansion of generalized trust requires sustained and usually 
incentivized positive inter-group interaction.  In fragile states, most inter-group 
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interaction is conflictual and occurs through civil society because individuals have little 
capital with which to engage in the market and the state is dysfunctional.  The 
generalized trust radius is likely to widen the more proximate and consociational its civil 
society is, regardless of how fragile the state is.  This dissertation enlarges and 
strengthens the social explanation for generalized trust variability in fragile states, filling 
a significant gap in the literature and establishing a research design and model for future 
research to replicate in other fragile regions. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
Dine with a stranger but save your love for your family. 
—Ethiopian proverb 
Is it possible for strangers to trust each other in highly collectivist societies 
governed by fragile state institutions and unstable market forces?  Many in the trust and 
fragile states literature say no (see Bratton 1989, 428; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner 
2004, 246).  This dissertation, in agreement with Kaplan (2008, 4), challenges this 
assumption and claims a society’s social network composition determines much of the 
extent of generalized trust between strangers in fragile states. 
Trust, having confidence one’s expectations will be met (Hardin 1992, 152-3), is 
the fuel that, along with incentivized or coerced self-interest, drives social interaction.  
While individuals may credit trust to institutions, physical matter, or unobserved forces, 
this research is concerned with the determinants of the extent of generalized social trust.  
Social trust requires human interaction, which is dependent on close physical, 
technological, or social proximity.  Social proximity occurs in two phases: initial and 
sustained.  Self-interest prompts initial interaction (Miller 1999, 1057), consisting of a 
mixture of basic human needs, cultural attraction, selective incentives, and capital 
exchange, while generalized trust: shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8), based 
on non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests, drives sustained interaction. 
The fragile state is a socio-political organism established by a social contract 
which has diminished “control over its territory” (Di John 2010, 10) and contested 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 2015, 
136).  Its social contract has eroded, though not to the point of collapse or failure, nor 
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irreparably.  It suffers from capacity, security, and legitimacy gaps (Eizenstat et al., 2005, 
134–146) and is either “unable or unwilling to provide core services to its people” 
(Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 24), leaving many interests unmet.  Fragile states 
lack many of the necessary preconditions for the production of generalized trust; this is of 
concern because state fragility levels are high and relatively stable (Bandura 2008, 17, 
85; Marshall and Cole 2008, 12) particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ensuring their 
perpetuation. 
Much of the trust and fragile states literature fails to recognize that fragile states 
come in many complex varieties with some types providing more optimal generalized 
trust conditions than others (Call 2010, 316).  Some in the trust literature (see Delhey et 
al. 2011; van Hoorn 2015) recognize this diversity; however, focus their analysis on 
cultural, economic, and political factors, while subordinating social effects.  This 
dissertation extends and strengthens this line of inquiry by producing an enhanced model 
for examining the function of generalized trust in fragile states through the effects of a 
society’s social network composition, defined as the configuration of and relationship 
between social inputs that produce social network structures. 
Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together provide the most 
suitable theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of the generalized trust 
radius (GTR): the extent that shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on 
non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests permeate society.  Institutional 
isomorphism is the homogeneity of social structures and processes between 
organizational units under similar constraints (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 157), and 
institutional scripts are protocols for seeking interests (Shweder 1991, 98).  Within this 
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theoretical framework, institutional isomorphism and scripts explain how social networks 
form, are composed and persist to affect the GTR in fragile states. 
A society’s social network composition, as much as its state security and contract 
institutions, individualism-collectivism levels, and inter-state market forces, determines 
whether groups are forced or incentivized to interact to meet interests and whether the 
outcome is increased or decreased generalized trust (Posner 2004, 242).  The trust and 
fragile states literature rightly assume most fragile states produce narrow GTR, yet has 
not pursued an explanation for fragile states that deviate from this typical outcome.  The 
test case of interest is subject to the same negative environmental factors as typical fragile 
states and results in some of the same expected adverse outcomes, yet exhibits a 
relatively wide GTR.  No region has more fragile states than sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
(Goldstone 2004, 454; Herbst 2004, 302).  This dissertation employs a deviant, least 
likely case selection method and most similar, multiple, and comparative case analysis 
method to address how social network composition affects the GTR in the test cases of 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria and control cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The examination of fragile states matters because, in a globalizing world, one 
state's problems readily become other states' problems, destabilizing regions in the 
process.  The GTR matters because trust’s outward expansion, more than its intensity 
level, determines access to the positive externalities of expanding social networks and 
increased access to physical, human, and social capital (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et 
al. 2009, 5), and the avoidance of the negative externalities of information asymmetry 
and moral hazard associated with a narrow GTR (Harrison 1985, 7). 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This research builds upon Fukuyama’s (2002) principal operational question for 
fragile states: How fragile must states become and in what configurations, before 
generalized trust is no longer able to expand (2002, 32).  The state constrains much of 
what is possible in society—if the state is fragile, so too should be the society…most of 
the time.  However, statist theories emphasizing security and contract institutions, alone, 
do not explain all that constrains the GTR.  The literature requires distinct theory and 
models for fragile states on the verge of collapse or failure from those that are reasonably 
functional (Posner 2003, 239; Rotberg 2004, 1-2).  The examination of social 
determinants, in addition to the statist, cultural, and market variables, has the potential to 
close a significant gap in the literature. 
The intersection of trust and fragile states provides fertile ground for many 
pertinent research questions.  This research is limited to questions addressing the 
structural determinants of the GTR in fragile states, leaving the balance of agent-centered 
and non-fragile state questions to future research.  The four related research questions are 
as follows: 
1. How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in 
fragile states?  
2. How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?  
3. How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?  
4. How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile 
states?  
 
The hypotheses for each research question are as follows: 
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the 
generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
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H2:  Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust 
radius in fragile states. 
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile 
states. 
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the 
generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
 
The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows and 
are defined and clarified later: 
• Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius] 
• Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization], 
[Proximity] and [Power Differential] 
• Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions] 
• Control Variable: Culture [Individualism] 
• Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI], 
[Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid] 
 
This research produces four contributions to the trust and fragile states literature.  
First, it confirms and enhances control variable arguments and confirms the inclusion of 
the test variable through the sociological institutionalism and social capital theory 
theoretical framework, which produces an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for 
analyzing structural determinants of the GTR in highly scripted fragile SSA states.  
Second, it validates and advances the World Values Survey new trust question battery 
and Delhey et al. (2011) generalized trust radius measurement through the development 
of two concepts.  The trust composition models the optimal balance of in-group, 
generalized, and institutional trust for creating environments conducive to the widening 
of the GTR.  The trust differential demonstrates the variability of GTR potential and 
realization among fragile states.  Third, by identifying, modeling, and measuring a fuller 
social effect on the GTR, it reveals generalized trust patterns across test cases, explains 
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fragile states’ transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and describes incentivization 
structures present in fragile state civil society networks.  This dissertation is a unique and 
original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and trust, which 
fills a critical gap in the trust and fragile states literature. 
Theoretical Framework 
The analysis of trust in the social sciences has been a multi-disciplinary effort 
with economics, political science, psychology, and sociology each cutting different paths 
through the trust literature, resulting in inefficiency and duplication of efforts.  For a 
concept with substantial explanatory power, the literature is quite disappointing (Delhey 
et al. 2011, 800).  The advancement of this literature requires, where permissible, an 
inter-disciplinary integration of theories, data, and findings.  Synthesis is beginning to 
occur at the intersection of political science and sociology where the sub-disciplines of 
political sociology, comparative politics, and social organization converge.  Bridging this 
gap in the literature are several related theories under the umbrella of sociological 
institutionalism and social capital theory that together posit there is predictability within 
complex systems of interaction. 
Institutions have been defined as “the underlying rules of the game” (North 1990, 
3) and “formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political, and economic 
relations” (1990, 3). 
Institutions are durable, socially constructed “cognitive and symbolic 
schemes” (Bevir 2006, 374), that shape (North 1990, 3) and constrain 
thought, interest, and behavior through formal and informal sanctions and 
incentives (Voigt 2013, 7). 
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While individual behavior is usually rational, institutional outcomes are often 
unintentional, regulating products of recurring social interaction; repeated interactions 
produce institutions.  Therefore, formal and informal institutions are by definition, 
enduring.  To combat deinstitutionalizing forces, they must be adaptive.  Effective 
institutions delineate social expectations, while weak institutions are enforced 
capriciously.  Individuals desire clear expectations as they seek to meet their interests and 
perpetually—usually tacitly—assess their environments to ascertain formal and informal 
institutional jurisdictions, to determine and weigh incentives and sanctions for various 
behaviors. 
The majority of the social sciences was not convinced that institutions mattered—
again—until Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) advanced 
theory on the isomorphic transfer of institutions.  Following this theoretical innovation, 
many in the institutionalism literature increasingly—and rightly—assume institutions 
governing inter-group interactions are highly scripted.  Institutional theories, particularly 
the sociological institutionalism branch of neo-institutionalism, have become standard 
analytical lenses in comparative politics and public policy (Radaelli et al. 2012, 539).  
Sociological institutionalism examines how the social structures of rules and norms, 
which govern behavior, develop and become embedded in society (Scott 2004, 18) as 
scripts, attempting to describe and explain when, how much, and under what conditions 
institutions matter. 
Social capital theory, advanced by Putnam (1995), Lin (2002) and Fukuyama 
(2002) on the foundations of Granovetter (1973), Bourdieu (1986), and Coleman (1988), 
has convinced the social sciences that social networks and trust matter because 
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institutions are embedded in social networks.  Social capital is one form of capital.  
Modern conceptions of capital originate from the natural law tradition as advanced by 
Locke and Smith.  Locke’s (2014 [1690], Chapter V, Paragraph 33) labor theory of 
property aligns with natural law’s assertion of the human right to own that other than 
oneself, claiming a person’s labor, when mixed with material, creates property.  Capital 
is “that part of a man's stock which he expects to afford him revenue” (Smith 1977 
[1776], Book II, Chapter I) and surplus value (Marx and Engels 2012 [1867], 84) created 
by human investment in resources of value to society (Lin 2005, 3).  It may take various 
forms embodied in material elements, finances, cultural embeddedness, knowledge, 
skills, and social connectivity.   
The social capital theory explains the emergence of generalized trust and the 
social capital creation processes.  Social capital is the surplus stock of network-
embedded (Son and Lin 2008, 330) wealth, power, and reputation (Marsden and Lin 
1982, 132, 205) that may be accessed, captured, and mobilized by network agents for 
collective action (Lin et al. 2001, 29, 185) through investment in and promotion of 
uncoerced cooperative social relations (Fukuyama 2001, 7).  It is “a capability that arises 
from the prevalence of trust in society…” (Fukuyama 1996, 26).  While the creation of 
social capital is vital for realizing the full array of positive externalities, the widening of 
the GTR, resulting from reciprocated trust between strangers, is a precondition for its 
creation (Fukuyama 2000, 99), and therefore the focus of this research. 
Following these advances in sociological institutionalism and social capital 
theory, the fragile states literature, advanced by Posner (2003) and Rotberg (2004), has 
made initial progress in disaggregating fragile states.  Delhey et al. (2011), through their 
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new GTR measurement based on the World Values Survey (WVS) new 6-question trust 
battery, has made possible the alignment of the literature at the intersection of trust and 
fragile states.  The reactivation of this discourse has provided the needed intellectual 
space for modeling the function of the GTR in fragile states. 
Methodology 
A recent methodological debate has reinvigorated, yet divided the trust literature: 
how generalizable across countries are the WVS trust questions.  Because past trust 
research has been prone to overgeneralization (Delhey et al. 2001, 787), this dissertation 
delimits its case selection and analysis to a single socio-culturally similar region (SSA) 
where there is a concentration of fragile states and where the concept of trust is likely to 
be interpreted similarly. 
The selected dependent, test, and control variables are defined and operationalized 
here.  The dependent variable [Generalized Trust Radius] is an outcome of social network 
composition, state security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market 
forces.  It is operationalized using the Delhey et al. (2011) derivative and transcendent 
trust procedure for isolating the extension of in-group trust (derivative) from the GTR 
(transcendent) and aggregating its measurement from the individual to the country level.  
Transcendent trust is the most accurate proxy for the GTR.  The difference between in-
group and generalized trust (trust differential) represents a society’s unrealized 
generalized trust potential.  Control variables may mitigate this gap through strong 
institutions, individualism, and high trade and investment, as may the test variable 
through increasing fractionalization, proximity, and multipolarity.  Other related 
mechanisms that increase inter-group interaction and possibly mitigate the gap include 
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unmet interests, selective incentives, opportunities for capital exchange, and external 
coercion. 
1. This research introduces the test variable Social Network Composition, 
operationalized and measured by [Fractionalization], [Proximity] and [Power 
Differential].  A society’s social network composition includes its ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious fractionalization, physical, technological, and social 
proximity, and power differential polarity. 
Social Network Composition is the configuration of and relationship 
between social inputs that produce social network structure. 
 
Fractionalization is the likelihood that two people chosen at random will 
be from different (ethnic, linguistic, or religious) groups. 
 
Proximity is the aggregate physical, technological, and social distance 
between nodes in a network or across networks. 
  
Power Differential is the difference in parity between nodes in a network 
or across networks. 
 
The product of social network composition, social network structure, is 
defined as “influential and persistent sets of interrelationships” (Spillman 
1995, 132) and flows between actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
 
This dissertation employs a 2x2 case selection typology to separate the control 
and test cases of interest and utilizes several descriptive network measures (transitivity, 
propinquity, and cohesion) to provide an analytical language (Emirbayer and Goodwin 
1994, 1447) for explaining the effect SNC has on the GTR. 
The literature-supported control variables include: 
2. Institutions, operationalized and measured by [State Security & Contract 
Institutions]  
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Security Institutions are state-established rules for providing protection 
from real and imagined, internal and external threats achieved by socially 
appropriate means, which enables the free exercise of societal values and 
the activation of social goods for all populations residing within the 
territorial and political jurisdiction of the state. 
 
Contract institutions are state-established legal statutes, bureaucratic 
rules, and social conventions purposed to manage assets, real property, 
and legal relationships through the penalization or incentivization of 
appropriate behavior. 
 
State security and contract institutions are measured using a combination of 
World Bank quantitative data on state stability, violence, the rule of law, and corruption 
and Voigt’s (2013, 17) qualitative procedure for assessing institution size, embeddedness, 
strength, effectiveness, and duration. 
3. Culture, operationalized and measured by [Individualism] 
Culture is “collective programming of the mind” (Hofstede 2001, 9) that 
guides the outworking of personal values held by a common identity group 
through “inherited ethical habit” (Fukuyama 1995, 34) and “community-
specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient” (Shweder 
2000, 163). 
 
Individualism is the community preference for autonomy, self-
determination, and a “loosely-knit social framework in which individuals 
are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families” 
(Hofstede 1984, 83). 
 
In-group collectivism is the community preference for dependence, 
interconnectivity, and attachment and “the degree to which individuals 
express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or 
families” (House et al. 2004, 30). 
 
Individualism and collectivism are the cultural components that most affect the 
GTR.  They are psychologically internalized feelings that are enacted and experienced 
through one’s group(s) and society and are measured at the societal level most accurately 
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along an individualism-collectivism continuum by comparing Hofstede (2001) and 
GLOBE (2004) country-level data. 
4. Inter-State Market Forces, operationalized and measured by [Trade], [FDI], 
[FPI], [Remittances], [Military Aid], and [Non-Military Aid] 
Inter-state Market Forces are uni- and bi-directional transfers of financial 
and manufactured capital between states and societies. 
 
Trade is the bi-directional transfer of financial and manufactured capital, 
goods, and services between states and societies. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the active uni-directional investment 
of financial or manufactured capital in another country’s market. 
 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) is the passive uni-directional 
investment of financial capital in another country’s market. 
 
Remittance is the uni-directional transfer of financial capital from 
individuals in a country’s diaspora to individuals in its home country. 
 
Aid is the uni-directional transfer of military or non-military financial or 
manufactured capital from one state or non-state actor to another for non-
commercial purposes. 
 
Inter-state market forces are measured by qualitative description and a 
combination of annualized quantitative World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) data. 
These three control variables constitute the largest effects the trust literature has 
found to have on the GTR.  Additionally, since fractionalization alone is an insufficient 
explanation for the social effects on the GTR, proximity and power differential are 
needed additions to the social variable.  This dissertation claims that even when security 
and contract institutions are weak, society is collectivist, and remittances and aid exceed 
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trade and investment, increased fractionalization, proximity, and power differential may 
widen the GTR.  Therefore, an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in the most 
unfavorable environments is conducted to isolate the effects of SNC on the GTR. 
Due to the disconfirmatory purpose of this research, the complexity of the GTR 
concept and the limited number of fragile states with relatively wide GTR, the inference 
is limited to the deterministic generalization of theoretical propositions related to well-
defined and tightly bound most similar types of cases rather than probabilistic 
generalization to a population.  While one cannot draw big empirical conclusions from 
this small-N examination incorporating a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
(Lieberson 1994, 311), one may infer appropriate theoretical inference because this 
research design ensures reliability and construct, internal, and external validity are high. 
Structure 
This introductory chapter has presented the relevant research questions, claims, 
theoretical framework, research context, and methodology for examining the 
determinants of the GTR in fragile states.  Chapter II organizes and synthesizes the 
relevant trust and fragile states literature.  Themes include: 
• Defining, disaggregating, and classifying fragile states. 
• Proxy measures for the GTR. 
• Theoretical frameworks and methods for analyzing generalized trust. 
• Independent variable rationales. 
 
Chapter III presents the logic and suitability of the selected methodology and 
cases and presents a detailed framework for its implementation.  Chapter IV reports the 
literature’s most pertinent quantitative and qualitative findings organized thematically by 
each variable.  Chapter V tests the research hypotheses through within- and cross-case 
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analyses of each variable and comparative analysis and synthesis of all variables across 
all cases.  Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and research and policy 
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Happy families [states] are all alike; every unhappy family [state] is 
unhappy in its own way. 
—Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 
 
Since the emergence of the modern state initiated by the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, states have existed in increasingly complex configurations, each producing a 
unique trust environment.  During this period, societies have transitioned from 
disconnected feudal fiefdoms embedded in loosely knit empires into a relatively 
consolidated inter-dependent global system of states.   
The number of states has increased substantially due primarily to rapid 
decolonization and the break-up of the former Soviet Union.  The number of states has 
nearly doubled since the end of World War II in August 1945 (Rotberg 2003, 2).  There 
were 55 states at the beginning of the twentieth century (Herbst 2004, 304) increasing to 
195 (U.S. Department of State) in 2018.  Many of the newest states resulting from 
decolonization are the most dysfunctional (Rotberg 2004, 1).  Fragile, collapsed, and 
failed states, primarily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Goldstone 2004, 454; 
Herbst 2004, 302; Puddington and Roylance 2017, 11), will continue to be a concern for 
the foreseeable future. 
A state’s primary purpose is the provision of stability for its population.  To what 
or whom is trust credited in states where basic needs of water, food, shelter, and security 
are consistently met, and violations of the rule of law are sanctioned fairly and 
transparently?  Trustworthy institutions underwrite the risk inherent in inter-group 
interaction.  Groups may lean on strong state institutions to seek interests with potentially 
untrustworthy groups.  Besides minimally effective security and contract institutions, 
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which are essential for the widening of the generalized trust radius (GTR), non-fragile 
states also have functioning infrastructure, social service delivery, and economic 
regulation institutions.  Such institutions serve as a capable second- and third-party 
contract agent for their populations.  This type of state is stable because it has strong 
institutions and has struck a satisfactory balance of generalized and in-group trust.  
However, this type of state is susceptible to overdependence on formal institutions, 
rendering its generalized trust less able to fill gaps in the rare occurrence of institutional 
weakening. 
It is a mischaracterization that predatory tyrants lead most fragile states (Di John 
2011, 6).  Each fragile state has a unique mixture of weak institutions and contexts that 
bound what is politically possible for leaders, which requires different coercion and 
incentivization strategies to realize developmental goals and produce a congruence of 
norms and stability.  While coercive strategies may successfully produce minimally 
secure environments, they often have the unintended consequence of increasing in-group 
trust (Widner 1995, 148) and decreasing generalized trust. 
At its logical extreme, societal congruence entails the total loss of group cohesion; 
the desired end of totalitarian political systems.  To what or whom then is trust credited in 
fragile states where many interests go unmet, and the state is unwilling or unable to meet 
all of its population’s expectations?  In this type of state, elites either benefit from the 
state—likely to the detriment of others—or avoid the state, through access to foreign 
capital.  Individuals prefer to have their interests met by their own group due to the power 
of cultural attraction.  However, because groups are rarely able to meet all of their 
members’ interests in this context, inter-group interaction occurs, even if not desired.  
 17 
Where low levels of generalized trust exist, inter-group cooperation requires easily 
monitored and enforceable institutions (Chan 2007, 734).  Void of a moderate-high 
functioning state worthy of institutional trust (Plattner and Diamond 1994, 3) and able to 
moderate inter-group interaction, these societies rarely benefit from the positive 
externalities of increasing generalized trust.  While this is true of the typical fragile state, 
there are types of fragile states that have realized more of their generalized trust potential 
than the literature recognizes. 
This review of the pertinent trust and fragile states literatures is organized 
thematically into four sections.  The first section provides an extensive background 
discussion on the dynamics of trust, interests, inter-group interaction, and the GTR in 
fragile states.  The second section introduces the joint sociological institutionalism and 
social capital theory theoretical framework.  The third section delineates the independent 
variables: social network composition, security and contract institutions, individualism, 
and inter-state market forces.  Finally, the fourth section clarifies this dissertation’s 
contribution to the literature. 
Background 
Human development is thus about much more than the rise or fall of 
average national incomes; it is about creating an environment in which 
people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives 
in accord with their needs and interests. 
—Damien Kingsbury, Political Development 
 
The social world is best understood through interactions.  Individuals expect a 
return on their social investments when interacting (Lin et al. 2001, 8), though a form of 
capital, be it financial, physical, human, or social.  Self-interest is the desire to advance 
one’s perceived well-being; this requires regular social interaction within and sometimes 
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between groups.  The primary drivers of initial inter-group interaction—because groups 
do not share cultural attraction—are either incentivized instrumental interests or external 
coercion.  Even in non-fragile states, where many preconditions exist for positive inter-
group interaction, generalized trust is required to sustain positive interaction (Miller 
1999, 1057). 
The trust literature has developed multi-disciplinarily, segmented between 
psychology, sociology, political science, and economics (see Ahn and Esarey 2008; 
Bauer 2015; Delhey et al. 2011; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter 1973; Hardin 1992; 
Harrison 1985; Lin et al. 2001; Lundmark et al. 2016; Realo et al. 2008; Torpe and Lolle 
2011; van Hoorn 2014; Uslaner 2002; Welzel and Delhey 2015).  It has concentrated on 
the examination of institutional trust, generalized trust level, and aggregated trustingness 
and trustworthiness in non-fragile states while paying less attention to the GTR in fragile 
states because developed contexts are more easily accessible.  As developing world data 
has become more trustworthy, reliable, and available, these literature have begun to 
converge. 
The fragile states literature has been driven by the international relations (IR) sub-
discipline (Büger and Bethke 2011, 28-9) (see Bratton 1989; Call and Cousens 2008; 
Chauvet et al. 2007; Coleman 1988; Di John 2010; Easterly 2008; Goldstone et al. 2004; 
Kaplan 2008; Lin 2005; Lowenkopf 1995; Migdal 1988; Ncube et al. 2014; Posner 2003, 
2004; Rotberg 2004; Vallings and Torres 2005; Woolcock 1998).  It has focused on 
democratization, institutional failure, and political regimes in developing states, rather 
than on trust.  Except for Zartman (1995) and Fukuyama (2001), the dearth of 
comparative politics literature on state fragility is puzzling since its theories are better 
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equipped to address states’ inability “to implement rules, collect taxes and enforce 
monopolies of violence” (Lambach 2007, 33).  This dissertation returns the examination 
of state fragility to the sub-discipline of comparative politics, where the discourse is best 
advanced. 
The trust and fragile states literature have struggled to agree on conceptual 
boundaries, definitions, and measurement criteria, producing disorganized and stunted 
discourses (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 4).  The trust literature has long 
recognized the need for the objective, universal measurement of its concepts (Morrone 
and Ranuzzi 2009, 7), yet has been unable to agree on the boundary between in-group 
and generalized trust (Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004, 2-3; Portes 1998, 7; Sztompka 
1999, 42).  While the fragile states literature has wrestled with the criteria for 
distinguishing between non-fragile, fragile, collapsed, and failed states, entertaining 
many competing and overlapping terms to describe similar phenomena. 
State Fragility 
This dissertation adheres to the Weberian definition of state based on the Lockean 
view of the social contract.  Weber defines “a state [as] a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” (Weber 2015, 136).  Much of the fragile states literature agrees there are broad 
indicators of stateness that determine a state’s legitimacy and condition.  Rotberg (2003, 
3) provides the following hierarchy of positive state functions: security; regulatory and 
enforcement institutions; political participation; social service delivery; infrastructure; 
and regulation of the economy.  Two of these variables (security and regulatory and 
enforcement institutions) serve as control variables for this dissertation. 
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The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) drafted, 
signed, and ratified by seventeen western hemisphere states defines the state in relation to 
an equal community of states.  Claims of statehood are legitimate as long as they do not 
violate the harm principle and infringe upon the rights of other states (Article 3).  Peer-
recognition is central to this definition, only when there are competing claims of 
statehood and sovereignty over the same geographic territory (e.g., Israel-Palestine) 
(Article 6).  It considers the criteria of a permanent population, a defined territory and 
government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states (Article 1), to assess 
claims.  This method is undoubtedly democratic in theory, although, is vulnerable to 
political motivation by the community of states. 
States that violate Weber, Rotberg, or Montevideo Convention stateness criteria, 
may slide lower on the state fragility continuum; however, the international community 
of states is divided over at what point a state is no longer sovereign.  Dysfunctional states 
that fall below these, admittedly nebulous standards, have been described in the IR-led 
fragile states literature as “weak,” “fragile,” or “poorly performing,” with more extreme 
and rare cases labeled “failed” or “collapsed” (Torres and Anderson 2004, 5).  These 
competing definitions over this conceptual territory have confused the literature leading 
to misunderstanding of how the GTR functions in dysfunctional states.  The once popular 
term, “weak state,” has diminished in influence.  In 2003, the White House’s National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) report defined “weak states” as lacking the 
“capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities” (White House 2006, 78), but since the 
2006 report, it has no longer used the term “weak states” (2006, 76). 
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When most researchers consider dysfunctional states, they think first of SSA 
because it is the most uniformly fragile region (Herbst 2004, 302; Ncube et al. 2014, 2; 
Vallings and Torres 2005, 7), having the “most inhospitable conditions for stability and 
democracy” (Goldstone 2004, 454).  The widening of the GTR requires a minimally 
functional state.  Collapsed and failed states’ security and contract institutions are so 
damaged (Wyler 2008, 4) they require external intervention, often through a United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operation or Mission.  In failed states such as Afghanistan, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen, the state exists but is not in sufficient control.  They are unable to, without 
assistance, control their territory and are “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and 
contested bitterly by warring factions” (Rotberg 2003, 5).  Collapsed states such as 
Somalia are rare; the state no longer exists, producing “a vacuum of authority (2003, 9) 
and groups take on functions of the state such as security and contract enforcement. 
The state type of interest for this research is fragile, rather than non-fragile, 
collapsed, or failed because the research question requires a context where the widening 
of the GTR is unlikely, yet possible.  The majority of the state literature and development 
practitioners embrace the concept of state fragility while a minority avoid it.  They use it 
to describe, weigh, and measure multifaceted state dysfunction, while some claim donors 
use it to “legitimize their strategic objectives in foreign policy” (Grimm et al. 2014, 205).  
The desire to avoid it arises from the potential political fallout from labeling states as 
fragile; this position has led the European Union to refrain from its use (Grimm 2014, 
262).  Some fragile, failed, and collapsed states embrace the concept.  Twenty self-
declared fragile states formed the g7+ in an attempt to influence international 
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development donors and the fragile states discourse (Hughes et al., 2014, 2).  However, 
more than one-third of member states are failed (e.g., Yemen) or collapsed (e.g., 
Somalia), rather than fragile states. 
The state literature has had difficulty agreeing on a definition for state fragility 
(Kaplan 2014, 15), with some favoring the OECD or World Bank definitions. 
A fragile state has “weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, 
and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with 
society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal and external 
shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters” (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2012, 85). 
 
A fragile state is one “facing particularly severe development challenges: 
weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. 
Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past 
severe conflict” (World Bank 2012). 
 
While this dissertation appreciates the succinctness of these definitions, both are 
ultimately unsatisfying alone because they use static categories to describe dynamic 
environments where some state institutions are becoming more fragile and others less so. 
The factors predisposing a country to fragility and conflict may be many 
and varied, and a very different set of factors—i.e., not merely the same 
factors working in the opposite direction— may shape that country’s 
pathways into and out of fragility (Woolcock 2014, 11). 
 
This dissertation defines fragile states by building on these definitions and 
additional insights from the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2018).  A fragile state 
has a net diminished capacity to provide stability for its population and interact as an 
equal in the international community through a combination of decreased: institutional 
functionality, territorial control, legitimate use of force, and provision of essential public 
services, rendering it overall more vulnerable to shocks. 
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Even this definition is necessarily limited in that it does not indicate which 
institutions are diminished, nor how much or if the state as a whole is becoming more or 
less fragile.  While fragile states may have specific areas of fragility, they are not fragile 
across all institutions. Notably, their security and contract institutions are at least 
minimally functional; otherwise, they would be considered failed or collapsed.  While no 
single geopolitical region is culturally, economically, or politically homogenous, many 
(30 of 45) SSA states are uniformly fragile, as opposed to non-fragile, collapsed, or 
failed.  Sub-Saharan Africa has the most similar geopolitical context, institutional 
conditions, and developmental constraints.  The pan-African experience is relatable 
across countries and is, therefore, the most suitable geo-political region for this 
examination of generalized trust.  This is not to say that SSA lacks diversity; this research 
agrees with Allen (1995, 318) who disputes Kaplan’s (1994) overgeneralization of a 
single African political culture. 
The states literature has made greater advances explaining non-fragile, collapsed, 
and failed states than fragile states.  These opposing state types clearly violate or adhere 
to stateness criteria, while fragile states come in complex varieties.  It is therefore 
understandable that the literature has opted to examine these easier research targets, while 
leaving the fragile states literature in a fragile state itself, with unclear definitions and 
measurement criteria.  The state literature and development industry have produced 
numerous indices of state dysfunction that measure overlapping economic, political, 
social, and security factors.  None, to date, explain sub-state variation in capacity across 
state sectors (Di John 2009, 16), which is essential for assessing trust environments.  Of 
the four most popular state dysfunction indices—each claiming to measure something 
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different—there is a 75 percent overlap of the top 16 most dysfunctional states (Wyler 
2008, 32).  The Brookings Institution “Index of State Weakness” (ISW) (2008) focuses 
more on standard economic measurements of GNI, GDP, inequality, and inflation, while 
the other three share a legitimacy, policy, and poverty focus.  The World Bank’s 
“Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” (HFS) (2016) primarily documents the locations 
of UN has Peacekeeping or Political and Peacebuilding Missions, an indication that the 
state is likely collapsed or failed rather than fragile.  It focuses more on political 
institutions while the other three share a political legitimacy and human rights focus.  The 
Fund for Peace “Fragile States Index” (FSI) (2016) and Systemic Peace “State Fragility 
Index” (SFI) (2015), when measuring social factors, share a focus on spillover effects 
while the other two focus domestically.  Also, the FSI and ISW focus on conflict in their 
security measures while the HFS does not include conflict measures at all.  Alone, these 
indices are less useful for this research, but together, they provide valuable triangulation 
of data sources claiming to measure aspects of state fragility. 
Table 1  
State Dysfunction Indices 
Country 
Fragile States 
Index 2017 
(higher = more 
fragile) 
(N=178) 
Index of 
State 
Weakness 
2008 
(lower = 
weaker) 
(N=141) 
State Fragility 
Index 2016 
(higher = more 
fragile) 
(N=167) 
Global 
Peace 
Index 
2017 
(higher = 
less 
peaceful) 
(N=163) 
Fragile 
Situations 
2017 
(lower = 
more 
fragile) 
(N=35) 
Most 
Dysfunctional 
113.9 
(South Sudan) 
0.52 
(Somalia) 
24 
(Congo, DRC) 
3.814 
(Syria) 
1.11 
(Somalia) 
Ethiopia 101.1 4.46 19 2.477    - 
Nigeria  101.6 4.88 18 2.849    - 
Zimbabwe 101.6 3.44 17 2.352 2.76 
Mali 92.9 5.85 16 2.596 3.53 
Rwanda 90.8 4.68 16 2.227    - 
Table Continued 
Burkina Faso 88.0 5.51 16 2.07    - 
Zambia 87.8 5.23 12 1.786    - 
South Africa 72.3 7.50 8 2.324    - 
Ghana 69.7 6.72 11 1.793    - 
Least 
Dysfunctional 
18.7 
(Finland) 
9.41 
(Slovakia) 
0 
(UK) 
1.111 
(Iceland) 
N/A 
Note: Most recent data from each source is used. 
“Fragile Situations” have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN regional 
peacekeeping or peace-building mission during the preceding three years. 
Sources: The Fund for Peace “Fragile States Index” (FSI) (2017); The Brookings Institute “Index of State Weakness” (2008); The 
Systemic Peace “State Fragility Index” (2016); Institute for Economics & Peace Global Peace Index (2017); World Bank’s 
“Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” (2017) 
Data extracted from sources on 12/02/17. 
 
While fragile states are unstable, they appear to be stably so, with their relative 
FSI index rankings remaining static from 2005 to 2016 (Fund for Peace 2016).  For the 
minority of states that did fluctuate during this period, more decreased in fragility, but 
those that increased in fragility did so more intensely (Fund for Peace 2016).  Zimbabwe 
dropped ten places from 15th to fifth; Pakistan dropped 25 places from 34th to ninth; 
Nepal dropped 15 places from 35th to 20th; and Kenya dropped 12 places from 26th to 
14th, all of which worsened following severe currency, electoral, and security crises.  
Each of these cases also had an endemic structural fragility that allowed a series of agent-
driven economic and political events to plunge them into greater fragility. 
Trust 
How does trust function in these complex environments with chronically fragile 
institutions, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their gap-filling purpose (Plattner and 
Diamond 1994, 3)?  The trust and state literature claim successful societies have 
increasing trust (see Almond and Verba 1963; Arrow 1972; Delhey et al. 2011; Freitag 
and Bühlmann 2009; Gambetta 1988; Herreros 2004; Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002; 
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Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 2002).  However, there are multiple types of trust, and the 
literature disagrees from where they arise and what causes them.  Some in the trust 
literature claim trust is primarily a learned behavior gained through cooperative 
experiences with others (see Delhey and Welzel 2012; Hardin 2002; Seligman 1999; 
Sztompka 1999), rather than an invariable socio-cultural antecedent.  This view of trust 
does not give sufficient weight to the institutional effects that tacitly shape actor 
behavior, though it does challenge the incorrect assumption that there is little to be done 
to increase generalized trust in fragile states. 
Trust is the confidence a human (truster) has in a physical object, formal or 
informal institution, unobserved force, or another human (trustee) (Hardin 1992, 152).  It 
has an instrumental purpose in all societies, to manage the risk involved with cooperation 
and avoidance (Hardin 1993, 362; Luhmann 1988, 95).  Trusters choose to credit trust to 
trustees because they have a cultural or instrumental interest in continuing the 
relationship (Cook et al. 2005, 5) and deem them worthy based on their public reputation.  
Reputation, however, is more easily monitored within groups than between groups where 
greater information asymmetry makes verification more costly.  Without sufficient 
verification, groups form myths about out-groups that members adopt uncritically (Mealy 
et al. 2015, 394).  While it is possible to credit trust to someone not physically proximate, 
as consumers and voters regularly do, generalized trust is generated most effectively 
through inter-personal interaction (Cook and Hardin 2001, 327; Couch et al. 1996, 305). 
Trust is a relatively stable feature of societies.  The components of trust, 
trustingness of the truster and trustworthiness of the trustee and the structural forces that 
drive them, vary greatly between and within societies at the individual level, however, 
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when aggregated to the group or society, are relatively stable over time.  Individual 
antecedent trustingness is a composite of inborn trustingness disposition and formative 
developmental context.  Poverty and instability are generators of mistrust; the more a 
population perceives valued resources to be scarce, the less trustworthy they perceive 
others to be (Mealy et al. 2015, 414).  From this foundation, individuals rationally 
calculate trust choices, limited by their capacity and available information in specific 
contexts.  Mutual trust reduces uncertainty and ambiguity (McFarlin et al. 1999, 64) and 
“increases efficiency in human interactions” (Buskens and Raub 2002, 168 quoting 
Arrow 1974).  With each mutually-positive self-interest-driven interaction, a truster’s 
trustingness of a trustee’s trustworthiness increases, decreasing transaction costs 
(Helliwell and Putnam 2004, 1442) and increasing positive externalities and the 
probability of future interactions. 
Self-Interest 
The trust literature often misconstrues interests, positions, and motivations.  
Groups avoid interaction unless there is potential to meet an interest that cannot be 
satisfied within the group.  Although Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs requires revision 
(Trigg 2004, 397), it serves as an appropriate rough template to model interest seeking in 
fragile states.  While individuals may experience less self-interested motives (e.g., 
fairness and aversion to inequality) (Chan 2007, 739), more common self-interests 
include: 
• Requirements to sustain life (e.g., air, water, food, health, sex, shelter, and 
security). 
• That which improves life (e.g., freedom, capital, employment, power, and 
services). 
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• That which denotes humanness (e.g., humor, justice, aesthetics, 
spirituality, abstract thought, future planning, and conscience). 
• That which imbues purpose (e.g., identity, love, solidarity, reputation, and 
community. 
 
Humans, being subject to the physiological constraints of thirst, hunger, fear, 
sexual desire, and thermoregulation (Godsil et al. 2003, 34), are first-and-foremost 
motivated by their instincts (Forgas et al. 2005, 2) of pain and punishment avoidance and 
pleasure and reward-seeking followed by the desire for community, belonging, and love.  
However, because humans are complex sentient social actors that are neither perfect nor 
entirely rational homo-economicus, a greater understanding of how different types of 
trust interplay with interests is required (Miller 1999, 1053). 
Contact Hypothesis 
The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves 
common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, 
nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond 
him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people. 
—Simmel and Wolff, The Stranger 
 
Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis claims that interaction between strangers 
reduces prejudice (Mutz 2002, 113).  “Contact, under certain specified conditions, will 
bring about positive attitude changes; the more people learn about each other, the less 
prejudice and the more positive interactions there will be” (Svensson and Brouneus 2013, 
565).  This theory gets it partially right.  Inter-group interaction may lead to either the 
strengthening hostile feelings (Forbes 1997, 203) or the reduction of stereotyping and 
greater tolerance (Mutz 2006, 164).  Interaction, driven by a high tolerance for risk-taking 
and the need for met interests outside of one’s group, can either lead to conflict and 
violence or cooperation and tolerance; avoidance can lead only to myth-based 
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stereotyping of groups based on information asymmetry which results in violent conflict 
when interaction does occur.  The most positive inter-group interaction outcomes occur 
when opposing group members are unaware of the other’s group membership status when 
initiating contact (Pettigrew 1997, 174).  State policies driven by the contact hypothesis 
are likened to prescribed forest management burns, aimed at reducing fuel loads over 
time to decrease the likelihood of uncontrollable fires in the future.  While there may be 
initial tension and conflict by incentivizing or coercing inter-group interaction, done 
correctly, it acts as a pressure valve; applying small periodic doses of conflictual inter-
group interaction to prevent future violence can be a sound strategy. 
Types of Trust 
In-group and generalized trusts are two discrete and separately measurable types 
of social trust present in and essential to all societies.  They have been subject to ongoing 
definitional variance among competing alternatives (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; 
Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999).  In-group trust—that which is credited within groups—is 
contingent on the interest of cultural and ideological solidarity and attraction.  Even when 
a group fails to provide for its members’ instrumental interests, they are likely to continue 
to value in-group relationships as long as their cultural self-interest is met.  Generalized 
trust—that which is credited between groups—is contingent on the interest of mutual 
economic and political benefit (see Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton and Zmerli 
2011; Oskarsson et al. 2009; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
1994).  This dissertation also employs the terms in-group and out-group to distinguish 
between individuals’ self-identified group(s) and all other groups respectively.  The term 
trust level signifies its intensity, while trust radius its outward extension. 
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Table 2  
Types of Social Trust 
Definition Preferred 
Terms 
 Alternate Sources/Terms 
Yamagishi 
and 
Yamagishi 
(1994) 
Putnam 
(1995) 
(2000) 
Knack and 
Keefer 
(1997) 
Uslaner 
(2002) 
Delhey et al. 
(2011) 
Trust in 
own group 
In-group Knowledge-
based 
or 
Particularized 
Bonding 
or 
Thick 
Specific Moralist Derivative 
or 
In-Group 
Trust in 
other 
groups 
Generalized General 
or 
Generalized 
Bridging 
or 
Thin 
Anonymous Strategic Transcendent 
or 
Generalized 
 
Each trust type has a discrete level of intensity and radius of extent, and in-group 
trust level is always more intense than generalized trust level because there are 
limitations to the extent of feelings of solidarity between groups (Arnett 2002, 776) as 
well as the state’s ability to manage pluralism (Yeates 2002, 647).  A society that 
theoretically had a higher generalized than in-group trust level would risk social 
atomization. 
Homogeneous groups have many advantages over heterogeneous groups in that 
their high in-group trust and reciprocity serve to efficiently limit free-riding (Paldam and 
Svendsen 2000, 344) through the mechanism of social sanction (Olson 1965, 62).  As 
well, their greater network solidarity and cohesion provides greater options for collective 
action (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004, 19), particularly when engaging in the market (Ruben 
and Heras 2012, 463).  Increasing in-group trust produces direct positive externalities and 
efficiencies for the involved parties and indirectly for the whole group, but may 
contribute to either negative or positive externalities for other groups.  When groups 
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pursue collective action through seeking “prestige, respect, standing in the community, 
and even the avoidance of social disapproval” (Bratton 1989, 427-8), it regularly results 
in negative externalities for other groups (Olson 1982, 23). 
The trust literature has long agreed that homogeneous environments predict 
trustworthiness and trustingness, but studies often fail to disaggregate in-group, 
generalized, and institutional trusts for analysis.  Every inter-group interaction is 
composed of part in-group, generalized, and institutional trust.  The presence of cultural 
attraction makes principles more willing to forego instrumental interests.  Oppositely, in 
the absence of cultural attraction, generalized trust may increase if principles perceive 
their interaction to be mutually beneficial.  Because institutions make interaction 
possible, principles credit some trust to the institutions managing the interaction; the 
amount depends on how trustworthy the principles perceive the institution to be.  Glaeser 
et al. make claims on the positive correlation between homogeneity and trust, stating, 
“when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise” (Glaeser et al. 
2000, 811). 
…social connection strongly predicts trustworthiness and weakly predicts 
trust.  In particular, national and racial differences between partners 
strongly predict a tendency to cheat one another – Glaeser et al. (2000, 
840) 
 
They claim trusting people are trustworthy people and trusting behavior and 
trustworthiness are stable individual characteristics.  “To determine whether someone is 
trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others” (2000, 840).  The assertion that it is easier to 
credit trust to someone who looks, smells, and sounds like oneself, transfers well from 
this research site, Harvard undergraduate classrooms, to SSA.  The more dissimilar and 
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disconnected individuals and groups are from one another, the less likely they are to give 
the “Other” the initial benefit of the doubt. 
This study provides strong support for the joint use of experiments and surveys in 
the examination of trust as it finds trustworthiness is “strongly predicted by attitudinal 
survey questions about trust” (not trustworthiness), as well as by respondents having 
siblings (2000, 840).  However, experiments are rarely possible in the examination of 
national-level or cross-country political phenomena.  The authors’ claims leave open the 
possibility of some types of homogeneous environments having low generalized trust and 
some heterogeneous environments having highly trusting populations and high 
generalized trust, although highly trustworthy populations are less likely.  This study 
provides support for this dissertation’s examination of how trustingness, generalized 
trust, and even trustworthiness may increase in heterogeneous fragile states, through 
greater inter-group interaction opportunities—by force, but preferably incentive—to meet 
groups’ interests. 
Limitations of In-Group Trust 
Most individuals’ interests are met through their identity group(s) or the state.  
Cultural attraction, driven by “shared norms and values” (Fukuyama 2002, 27), 
solidarity, and community self-interest, serve as a powerful social force drawing similar 
individuals together to meet interests.  Guiding appropriate thought and behavior within 
groups are informal institutional scripts consisting of culturally organized common codes 
(Parsons 1971, 5), which aid individuals in making efficient judgments about others’ 
suitability for meeting their interests (DiMaggio 1992, 125), whether it be marriage, 
business, or friendship.  Within these bounded systems of meaning, values operate rather 
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tacitly, where people are unaware of why they value what they do, “they just ‘know’ or 
‘feel’ how to do the right thing” (Hofstede 2010, 20). 
Goal contagion, the scripted adoption of others’ goals to meet one’s self-interest 
of community, strengthens in-group trust.  Self-interest drives individual behavior, but 
scripts incentivize and reward group members for inferring the goals from other 
members’ actions (Aarts et al. 2004, 23-4), providing an efficient template for 
appropriate ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving in the pursuit of self-interest.  This 
social intercourse and resulting positive recognition results in the spreading and 
strengthening of community self-interest, ideas, and goals.  However, due to information 
asymmetry and capacity limits, group members do not perfectly perceive, evaluate, and 
adopt others’ goals.  Together, cultural attraction and goal contagion ensure in-group trust 
intensity is always stronger than generalized trust (see Brewer 1981; Kramer 1999, 581-
3) and are sufficient to create strong bonds within groups, resulting in a limited form of 
social capital and relatively narrow trust radii (Harrison 1985, 7; Uslaner 2012, 194) 
across society. 
While in-group trust may stimulate social capital between members, for it to 
increase further, positive inter-group interaction is required.  The more different groups 
are, the more they lack cultural attraction, leaving the only drivers of social interaction to 
be non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests or external force.  Groups’ inability or 
unwillingness to meet members’ instrumental interests provides a potential sharing 
context (Boisot 1995, 119) between groups, though this does not guarantee sustained 
cooperation.  Selective incentives, including prestige, respect, financial remuneration 
(Posner 2004, 241), status, social contacts, and access (Clark and Wilson 1961, 172), may 
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serve to motivate collective action and limit free riding within and between groups.  
Public goods theory and critical mass theory may also have utility in explaining 
collective action spurned by self-interest, and physical, technological, and social 
proximity theories may have value in explaining group proximity, which is required for 
inter-group interaction to occur (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1994, 29). 
Social Capital 
Social capital’s generation requires instrumentally intentioned agents to be 
positioned advantageously in networks (Lin 2001, 11).  It is challenging to measure 
directly because its analysis requires measurable trust, reciprocity, networks, and 
institutions (Ostrom 1994, 323-7).  Further, proving causal direction is difficult, which is 
why the trust literature has debated the most appropriate proxy measures for it (see Bauer 
2015, 2; Dasgupta and Serageldin 2001; Portes 2000, 33; Robinson 2002) and treated it 
as both a dependent variable and independent variable.  Past inadequate proxies for social 
trust and social capital have included “ethnic homogeneity, income inequality, or 
religious composition” (Knack 2001, 14). 
Generalized Trust Radius 
Again, the generalized trust radius is the extent that shared co-operative norms 
(Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests 
permeate society.  It represents a societies’ network connectivity between groups.  The 
GTR literature subsequent to the release of the 2011 Delhey et al. (2011) new generalized 
trust measure (see Bauer 2015; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Van der Veld and Saris 2011; van 
Hoorn 2014; Welzel and Delhey 2015) has made improvements to the literature prior to it 
(see Ahn and Esarey 2008; Bankston and Zhou 2002, 285; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter 
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1973; Hardin 1992; Harrison 1985; Realo et al. 2008; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008).  
Delhey and Welzel (2012) extend and refine the Delhey et al. (2011) argument for the use 
of the new trust measure, conducting “the first broadly cross-national study of how 
outgroup-trust is generated relative to ingroup-trust” (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 65).  
They claim generalized trust is conceptually distinct from in-group trust rather than an 
extension of it (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999) and 
ask under what conditions generalized trust emerges independent of in-group trust.  They 
conclude that the Prerequisite version of Alliance Theory, which considers in-group trust 
to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of generalized trust (Delhey and Welzel 
2012, 46), explains the GTR best. 
The trust literature agrees that the widening of the GTR is the foremost 
prerequisite and mechanism for the creation of social capital and the positive externalities 
associated with it, and is, therefore, its most accurate proxy measure (Fukuyama 2002, 
32; Uslaner 2002, 7).  Often, when widening, “the [generalized] radius of trust can be 
thought of as a type of positive externality because it is a benefit that accrues to the group 
[or society] independently of the collective action that the group [or society] formally 
seeks to achieve” (Fukuyama 2001, 13).  However, generalized trust is only “a very 
specific component of social capital” (Hooghe 2007, 711).  What is missing in these 
claims is actor agency through the mechanisms of reputation and interests.  It is more 
accurate to measure the GTR through its structural causes (social network composition, 
security and contract institutions, individualism and collectivism, and inter-state market 
forces) than by its outputs (decreased information asymmetry and increased access to 
physical, human, and social capital) (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et al. 2009, 5). 
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The GTR and social capital are amoral (Foley and Edwards 1997, 671), and the 
crediting of trust to out-groups does not guarantee the trustworthiness of the out-group 
trustee, nor that participants enter into the interaction honestly communicating their 
intentions.  In fragile states, where many interests go unmet, and the state serves as a 
weak intermediary, this is a concern.  “Even if trust improves social and political 
interactions between dissimilar groups, it is not always good or necessary” (Morrone et 
al. 2009, 5).  Inter-group interaction does not guarantee the advancement of the social 
good, as is evidenced in highly interactive fragile conflict-ridden states where increased 
inter-group interaction often produces conflict and violence. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The need for a unified body of theory able to explain trust in fragile states is 
considerable.  Most theories explain typical cases where fragile states produce fragile 
societies (see Caparini 2005; Ikelegbe 2013, 36; Posner 2005, 247) with narrow GTR 
(see Bratton 1989, 428; Kaplan 2008, 4; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner 2004, 246).  
Undeniably, the trust-fragile states literature’s assumption that the GTR cannot be wide 
or widen in collapsed and failed states is sound, although this claim requires extensive 
revision for the theoretically rich conceptual space occupied by fragile states. 
There is predictability within complex systems of interaction.  The joint 
theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism and social capital theory enables 
the construction of an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for explaining how 
institutions embedded in social networks form, constrain behavior, and shape trust 
environments through the GTR in fragile states. 
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Sociological Institutionalism 
The social sciences literature has wavered back and forth and back again from 
classical institutionalism to behaviorism to neo-institutionalism, as to how much 
institutions matter for the production of trust.  Sociological institutionalism explains how 
institutions function through the concepts of institutional isomorphism and institutional 
scripts.  “Sociological institutionalists focus on values and identities, and the ways in 
which these shape actors’ perceptions of their interests” (Bevir 2006, 374).  Institutional 
configurations within states “affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group 
formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising 
of certain political issues (but not others)” (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 489). 
To follow social scripts is to be human.  Institutions govern and shape all social 
interaction through scripted practices that are “embedded in structures of meaning and 
resources” (March and Olsen 2006, 3).  They are also mostly unintentional and enduring, 
providing tacit guidance for appropriate thought and behavior.  Nonetheless, not all rules 
and social conventions are institutions.  Institutions are embedded in the group, 
state/society, and international levels.  Rules that govern one’s self are not institutions 
because institutions are social (Voigt 2013, 8) and rules that govern particular families 
are rarely institutions because institutions have broad reach throughout a group or 
society.   
The literature categorizes institutions as formal and informal based on their legal 
status.  Formal institutions derive from the state in the form of officially sanctioned laws, 
while informal institutions derive from identity groups in the form of longstanding 
cultural preferences.  While formal rules are evident to all, informal “rules may be almost 
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invisible to outsiders” (Ostrom 1998, 208) and taken for granted by insiders.  Informal 
institutions tacitly shape and constrain intra-group expectations, thought, and behavior 
through social pressure, while formal institutions conspicuously shape and constrain 
inter-group expectations, thought, and behavior through coercion and incentive.  In-group 
trust allows groups to forego rigid encoding of institutions, but societies—because they 
are always more heterogeneous than groups—require more formal, clearly defined, and 
inelastic institutions.  Formal and informal institutions may complement, compete, or 
overlap (Jutting et al. 2007, 9; Leftwich and Sen 2010, 17); though in fragile states, they 
are often in conflict.  The enforcement of formal institutions is dependent on the coercive 
ability and perceived legitimacy of the state. 
Competing Non-Institutionalist Theories 
Many competing theories claim to explain why post-colonial states tend to 
transition into fragile “gatekeeper” states (Cooper 2002, 5) with patrimonial, clientelist, 
and rent-seeking political cultures, resulting in institutional instability and weak 
bureaucratic capacity (Lockwood 2005, 776), rather than developmental states.  These are 
categorized as institutional and non-institutional theories for analysis. 
The idea of the resource curse has gained support in the non-institutionalist 
literature for explaining state fragility (see Frankel 2012; Sachs and Warner 1995; 
Venables 2016).  However, “it has significant shortcomings in terms of theory and 
evidence” (Di John 2011, 167) and is not an appropriate theoretical lens for this 
dissertation.  Many states, fragile and not, have abundant natural resources, which 
account for a large percentage of their exports.  The two states with the largest total 
percentage of natural resource rents per GDP are Liberia (46.4 percent) and Kuwait (39.1 
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percent) (World Bank 2015), each having very different contexts and developmental 
outcomes. It is not because economies have sizeable natural resource extraction and 
exportation sectors that they are anti-developmental, as the theory claims; petroleum-
dominated economies are not more prone to state breakdown (Smith 2004, 242). Instead, 
global market volatility (see Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Leong and Mohaddes 2011) affects 
all non-diversified economies, rendering them vulnerable to shocks in the global 
economy.  Weak institutions are unable to weather global economic shocks.  
Brunnschweiler and Butle (2008) claim that weak institutional configurations that cause 
dependence on single export sectors, specifically natural resource extraction and 
exportation, are to blame.  Uneven development, which some claim originates from an 
abundance of natural resources or a natural resource-dominated economy, is instead 
caused primarily by institutional dysfunction.  Uneven growth is disruptive in that it 
increases incidences, intensity, and duration of conflict in the market, state, and civil 
society.  Some in the literature (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Ross 2004) claim uneven growth alone is sufficient to produce state failure. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found in a study of 48 non-renewable 
commodity exporters1 (1970-2014) that unless a state already had stable political 
institutions, its adoption of fiscal rules and savings or stabilization funds did not have a 
significant effect on its ability to withstand market shocks and reduce procyclicality 
(Bova 2016, 4).  When measuring natural resources as per capita, only a dozen of this 
study’s countries qualify as resource-rich, of which only two, Botswana and Equatorial 
                                                 
1 Non-renewable commodity exporters are resource-rich countries with at least 20 percent of total exports being non-renewable 
commodities or making up at least 15 percent of fiscal revenues. 
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Guinea, are in SSA.  For example, Nigeria’s petroleum export sector, valued at USD 28 
billion per annum in 2016, looks less dominant when compared to its population of 177 
million (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 2017).  Another study by 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) claims the resource curse literature suffers from an omitted 
variable curse; states with increasing natural resource reliance do not become more 
authoritarian but rather more democratic and almost twice as many of them become more 
prosperous (e.g., Australia, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago).  Cavalcanti et al. (2011) 
find that as petroleum reserves increase, short-term and long-term income levels increase. 
Several other non-institutional theories deserve mention and critique.  Democratic 
instability (see Karl 2000; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) and democratic transition (see 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996) theories are useful 
for explaining challenges experienced in some types of fragile states, although they are 
limited in their ability to explain variation across all types of non-democratizing states.  
While some argue that global technological and transportation advances have changed 
the nature of warfare, the war-based new war theory (see Duffield 2001; Kaldor 1999) 
has limited explanatory power for states that are not primarily fragile due to conflict, 
violence, and war (e.g., Burkina Faso, Haiti, and Zambia).  Post-colonial states have 
many institutional design flaws with many founded on a system of boundaries with little 
regard for future self-governance (Herbst 2000, 94) or the possible repercussions of 
ethnic and religious compositions.  Even so, dependency theory (see Herbst 2000; 
Nkrumah 1965), closely associated with new war theory, wrongly assumes post-colonial 
Africa is a monolithic body politic of weak cookie cutter states with peripheral 
economies suffering at the hand of core capitalist countries.  Sub-Saharan Africa is not 
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homogeneous nor geo-politically and economically powerless; there are 48 unique states 
with a variety of institutional compositions. 
Competing Institutionalist Theories 
Sociological institutionalism offers a more thorough and credible explanation of 
trust in fragile states than do other institutionalist theories.  It serves as a corrective to 
behaviorism’s overemphasis of individual agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 156; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977, 340) and redresses classical institutionalism’s descriptive 
restrictions and lack of objective analysis of institutional and social interactions.  Where 
historical institutionalism fails to do so, it explains the gap between macro-level events 
and “policy outcomes that are characterized by major breaks and that evolve in a non-
linear fashion” (Uygur and Martinsen 2015, 2).  It provides a more comprehensive 
framework for examining institution-society interactions than rational choice 
institutionalism, which tends to over-aggregate groups for analysis.  Finally, it provides a 
useful framework for weighing the balance between agency and determinism and 
captures the distinctiveness of individual, group, field, society, and institutional 
interactions. 
The normative, descriptive, and prescriptive emphasis of classical institutionalism 
is useful for constructing policy modifications limited to fixed properties of formal 
government institutions (see McCloskey 2016; Rorty 1990; Sen 1986), but as positivism 
and neo-institutionalism have revealed, this is of limited value when not also considering 
individual agency and institutional and social interactions.  For example, in fragile states, 
where there are many institutional dysfunctions, it is critical to understand how informal 
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markets and civil society institutions rise to fill capacity gaps left by the state.  Classical 
institutionalism is unable to provide this analysis. 
Rational choice institutionalism (see Bates et al. 1998; North 1993; Ostrom 1998; 
Weingast 1996) oppositely, overemphasizes the utility maximization and agency of 
individuals, leaving less room for institutional effects on individual and group behavior.  
Instead, much of the capacity of human agents derives from their position in society 
(Mahoney 2001, 142, 215; McAdam et al. 2003, 119, 211).  Individuals and groups 
attempting to behave rationally within the bounds of institutional scripts are more 
predictable in market-dominated environments (Kugler et al. 2012, 25), although the 
more fragile the state is, the less behavior aligns with rational choice assumptions.  
Therefore, rational choice institutionalism is best suited to the limited examination of 
strong market-environments, rather than fragile states. 
Historical institutionalism (see Huntington 1968; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; 
Lieberman 2002; Marcussen 2000; McNamara 1998; Polanyi 1945; Skocpol 1979; 
Steinmo 2008; Thelen 2004) is a comparative case study methodology as much as a 
theory, one that attempts to measure and trace institutional patterns, “big structures, large 
processes, and huge comparisons” (Tilly 1984, 15).  Its assumption of an institutionally 
determined environment based on historical path dependencies greatly discounts 
individual agency.  Historical institutionalists claim, “The ‘path not taken’ or the political 
alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002, 6).  What the historical institutionalist neglects is that institutional 
longevity is dependent on societal legitimacy, which is rooted in script-executing agents 
rather than impersonal historical forces. 
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Institutional Change 
Neo-institutionalism broadly, and sociological institutionalism specifically (see 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Jepperson 2001; March and Olsen 1984; 1989; Meyer et al. 
1997), provides an analytical lens for explaining institutional change in fragile states.  
Formal and informal institutions are conservative in that they encourage the status quo, 
but they are also susceptible to influence and change, albeit it rarely occurs rapidly.  
Formal and informal institutions shape agent choices through the scripting process.  
Historical events, such as revolutions, do not occur spontaneously or in a vacuum, instead 
agents, often acting through groups following scripts, make choices in particular 
institutional environments, which alters future institutional compositions, expanding or 
limiting future agent choices in not wholly predictable ways.  The more culturally-, 
economically-, and politically-embedded institutions become in society, the more 
difficult they are to change because, over time, they become interwoven into a web of 
interdependent and legitimized institutions.  The more developed, modern, and 
heterogeneous society is, the more complex its formal and informal institutional 
configurations tend to be.  In democratic-leaning societies, the presence of many 
competing institutions makes large institutional change in any particular direction 
difficult; however the more that formal and informal institutions overlap, the easier 
change becomes (Piotti et al. 2006, 94).  For example, through the legislative process of 
the state, society may choose to develop a new formal speed limit statute for cultural, 
economic, or political reasons.  However, it is the executive bureaucracy that fine-tunes 
and implements the statute; law enforcement agencies that enforce it; the judiciary that 
interprets it; and society that provides it with continued legitimacy.  Institutions are 
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endogenous and overlapping, so the development of a new speed limit statute likely 
affects other related institutions such as traffic management protocols, automotive safety 
regulations, automotive insurance formulas, automotive industry production, law 
enforcement hiring, and fuel cost. 
The ability to influence institutions takes the form of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization and varies across fragile states.  Individuals, organizations, firms, 
and government agencies with varying capacities and competing and divergent interests, 
leverage their capital resources, in authoritarian and democratic states alike, to sustain, 
transform, or discard existing institutions (Phillips et al. 2004, 657).  Through these 
processes, formal and informal institutions are continually reconstituting, in part, through 
agent inputs (Giddens 1984, 25), although, agent behavior is never entirely predictable 
(Leftwich and Sen 2010, 9).  Deinstitutionalization is the process of purposefully 
weakening institutions and requires greater momentum.  The more isomorphism 
influences an institution and the more cultural legitimacy it has, the more difficult it is to 
deinstitutionalize.  Deinstitutionalization takes hold when dominant groups take for 
granted their advantaged position and fail to sufficiently reproduce and reinforce their 
previously legitimated institutions (Oliver 1992, 564), leading to atrophy and 
vulnerability to change.  Concurrently, subordinate groups work to delegitimize 
prevailing institutions through eroding established laws, cultural practices, and material 
artifacts associated with them.  Through both mechanisms, prevailing institutions erode 
and new institutional forms, incrementally, take their place.  Newly prevailing institutions 
shape the behavior of agents (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 147), and institution-driven 
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actor behavior reinforces these prevailing institutions (see Thornton 2002), and the cycle 
continues. 
Isomorphism 
The isomorphic principle states that despite myriad social configurations 
influenced by economic, political, and cultural inputs, organizational sub-units sharing 
similar environments and having similar goals, converge, adopting similar forms, rather 
than differentiating themselves.  Formal and informal institutions vary in their isomorphic 
properties (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149) with the former being subjected to greater 
isomorphic effects.  Informal institutions driven by ideological and cultural uniformity 
are affected less, especially when the in-group adhering to them meets its members’ 
interests. 
Isomorphism has three sub-types: coercive, normative, and mimetic.  Coercive 
Isomorphism states organizations operating within similar domains will be subject to 
regulatory forces to which they will be compelled to conform (1983, 150).  Normative 
isomorphism states that as the interaction of organizations with similar goals increase, 
expectations for interaction and standards of practice develop, which aligns the internal 
structure and behavior of their similar sub-units.  Mimetic isomorphism states that when 
organizational environments are uncertain, organizations will imitate efficient, effective, 
and legitimate organizations in their respective organizational fields. 
Informal institutions are a powerful secondary influencer of formal institutions in 
fragile states through shaping local response and adherence to them (Jutting et al. 2007, 
7; Migdal 2001, 127, 58).  At the societal level, informal institutions are “collective 
representations” that define desirable types of social systems (Parsons 1971, 9).  
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Societies, through their informal institutions, provide formal institutions meaning and 
legitimacy.  Formal institutions’ long-term viability is dependent on their sensitivity to 
societies’ cultural preferences, moral conceptions, norms, and rules (Scott 1995, 33; 
2001, 48).  The more incongruent isomorphic forces are from a society’s cultural values, 
the less effective and enduring formal institutions will likely be. 
Due to increasing global isomorphism, “social, political, and economic 
institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima 
facie more important to collective life” (March and Olsen 1984, 734), yet, fragile states 
continue to exhibit strong traditional institutions, which the majority of the fragile states 
literature consider detrimental to development (Unsworth 2010, 49).  The historic 
isomorphic transfer of colonial institutions must be considered when examining the 
development of fragile states’ formal institutions, specifically those affecting contract and 
legal systems (La Porta et al. 1998, 1126).  Political modernization, the movement from a 
traditional polity to a modern polity involving the hyper-specialization and 
“differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures 
to perform those functions” (Huntington 1968, 34), has developed unevenly due to 
colonialization and decolonization.  As far as institutional cycles are concerned, 
decolonization did not occur that long ago.  Political modernization can be confusing and 
exhausting to those in traditional societies who are not conditioned to having multiple 
competing identities and role specialization (Breuilly 1994, 415).  Groups once able to 
avoid each other are forced to compete for position, legitimacy, interests, and 
opportunities to influence the institutional structure of the state to serve their interests 
(Mann 1993, 118-9).  When measuring modern formal institutional outcomes in fragile 
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states, it matters whether the colonizing power was British, Portuguese, Spanish, German, 
or Dutch, with British colonies faring better (Landes 1998, 437).  However, the claim that 
colonial legacy is a strong determinant of modern African underdevelopment is unsound 
(Bhattacharyya 2008, 106). 
Social Capital Theory 
Social networks are worthy of examination, in part, because institutions are 
embedded in them, and collective action is generated through them.  Social capital 
accumulation is “a slow, long-term, internal process of gradual accumulation of the 
capacity and the willingness to negotiate, compromise, and shape the political arena” 
(Uvin 1989, 171).  Putnam (1995) claims, “For political stability, for government 
effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important 
than physical or human capital” and Lin (2002, 142) asserts, “concepts of power, 
dependence, solidarity, social contracts, and multilevel systems do not make sense until 
social capital is brought into consideration”.  Also, Collier (2002) and Saegert et al. 
(2002) go so far as to claim that where all other capital is lacking—which is the case in 
most fragile states—social capital becomes a more important currency.  This makes the 
examination of environments where social capital is created vital. 
A widening GTR increases the diversity of the pool of individuals, through which 
social capital may be created and exchanged.  The potential higher quantity and quality of 
social interaction produces the positive externality of expanded social networks, 
providing access to further human and physical capital, the foundation for development 
(Fukuyama 2002, 34; Morrone et al. 2009, 5).  Social capital is somewhat fungible in that 
it may be exchanged for other types of capital and political access and may indirectly 
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benefit participants’ shared social networks through trust by association, though it is not 
entirely transferable between actors. 
 
Empirical Literature 
Fragile states have considerable barriers to widening their GTR.  The primary task 
of this dissertation is to test the independent effects of social network composition on the 
GTR in fragile states.  The majority of the trust literature recognizes the necessary, 
though not sufficient, structural control variables of security and contract institutions, 
individualism, and inter-state market forces, as most effective in shaping environments 
where individuals interact to meet their interests.  These control variables are structural in 
that they are persistent and difficult to change without a great deal of social momentum 
and time.  However, some in the literature (see Welzel and Delhey 2015) curiously move 
away from identifying and explaining the causes of the GTR to hypothesize on the effects 
of the GTR, as if the trust literature has accepted their human empowerment variable as 
the primary, all-encompassing cause of the GTR along with secondary causes of 
associational activities and religious pluralism.  This claim is a premature assumption.  
Delhey and Welzel (2012) downplay the effects of associational activities on the GTR 
and claim religious fractionalization, rather than religious pluralism widens the GTR, 
whereas Welzel and Delhey (2015) reverse this claim.  This internal discourse reveals a 
rush to identify the causes of the GTR so that the trust literature may return to focusing 
on the consequences of the GTR.  Further examination is required to identify under what 
conditions social network composition, state security and contract institutions, 
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individualism, and inter-state market forces affect the GTR before attempting to explain 
its causes. 
It is valuable to identify related cultural, economic, and political background 
factors even though they do not have a sufficient effect on the GTR for inclusion in this 
dissertation.  Delhey et al. (2011) incorporate most of the control variables selected for 
this dissertation as well as find that Protestant societies, economic modernization, 
cognitive mobilization through education and access, social diversity, and quality of 
institutions, affect the GTR in some measurable way.  They claim the causal relationship 
between social heterogeneity and ethnic diversity on generalized trust remains widely 
disputed in the literature (2011, 801).  Background factors related to generalized trust—
though not sufficiently to its radius—include the following: institutional trust (see 
Rothstein and Stolle 2008); satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians (see 
Zmerli and Newton 2008); life satisfaction (see Sønderskov 2010); education (see Huang 
et al. 2011); regime type (see Goldstone et al. 2004, 449); and spillover (see Chauvet et 
al. 2007, 6).  Rotberg (2003) and Dobbins (2007) offer multiple economic and political 
background factors that affect generalized trust in fragile states but may exist at low-
moderate levels without affecting the GTR.  These include state institutions related to 
political participation, social service delivery, infrastructure, economic regulation and 
stability, governance, democratization, and development.  Hall (1966), Hofstede (2001), 
Lingenfelter (2003), Strodtbeck and Kluckhohn (1961), and Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (2011), have developed many competing and overlapping cultural orientation 
continuums of phenomena that affect society broadly but not generalized trust 
sufficiently.  These include goal-relational awareness, spontaneous-strategic interaction, 
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compartmentalized-relativistic ethics, ascribed-achieved prestige, vulnerable-risk-averse, 
nomadism-sedentism, and limited-unlimited good.  Lastly, while inter-state market forces 
affect the GTR in all fragile states, inter-state conflict flows affect it only when security 
institutions are weakened to the point of state failure or collapse. 
Social Network Composition 
The trust literature lacks a social variable that can capture stratification and 
network effects to explain the GTR.  The closest it has come is through the limited 
concepts of social distance, polarization, social segregation, and ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious fractionalization.  A combination of social distance and polarization is the most 
appropriate measure for capturing “the intensity of disagreements across groups” 
(Alesina et al. 2003, 164), however, “whether societal conflict is the result of 
fractionalization or polarization is largely an unresolved question…” (2003, 178).  Social 
segregation “refers to the degree to which the various groups of a population actually 
interact or not, and under what circumstances.  While diversity is a community 
characteristic, segregation is a network characteristic” (Hooghe 2007, 719).  However, 
social segregation has not received much support in the trust literature, which has instead 
focused on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (see Alesina et al. 2003; 
Fearon 2003; Posner 2004; Roeder 2001), favoring the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic 
fractionalization measure as a proxy for social heterogeneity.  Most of the trust literature 
assumes a negative relationship between generalized trust and fractionalization (see 
Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Delhey and Newton 
2005; Hero 2003), while a minority (see Bjørnskov 2008, 271) rightly challenge this in 
particular contexts. 
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Fractionalization is measured by the likelihood that two people chosen at random 
will be from different groups (Posner 2004, 849), whereas “…polarization is typically 
maximized when there are two groups of equal size” (Alesina et al. 2003, 177), 
producing a parity and possibly a bipolar power differential.  All societies have different 
and overlapping ethnic, religious, and linguistic compositions.  “The boundaries around 
and the meanings attached to ethnic groups reflect pure social constructions” (Nagel 
1994, 168) and “ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, 
appearance, ancestry, or regionality” (1994, 152).  There are 7,099 living languages 
(Simons and Fennig 2017), and as of 2003, there were 819 ethnic groups larger than 1 
percent of a given country’s population (Fearon 2003, 36), with thousands more not 
meeting that threshold.  However, few states (e.g., South Korea and Japan) are considered 
nation-states (United Nations 1987) where the nation and state’s boundaries align to form 
a relatively homogenous ethnopolitical community.  The line between fact and fiction 
concerning ethnic groups is often blurred (Davis 1999, 26), making it a difficult concept 
to measure.  Language is often the glue that helps to hold minority ethnic groups together 
amid centrifugal cultural pressure from dominant groups (Luo and Shenkar 2006, 336).  
Linguistic separation creates a space for unity, symbolism, identity formation, and 
exclusion of the “Other.” 
Most fragile states have highly religious populations. Therefore, distinctions 
between religious and secular demarcate an essential division in the trust and fragile 
states literature (An-Na’im 2002, 60).  Olson and Li (2016, 756) and Manglos-Weber 
(2016, 18) claim highly religious and heterogeneous societies produce narrow GTR in 
SSA, while Putnam (2000) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) contend voluntary 
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membership in religious organizations widens the GTR.  However, the majority of this 
research has been conducted in non-fragile states, “where generalized trust tends to be 
higher and active religious membership is less prevalent” than in SSA (Manglos-Weber 
2016, 18).  The convergence of disparate religious groups in fragile state urban centers 
has produced diverse populations but has not guaranteed a more plural-minded citizenry 
(Juergensmeyer 2017, 154).  Without the aid of strong institutions, highly competitive, 
politicized, and polarizing strategies for religious dominance heighten the perceived 
value of shared public space (see Hassner 2009). 
Bjørnskov (2007) introduces the claim that social polarization, income inequality, 
and ethnic fractionalization as measured by Alesina et al. (2003) reduce trust and religion 
and political systems affect the formation of trust, clarifying and improving these 
assertions in Bjørnskov (2008).  The religious composition of a population matters for the 
formation of social trust, with many in the literature claiming high population Catholic- 
and Islamic-majority countries are less trusting (Berggren and Jordahl 2005, 13) (see La 
Porta et al. 1999; Zak and Knack 2001).  Bjørnskov finds that monarchic societies are 
seven percentage points more trusting (2008, 276), while post-communist societies are 
less trusting (2007, 16). 
Bjørnskov claims determinants of social trust fall into two categories: those 
affecting the trust radius and those affecting social polarization (2008, 271).  He also 
agrees with the consensus in the trust literature that fractionalization and social distance 
are the most important determinants of social trust (see Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and 
Newton 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack 2002; Uslaner 2002; Zak and Knack 
2001).  This claim is sound, yet incomplete.  While these concepts intersect with this 
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dissertation’s conception of social network composition, they are not inclusive of it, 
omitting locational distance (physical proximity), technological proximity, social 
proximity, and power differential.  Whereas fractionalization measures various types of 
diversity, social distance measures how different.  He also neglects that a society’s level 
of trustingness and the human desire for reputation and interests affect social trust. 
The trust literature most often proxies fractionalization via income inequality and 
ethnolinguistic diversity, assuming both negatively affect social trust.  While rarely 
actualized in fragile states, highly fractionalized environments have greater potential 
generalized trust than homogenous environments because the likelihood of encountering 
a stranger is greater.  Bjørnskov claims income inequality is the strongest determinant of 
the social trust level (2008, 271).  He also rightly suggests political diversity, through a 
society’s fractionalized weltanschauung (see Rokeach 1960), negatively affects social 
trust, but he mistakenly operationalizes it through measuring which political parties are in 
power.  He correctly recognizes generalized trust and inequality to be stable over time.  
Although he appropriately includes the Kaufmann et al. (2003) Rule of Law variable, he 
does not find it significant.  He recognizes and attempts to address the possibility of 
endogeneity between inequality (Bjørnskov 2007, 16) and education (2007, 7) and 
reverse causation of democracy, rule of law, and education, claiming, “…most of the 
variables proposed in the literature as determinants of such trust are either spuriously 
related to trust or more likely caused by trust” (2007, 15).  He also claims democracy, the 
rule of law, and education are results of generalized trust, not its cause (2007, 16).  While 
he concedes that a minimal level of education and the rule of law are required for 
generalized trust to exist (2007, 17), he does not find education to be significant.  He 
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agrees with Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2002), “that trust is created in the 
educational system by making individuals better informed and better at interpreting 
perceived information” (2007, 7). 
Delhey and Welzel (2012) counter to the majority of the trust literature, claim 
inequality and ethnic fractionalization do not affect the GTR, and that religious 
fractionalization widens it, in agreement with Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis.  In this 
view, since a primary byproduct of modernity is broader circles of cooperation (see Blau 
1977; Coser 1975; Granovetter 1973; Simmel 1984 [1908]), “dissimilar others are viewed 
as a potential source of mutual benefit” (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 51).  They claim the 
“literature over-estimates the role of voluntary associations and underestimates that of 
human empowerment and open-access activities in the generalization of trust” (2012, 65).  
They appear justified in downplaying the effects of associational activity since groups 
associate for purposes that may decrease generalized trust (e.g., terrorism) as well as 
increase it (e.g., inter-faith dialogue).  Their argument for the positive effects of human 
empowerment on the GTR is interesting but only moderately convincing.  They overstate 
their claim that religious fractionalization widens the GTR, though it does have the 
potential to do so under specific favorable conditions. 
Fractionalization measures explain the content of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
group identity, but provide an incomplete explanation of a society’s social network 
composition and its effect on the GTR.  To advance the trust and fragile states literature, 
this dissertation supplements fractionalization with measures of proximity, which defines 
the physical, technological, and social distance between groups; and power differential, 
which defines the fractionalization of power in society and groups’ relative access to 
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power and resources.  There has been little quantitative discourse on physical, 
technological, and social proximity and power differential individually and none 
comprehensively interacting with all of these concepts, leaving a gap in the literature.  
Thus, the unique contribution of this dissertation is to join these concepts together into a 
single test variable for explaining the social effect on the GTR.  
State Institutions 
The state is a “spatially defined territory under a single political authority which 
claims the compliance of its citizens for its laws up to the extent of its sovereign 
boundaries” (Kingsbury 2007, 58).  Weak political institutions are the central driver of 
state fragility (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 7) and low institutional trust.  
Generalized trust differs from institutional trust in that, people, not institutions, are the 
source of trust.  A society’s confidence in institutions is not affected by its generalized 
trust radius (Delhey et al. 2011, 798), demonstrating that institutional trust is a separately 
measurable phenomenon.  Although, oppositely, increasing state security and contract 
institutions widens the GTR in fragile states.  When security and contract institutions 
perform below a certain level, the GTR cannot widen, regardless of how positive social 
network composition, individualism, and inter-state market forces may be.  Rotberg’s 
(2003, 3) nine-part hierarchy of positive state functions and Dobbins’ (2007, xxiii) six-
part nation-building process, rightly elevate the socially legitimated provision of the 
public goods of security and enforcement of laws as its principal mandate (Caparini 2005, 
73).  When a critical mass of society does not consider its state to enforce institutions 
flexibly and fairly, providing it with clear expectations for appropriate behavior, then the 
state’s sovereignty may be at risk (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 210; Rosenblum and 
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Post 2001, 12).  Minimally functional security institutions (e.g., police, portions of the 
military, bureaucratic agencies, and the courts) and contract institutions (e.g., 
bureaucratic agencies and the courts)—products of the executive and judicial branches of 
government—can alleviate most problems inherent in governance related to the GTR. 
Welzel and Delhey (2015) initially support the inclusion of state institutions 
variables in agreement with the majority of the trust literature, but then claim, security, 
institutions, social separations, and cultural legacies each become insignificant when 
controlling for their human empowerment variable (2015, 893).  They agree with Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002) and Axelrod (1986) that when there is a stable order, rule of law, 
and low corruption, social interactions become more predictable and agreements reliable.  
However, they claim all of these benefits are accomplished through human empowerment 
rather than state institutions, leaving only associational activities and religious pluralism 
as separately significant variables in their regressions.  They do not recognize that the 
rule of law, one factor rendered insignificant in their regressions, may widen the circle of 
generalized trust because enforcement of contracts reduces the risk of cooperation 
(Nguyen and Rose 2009, 166). 
Security Institutions 
If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all. 
—Bernard Brodie, National Security Policy and Economic Stability 
 
National security is an often misunderstood and misused social science concept 
(Baldwin 1997, 26).  Various overly parsimonious definitions of security have been 
proposed such as “the absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers 1949, 485) or 
updated to “a low probability of damage to acquired values” (Baldwin 1997, 13).  A 
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minimally secure environment is one where the state has “effective control over its 
territory” (Di John 2010, 10) and has a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (Weber 2015, 136). 
A fully developed definition of security must consider security for whom, from 
what threats, protecting which values, by what means, and at what cost (Baldwin 1997, 
23) and must be defined in reference to what it is not: insecurity.  Since insecurity 
emerges from inter-state (see Gleditsch et al. 2002; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010) and intra-state (see Salehyan et al. 2012) sources, this dissertation’s state 
security institutions variable measures fragile states’ effectiveness in managing both in 
regards to their effects on the GTR.  Intra-state insecurity: civil war, military coup, 
revolution, armed conflict, social conflict and even environmental stress and human 
rights abuses, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving two or 
more domestic groups, one of which may be the state.  Intra-state conflict is increasing 
globally, particularly social conflict (Salehyan et al. 2012), while inter-state conflict is 
decreasing (Lacina et al. 2006, 674).  Inter-state insecurity: inter-state war, militarized 
interstate disputes (MID), territorial dispute, conflict spillover, and cross-border 
terrorism, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving the state and 
at least one other state or non-state actor.  Because inter-state insecurity is external to the 
state and society, its sources must first circumvent or pass through a state’s security 
institutions before affecting society and its GTR.  Therefore, security institutions serve as 
an intervening variable for inter-state sources of insecurity, while intra-state sources of 
insecurity are outcomes of the independent variables, rather than their causes. 
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Security must be measurable to know if it, or how much of it, has been achieved.  
Fragile states’ security institutions vary in their effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy 
of means used for providing a minimally secure environment.  For states to have 
legitimacy, they must be the responsible entity providing the secure environment rather 
than an occupying or intervening inter-state military force such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), or United Nations (UN) 
Peacekeeping Operation or Mission.  Security is measurable as a dichotomous, ordinal, or 
continuous variable.  However, because states have multiple security objectives, it is 
most profitable to analyze it as an ordinal or continuous variable where societies may be 
more or less secure in specific areas of concern along a continuum. 
While “absolute security is unattainable” (Baldwin 1997, 15) in any state, the 
state-provided establishment of a minimally secure environment is the most important 
factor affecting inter-group interaction and the widening of the GTR.  “The literature 
reflects this position.  Again and again, authors stress that a functioning state that 
provides basic public order and security is a prerequisite for the existence of civil 
society” (Posner 2003, 247).  Security institutions act as an intervening variable upon 
which all other social goods are dependent (Dobbins 2007, xxiv); without a minimum 
level of security, little else is possible in society.  At the same time, security is “one of 
many policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of 
diminishing returns” (Baldwin 1997, 19).  Regarding all institutions, “…up to a certain 
level, the strength of a rule might have positive returns, but once past that level, the 
returns may be marginal or even negative” (Voigt 2013, 11).  Spending resources on 
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security far beyond what is required to meet security goals, limits resources available for 
other social goods. 
Contract Institutions 
Once the prerequisite of a minimally secure environment is established, 
minimally encoded and enforced contract institutions that govern access and rights, 
especially to land and zoning, are required for a wide GTR (Knack 2001, 1).  Regarding 
contract institutions, “in many African countries, fundamentals of constitutional order 
and state character are at stake” (Boone 2007, 558).  Contracts are agreements between 
individuals for managing interests including universal requirements for sustaining human 
life and security for pursuing the instrumental intentions (Lin 2002, 58) of wealth, power, 
reputation, and solidarity.  They may take the form of formal regulations, such as zoning 
for low-income housing, marriage licensing, and business incorporation or informal 
norms regulating community expectations on the treatment of the poor, appropriate bride 
prices and dowries, and who has authority to speak on behalf of the group.  Contract 
enforcement constitutes the foundation of the rule of law (Kaufmann et al. 2009, 4). 
Merely being labeled democratic does not attract foreign investment, increase economic 
output, prevent military rule, or stop corruption (Schedler et al. 1999, 2), but 
strengthening the rule of law (de Mesquita and Root 2000, 230) by increasing horizontal 
accountability between institutions, signals to the global community a state’s readiness 
for increased responsibility (Schedler et al. 1999, 3). 
Global isomorphism shapes the structure of fragile states’ contract institutions, 
which tend to persist even when unproductive or a poor fit with the culture and informal 
institutions.  Increasing global communications and trade increases the isomorphic 
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transmission of institutional regimes from non-fragile to fragile states.  However, because 
these institutions are largely disconnected from—rather than an outgrowth of—
indigenous norms, they rarely embed deeply into or adhere strongly to society. 
Contract institutions are effective to the degree that “agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts” (Kaufmann et al. (2007: 4).  Fragile political 
institutions that produce insecure property rights and capriciously enforce the rule of law, 
increase transaction costs and information asymmetry (Bates 2006, 715; Gwenhamo 
2012, 593).  Functional contract institutions embody legal sanctions that reduce 
“incentives to cheat, thereby enhancing trust that agreements will be faithfully executed 
by both parties” (Knack 2001, 8).  When contract institutions are unclearly encoded, 
chronically unenforced, or unevenly and unfairly applied, society’s expectations go 
unmet, which incentivizes lawbreaking through vigilantism, corruption, and black 
markets, all of which narrow the GTR.  Professional and trade associations that crosscut 
groups may institutionalize commonly held ethical codes and standards, which can serve 
to widen the GTR and reduce transaction costs by efficiently communicating information 
about the identity of cheaters (Bernstein 1992, 138). 
A primary function of the state is to serve as an efficient and neutral contract 
enacting and enforcing agent between self-interested principles.  The principle-agent 
relationship influences inter-group interaction through defining legal responsibilities and 
privileges of principles and agents over resources in society.  Functional contract 
institutions mitigate the harm principle by providing a limited but common language for 
interaction between groups that reside in disconnected networks and may have little in 
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common.  They also encode for society who may own what (real property and tangible 
and intangible personal property) and its legal uses.  Properly functioning property rights 
provide owners the right to possess, use, manage, and transmit their land; provide access 
to capital and security; and protect from state confiscation (Honoré 1961).  In their 
absence, investments in human and physical capital are often wasted (Gwenhamo et al. 
2012, 594).  When contract institutions function optimally, the state can force—or 
preferably, incentivize—inter-group interaction by reducing the negative externalities of 
cost, effort (Hart and Moore 1988, 755), moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979, 74), and 
adverse selection (Laffont and Martimort 2002) related to the principle-agent 
relationship. 
Fragile and non-fragile states alike face contracting challenges, and the more 
heterogeneous they are, the more complex.  For example, how does the Canadian 
government reconcile its Sikh community’s religious duty to wear the Dastar headdress 
with legal statutes and industry requirements regulating safety headgear?  Should it be 
illegal for Sikhs to ride motorcycles without helmets or work on construction sites or 
should accommodations be made for their religious convictions?  In another example, the 
Israeli government has had the complicated task of weighing, not just domestic, but also 
international, claims by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim principles, to access the Temple 
Mount, also known as Haram esh-Sharif to Muslims.  Non-fungible contested sacred 
space such as this produces indivisible interests and extreme positioning, where parties 
believe there is no substitution or economic or political side payments possible to offset 
their potential loss (Hassner 2003, 12-3).  In a final example, how should the Nigerian 
government weigh the competing claims over access to petroleum revenues?  Should 
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priority be given to indigenous ethnic groups with historical claims to the producing 
lands which are also suffering the majority of the related environmental degradation or 
should the revenue be distributed differently throughout Nigerian states? 
The cases of principle-agent interactions and possible solutions are numerous.  
Fragile states face unique challenges in establishing and maintaining contract institutions 
and the rule of law.  Because desired resources are scarcer in fragile states and the state’s 
capacity to serve as an agent is limited, negative contracting externalities regularly 
produce unequal and unexpected contract outcomes.  In this context, principles become 
more risk-averse, and agents become more concerned with maintaining their power and 
legitimacy.  In this environment, a moral hazard may occur when one party to a contract 
increases its risk, resulting in another party bearing it (Holmstrom 1979, 74).  Adverse 
selection may occur when unmonitored agents—whose interests deviate from the 
principles’—provide asymmetrical information or establish bureaucratic hoops to favor 
the state, oneself, or one principle over another (Laffont and Martimort 2002, 29, 33).  To 
decrease the adverse selection problem, fragile states may, but rarely do successfully, 
introduce competition among government agencies, incentivizing them to differentiate 
themselves from competing agencies when seeking desirable contracts through signaling 
their comparative legitimacy (see Spence 1973).  First-, second-, and third-party contract 
enforcement mechanisms are present in heterogeneous fragile states, although first-party 
mechanisms of cultural pressure are strongest; second-party mechanisms of multiple 
contracts between groups are rare and weakly enforced, and third-party institutions are 
enforced unevenly.  This combination of factors usually produces weak contract 
institutions where principles unknowingly agree to inequitable terms because the state 
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either fails to fulfill its agentic duties or it takes advantage of its agentic position, both of 
which breaks down society’s confidence in its contract institutions. 
Individualism 
Culture, driven by ethical habit, changes more slowly than ideas (Fukuyama 1995, 
40) and much slower than political and economic processes.  Rapid political and 
economic upheaval does not often quickly change durable cultural values of a group or 
society.  Culture is the product of groups’ rationality.  Individualism encourages all 
individuals to exercise their rationality while collectivism specifies bounds of agency to 
predefined roles within groups.  Culture is the outworking of personal values held by a 
community and is primarily the mechanism through which cues for meaningful action are 
transmitted (Eriksen 1991, 142).  It provides group members with answers—right or 
wrong, practical or not—to fundamental questions about the nature of the human 
condition (see Shweder 1991) and scripts proper protocols for seeking interests. 
We are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish 
ourselves through culture…Becoming human is becoming individual, and 
we become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically 
created systems of meaning. – Geertz (2000, 12, 13) 
 
The culture literature better explains collectivism than individualism, in part, 
because collectivist cultures, those that are composed of more tribal2 and insular groups, 
have been around longer to examine.  As well, due to rapid modernization, 
anthropologists have dedicated much of the 20th century to the focused examination of 
collectivist cultures.  The cultural psychology literature has advanced the measurement of 
                                                 
2 The terms “tribal” and “tribalism” have been discarded by the social anthropology sub-discipline and replaced with “ethnic group” 
(see Ekeh 1990: 660-1). 
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individualism and collectivism; however, there is debate whether they are equally 
opposite phenomena on a continuum (Fiske 2002, 87).  Individualistic and collectivistic 
behavior at the individual level is context dependent, but in aggregate, a culture is 
consistently more one than the other.  There are also varieties of individualism and 
collectivism.  The Libertarian impulse is wholly different from that of hermitism or urban 
isolationism (Douglas 1978, 41), and Familism and institutional collectivism vary on the 
unit of analysis to which one is behaving collectively.  Nevertheless, individualism and 
collectivism are the best measures the literature has produced of the tendency of cultures 
in aggregate towards prioritizing in-group interests over those of individuals. 
Individualism and collectivism are relatively stable cultural preferences that affect 
trust.  Trustworthiness and trustingness are separate phenomena.  Regardless how 
trustworthy a group or society is in aggregate, its level of trustingness remains relatively 
stable (Delhey and Newton 2004, 3; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 255).  This is due mainly 
to the stability of its position along the individualism-collectivism continuum (see 
Fukuyama 1995; Hofstede 1992; Realo et al. 2008; Triandis 2005; van Hoorn 2015; 
Yamagishi et al. 1998). 
Globalization, through the isomorphic mechanism, is spreading and increasing the 
cultural value of individualism (Welzel 2010, 152-3), although, fragile states remain 
relatively collectivist.  Collectivism promotes bonding within groups and draws a 
relatively narrow boundary around those who are deemed desirable to meet one’s 
interests, producing higher in-group trust levels and narrower GTR.  Oppositely, 
individualism promotes bridging between groups and encourages looking beyond one’s 
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family and group to meet one’s interests, producing lower in-group trust levels and a 
wider GTR (van Hoorn 2015, 270) in fragile states. 
Globalization is pushing collectivist societies towards individualism, yet “in 
fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western” (Huntington 
1996, 78).  Some key influencers of this trend are participation in the global market, 
formal education, and urbanization.  The trust literature recognizes individualism’s effect 
on the GTR, even though much of the social sciences avoids cultural factors for more 
parsimonious economic and political explanations (see Hirshleifer 1985; Lazear 2000).  
This is understandable since “the same cultural attribute can have vastly different 
implications for economic progress in different societies or even in the same society at 
different times” (Porter 2000, 15), leaving researchers asking if it is even possible to 
compare cultural factors across countries. 
Individualistic and collectivistic behavior may be context-dependent (Realo and 
Allik 2008, 449) as individuals differ in how they perceive themselves, relate to in- and 
out-groups, pursue goals, and interests driving their behavior (Triandis 1995, xiv).  
Collectivists tend to “attribute events to external causes” (Carpenter 2000, 42) and have 
low perceived agency, relying on in-group inputs to assess appropriate behavior 
(Oettingen 1995, 153; Triandis et al. 1993, 410).  The more one is proximate to culturally 
similar people, the more collectivist one’s behavior tends to be, while the more one 
interacts positively with strangers, the more one will tend to behave individualistically 
because the collectivistic impulse is absent between those members of society. 
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Inter-State Market Forces 
The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates 
into every crevice and cranny of human life:  the economical is perhaps 
the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable. 
—John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 
 
Inter-state market forces permeate increasingly porous modern states, affecting 
generalized trust in fragile and non-fragile states alike.  International political and 
economic governing bodies such as the UN, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and 
the IMF, along with multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, will 
continue to affect the domestic affairs of states.  Fragile states are more sensitive to 
external shocks, making them more susceptible to external control.  They repel the GTR-
widening market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI and attract the GTR-narrowing market 
forces of remittances, military aid, and non-military aid.  They can survive but not thrive, 
with minimally functional economic institutions.  Nonetheless, the GTR can widen in 
some fragile states with the right SNC configuration even if each control variable is 
having a narrowing effect on the GTR. 
Globalization has been a mixed blessing for fragile states; it has enhanced the 
individual citizen’s absolute, and sometimes relative, access to resources, while at the 
same time diminishing the state’s sovereignty.  Sub-Saharan Africa’s globalization 
experience has been substantially different from that of the West.  It does not have the 
benefit of industrial and technological advancement built on 400 years of Enlightenment 
reasoning; rather it has borrowed models of  “Cold War politics and Keynesian-style 
economics” (Moore 2001, 910) that are overlaid onto a collectivist foundation. 
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Those groups less able to meet their members’ instrumental interests are affected 
most by globalization, while dominant groups have greater access to market resources 
through connections to government power.  Potential gains from globalization require 
domestic adjustments of social values and practices (Chan 2007, 751), and skillful 
calculated risk-taking.  Low-income fragile states are at a disadvantage and necessarily 
take on more risk than middle- and high-income states, though they are usually not as 
calculated.  Neo-capital theories that appreciate the importance of culture on 
globalization, rightly “stress the interplay of individual actions and structural positions in 
the capitalization process” (Lin 2002, 18). 
External actors who choose to engage in fragile state markets expect a positive 
return on investment.  Trade partners expect better terms of trade and consistent access to 
quality products; investors expect to increase their capital; remitters expect increased 
quality of life for their in-country friends and family; non-military donors expect 
influence in shaping policy in the receiving state; and military donors expect the 
protection of their military, economic, and political interests in the region.  How fragile 
states interact with these actors as competitors or collaborators, determines differentiated 
group access to capital, which affects the GTR. 
Together, trade, FDI, and FPI proxies a state’s connection to the global market.  
Trade indicates what productive capabilities a state owns; FDI and FPI reflect the global 
market’s opinion of a state’s potential.  However, official trade data is unable to capture 
unrecorded capital flight and illicit financial flows, in the form of trade misinvoicing and 
same invoice faking because illegal activity is more difficult to track and measure in 
fragile states.  Trade affects the GTR by spreading values that are economically 
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beneficial (Bhagwati 2004; Serionne 1766, 384).  Relatively equal distribution of 
globalization gains across a society, increase social stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 
1996, 62), and generally widens the GTR.  Oppositely, if social inequality rises above a 
certain level, trade, along with all other market forces, will narrow the GTR (Chan 2007, 
738; Polanyi 1945, 163; Rodrik 1997, 20-1). 
Trade requires fragile states have something the market values; however, it does 
not have to be raw material, physical or financial products or services.  Trade partners 
often find related value in human and social capital or in establishing trade partnerships 
for political or competitive advantage.  The decentralization of global value chains has 
provided opportunities for fragile states to engage the global market through labor and 
trade.  States that do not have balanced trade, beneficial terms of trade, the ability to tax 
trade, or diversified exports are more susceptible to market volatility, global economic 
crises, and uneven economic development.  Institutional gaps in these areas are 
detrimental to exports (Mold and Prizzon 2010). 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) increase 
productivity and growth (Havranek and Irsova 2011, 21), but global market isomorphism 
determines that they flow primarily between high-income countries.  Foreign investors 
guided by global economic institutions are loath to risk capital in fragile states if the 
return on investment is not high and sure (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2013, 69) and if strong security and contract institutions do not exist to 
protect their investment.  Therefore, because investors are hesitant to engage in fragile 
states, FDI and FPI do not have the opportunity to affect the GTR as much as does trade.  
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In practice, they add additional growth to already strong economies, rather than sparking 
growth in fragile economies. 
Remittances are a critical lifeline in collapsed and failed states where basic needs 
regularly go unmet.  While they also reduce development volatility in fragile states for 
some, they also reduce potential inter-group interaction.  When receiving groups have 
their needs met externally by their diaspora, they may forego inter-group interaction, 
inhibiting the potential widening (or narrowing) of the GTR.  Globally, trackable formal 
remittances received are more than double that of official development assistance (ODA) 
(World Bank 2011), only second to FDI (Zanamwe and Devillard 2009, 73).  However, 
remittances are primarily sent through informal channels (2009, 73), making reporting of 
total amounts difficult.  The better educated and wealthiest of fragile state citizens often 
seek better opportunities in higher GDP countries where they form a diaspora from which 
they transfer currency to their home country friends and family.  Because of this, 
remittances are not spread equitably throughout the receiving population.  Remittance 
sending is a collectivist behavior driven by the remitter’s desire to strengthen in-group 
bonds by investing in and increasing the absolute and relative (financial, physical, 
human, and social) capitals and well-being of non-proximate culturally similar people.  
Oppositely, FDI investing is an individualist behavior driven by the desire to receive a 
financial return and increase one’s well-being.  “Remittances are not profit-driven, but 
are compensatory transfers” Chami et al. 2005, 55).  Dependence on remittances may 
reduce recipient motivation to participate in wage labor, and where remittances are 
highest, they may disrupt the economy through increased inflation (Zanamwe and 
Devillard 2009, 73). 
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The more extensive a diaspora, the more remittance inflows are likely to increase.  
Remittance flows indicate the stability and growth of the sending country’s economy and 
volatility and decline of the receiver’s.  Because they are countercyclical, relatively stable 
(Frankel 2009, 5), and usually flow from high to low GDP economies, it is not surprising 
that “there is a robust negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth” (Chami 
et al. 2005, 55).  High remittance flows lull receiving governments into a false sense of 
security, relying on them to buffer external economic shocks (Ratha 2005, 168) without 
prompting them to improve their services (Ebeke 2011, 90).  “When remittances exceed 
6% of GDP, they fully absorb the positive effect of trade openness on government 
consumption” (2011, 110).  Further, if remittances reduce the recipient’s labor supply or 
labor market participation, they have not only a negative correlation with GDP growth 
but also a direct adverse effect (Chami et al. 2005, 77). 
Most developed countries had the time and space to build up their economies 
while protecting critical industries until they were globally competitive (Stiglitz 2003, 
16).  This has not been the case for most fragile states, which have been subject to 
premature capital market without adequate social safety nets, resulting in reversed 
stability, poor terms of trade, and reliance on bilateral, multilateral, tied, project, and 
military aid. 
High-income states disburse military and non-military aid to high conflict fragile 
states in strategic regions to protect their economic and geopolitical interests.  Since the 
end of the Cold War, most military aid has originated from the United States with the 
purpose of protecting its economic and political interests in fragile states and strategic 
regions (e.g., Israel).  Non-military aid in the form of grants, low-interest loans, aid for 
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trade, and debt forgiveness has two purposes, to ensure a compliant government and 
protect neighboring countries from potential spillover, which can disrupt global markets 
if in a strategic region.  However, humanitarian disasters occurring in non-strategic 
regions are often left to fester longer (e.g., Rwandan genocide). 
When fragile states’ primary connection to the global economy is through aid, 
global politics gains greater influence over domestic politics (Beck 2006, 249), 
potentially weakening their already fragile sovereignty.  Aid is often inconsistent from 
year-to-year as donor states reallocate funds as their interests change.  This inconsistency, 
resulting in neoliberal shock therapy in receiving countries, may unevenly distribute aid, 
increasing domestic inequality.  This trend was evident in the 2000s, where every fragile 
state experienced at least one aid shock (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2013, 62).  As with remittances, when group interests are met through 
external aid, incentives for inter-group interaction decrease, inhibiting the potential 
widening (or narrowing) of the GTR.  As well, “…the empirical evidence suggests that 
civil society groups sponsored by resources from outside the community tend to be 
unreliable vehicles for generating trust among their members” (Posner 2003, 244).  
Beyond a point, as state conditions improve, there are diminishing returns and eventually 
negative returns on aid.  Fifty years and 2.3 trillion dollars of aid later, the literature is 
unsure of aid’s positive effect (Easterly 2006, 4). 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
Fragile states have not been high on the trust literature’s research agenda.  Delhey 
et al. (2011) have dislodged this literature from a decade of relative dormancy through 
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the development of the more accurate and theoretically sound transcendent out-group 
measurement of the GTR, which has made available new research opportunities.  This 
dissertation continues their momentum by presenting a new sociological institutionalism-
social capital theory theoretical framework and model for explaining variation, patterns, 
and limitations of the GTR in different types of fragile states.  While the statist variables 
(security and contract institutions) are essential for the explanation of the GTR, 
individualism and inter-state market forces, deserve increased attention and social 
network composition warrants inclusion.  This gap in knowledge is filled through 
challenging existing theoretical assumptions about the function of the GTR in fragile 
states, developing the trust differential measure, and constructing the SNC, a causal 
variable the literature has incompletely formed thus far, leaving it susceptible to omitted 
variable bias.  This framework differentiates between institutional rules, norms, scripts, 
and isomorphism associated with fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials 
and their effects on reciprocity and transitivity within and between group networks to 
produce variation in the GTR. 
Table 3  
Contribution to the Department Variable Literature 
Trust 
Conceptual Development 
Hardin (1992) 
Fukuyama (2001) 
In-Group Trust Generalized Trust 
Measurement 
Welzel and Delhey (2011) 
Institutional 
Trust 
Level Radius Level Radius Level Radius 
 Explaining the Effects on 
the Generalized Trust 
Radius 
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Table 4  
Contribution to the Theoretical Framework Literature 
Theoretical Framework 
Institutionalism Social Capital 
Theory 
Classical 
Sen (1986) 
Rorty (1990) 
Historical 
Skocpol (1995) 
Thelen (1999) 
Rational Choice 
North (1990) 
Ostrom (2003) 
Sociological 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
March & Olsen (1984) 
 
Social Capital-
Networks 
Granovetter (1973) 
Putnam (1995) 
Fukuyama (1999) 
Lin (2001) 
 Development of a Joint Theoretical Framework 
 
Table 5  
Contribution to the Independent Variable Literature 
Test Variable 
Social Network Composition (Caito 2018) 
Fractionalization 
Roeder (2001) 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Fearon (2003) 
Posner (2004) 
Proximity 
Collier (1998) 
Diamond (2000) 
Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman (1994) 
Power Differential 
Lijphart (1969) 
Horowitz (1985) 
Ethnic 
 
Linguistic 
 
Religious 
 
Physical Technological Unipolar Bipolar Multipolar 
Social 
Explaining the Full Social Effect on the Generalized Trust Radius 
 
This chapter synthesizes the trust, fragile states, institutionalism, and social 
capital theory literature, explaining how they have thus far viewed, defined, and 
categorized state fragility and the GTR.  It assesses the claims of rival theoretical 
frameworks, methodologies, and variables for modeling trust in fragile states.  The 
subsequent Methodology Chapter constructs the most suitable methodology and model 
based on the foundational literature presented here. 
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CHAPTER III  - METHODOLOGY 
Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same 
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as 
fast as that! 
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
 
It is time for the trust literature to turn its focus towards the examination of the 
generalized trust radius (GTR) in fragile sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) states.  Fragile states 
(e.g., Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are more productively 
examined separately from non-fragile (e.g., Botswana), failed (e.g., Chad), and collapsed 
(e.g., Somalia) states, as their institutional, cultural, market and social environments 
differ greatly. 
This dissertation demonstrates how it is possible for trust to increase between 
strangers in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state 
institutions and unstable inter-state market forces.  An enhanced theoretically 
generalizable model founded on sociological institutionalism and social capital theory 
provides explanatory power through testing of the new social network composition 
variable. 
The four related research questions of interest are as follows: 
1. How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in 
fragile states?  
2. How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?  
3. How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?  
4. How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile 
states?  
 
The hypotheses for each research question are as follows: 
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the 
generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
 75 
H2:  Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust 
radius in fragile states. 
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile 
states. 
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the 
generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
 
The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows: 
• Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius] 
• Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization], 
[Proximity], and [Power Differential] 
• Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions] 
• Control Variable: Culture [Individualism] 
• Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI], 
[Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid] 
 
The balance of this chapter provides a rationale for the selected mixed 
methodological framework, which includes deviant, least likely case selection, most 
similar multiple comparative case analysis, control, test, and dependent variables, 
boundary specification, and data selection. 
Research Design 
Method Selection 
This dissertation does not claim to resolve the ongoing probabilistic-deterministic 
methodology debate in the social sciences sparked by King et al. (1994).  The subsequent 
works of Beach and Pederson (2016), Bennett and Checkel (2014), Collier (2011), 
Fairfield (2015), Goertz and Mahoney (2012), Goertz (2017), Ragin (2013), and 
Seawright (2016) provide an extension of this debate and inform the methodological 
choices for this dissertation. 
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The broader a theory’s domain is the less detailed analysis of it is possible 
(Keohane 1986, 188).  This research advances the trust and fragile states literature 
through middle-range theorizing, which is recognized as the most fruitful approach for 
theory, methods, and policy development (see Boynton 1982, 29-68; Jentleson 2000, 
133-135; Ragin 1992; 2000).  The mixed methods literature has wrestled over when a 
probabilistic or deterministic methodology is most appropriate.  Many social phenomena 
are only measurable in probabilistic terms due to the difficulty of directly observing their 
outcomes (Lieberson 2000, 209-10).  This is not a concern for the analysis of the GTR 
and its causes as fractionalization, proximity, power differential, security and contract 
institutions, individualism and collectivism, trade, investment, remittances, and aid are 
each observable and measurable.  When making claims on human populations, “law-like 
generalizations” (Gomm et al. 2000, 98) are rarely possible; when phenomena are rare, as 
wide GTR is in fragile states, the sample of available cases is reduced, making 
probabilistic generalization less likely.  The “danger of error in drawing general 
conclusions [to populations] from a small number of cases must not be underestimated” 
(2000, 98).  Further limiting the number of cases is a requirement of the dependent 
variable.  Accurate analysis of generalized trust requires that populations interpret the 
concept of trust similarly, limiting this research to a single socio-culturally similar region; 
a regional study of SSA retains the highest number of potential country-level 
observations.  The most suitable research design within these constraints is to infer 
deterministic generalizations to theoretical propositions through deviant, least likely case 
selection and most similar multiple comparative case analysis.  This approach is well 
suited to manage complex causal relations and avoid the methodological pitfalls that 
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afflict case-based researchers who commonly overgeneralize their findings (George and 
Bennett 2005, 261). 
Among political scientists and political sociologists (see Collier 1991; Eckstein 
1975; George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Goldstone 1991; Hall, 2000; 
Laitin 1995; Lijphart 1968; 1984; Lipset 1959; and McAdam et al. 2003), the 
comparative method has become a widely used and respected method. 
…we emphatically believe they [case studies] are essential to the 
development and testing of social science theory…because they are 
simultaneously sensitive to data and theory…case studies are more useful 
for these purposes than any other methodological tool. – Achen and Snidal 
(1989, 167-8) 
 
However, some methodologists claim the most similar version of controlled 
comparison should be abandoned as a stand-alone research method because it fails to 
eliminate rival explanations (Teune and Przeworski 1970, 34).  Some counter this claim 
stating, “The value of Mill’s methods is in their capacity to eliminate a limited set of 
alternative causal statements” (Savolainen 1994, 1217).  Reliable small-N causal 
inference is most likely to occur when the (Plümper et al. 2010, 3, 5): 
• sample size from which cases are selected is large; 
• variation of the test variable is maximized; 
• variation of the control variables are minimized; 
• test variable has a stronger effect on the dependent variable than do control 
variables; 
• correlation between the test and control variables is minimized; 
• dependent variable is not dichotomous. 
 
The methodological literature referenced for the dissertation recognizes that a 
mixed-methods research design combining within- and cross-case analysis provides the 
most comprehensive necessary and sufficient explanations of social phenomena (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012, 87, 230) (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013; Blatter and Blume 
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2008; Blatter and Haverland 2012; Mahoney 2008).  Necessary, meaning causes must be 
present for an outcome to occur, but the outcome does not always occur when it is 
present and sufficient, meaning an outcome always occurs when it is present but can also 
occur in its absence.  “If measurement error is low, even a single case can falsify a 
hypothesis that posits necessary or sufficient conditions” (Levy 2008, 9).  “While some 
leverage can be gained by increasing the N of qualitative studies, if the total number of 
cases remains small, the main basis for causal inference must derive from within-case 
analysis” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 87).  This research design moves back and forth 
between theory and data, as dictated by the available evidence, combining within- and 
cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesized dependent 
variable outcome.  It provides strong construct and internal validity (George and Bennett 
2005, 254) and moderate external validity, which many in the literature recognize as the 
most rigorous means of drawing inferences from case studies (2005, 18). 
For complex social phenomena such as the GTR, it is uncommon for hypotheses 
on typical cases to meet both necessary and sufficient conditions and far rarer for deviant 
cases (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 92-3).  This more stringent deviant, least likely case 
selection design makes it more difficult for cases to pass hoop and smoking gun tests, 
making claims stronger when passed.  Hoop and smoking gun tests, when used jointly, 
are the most reliable techniques for testing necessary and sufficient conditions (Van 
Evera 1997, 32); the more certain and unique the claim, the stronger (1997, 76).  While 
passing a hoop test adds moderate support to a hypothesis, depending on how 
restrictively it is designed, failing a hoop test falsifies and discredits the hypothesis 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 93).  By contrast, passing a smoking gun test gives 
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substantial support to a hypothesis, while failing it does not eliminate it.  Increasingly 
tightening hoop tests work to eliminate competing explanations, proving the evidence of 
interest is a necessary condition of the outcome.  The more restrictive the hoop, the more 
validated the evidence. 
This research design ensures strong construct validity through use of multiple data 
sources, and the potential concern of a proxy gap is avoided by clearly defining and 
operationalizing the relevant concepts into variables during the first phase of the research 
design.  The combination of a least likely and deviant case design increases internal 
validity by tightening the claims on the hypotheses (George 1979, 57; Levy 2008, 14).  
The theory development phase strengthens internal validity by openly weighing 
competing explanations for effects on the GTR.  Through this design process, “alternative 
explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with data” (George 1979, 57).  
Clearly delineating the bounds of theoretical generalization to fragile states sharing 
similar socio-cultural contexts enhances external validity.  Finally, comparative research 
replication requires the researcher to provide detailed information on the sample 
(boundary scope specification) from which cases were selected, variables used to select 
cases, and case selection process and logic, as this dissertation does.  This research design 
is reliable; “By using the same information and the same methods one should arrive at the 
same results” (Plümper et al. 2010, 43).  This reliably constructed research design is 
transferable and reproducible to other socio-culturally homogenous regions. 
While MSSD case analysis cannot infer big empirical conclusions (Lieberson 
1994, 311) or determine if a variable increases the likelihood of a specified outcome 
within a population, it is valuable for theory-building (Eckstein 2000, 119) and theory 
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disconfirming.  Most similar systems design is preferred to the most different systems 
design (MDSD) because it can determine causality, while most different analysis is only 
useful for ruling out necessary causes (Fauer 1994, 314; George 1979, 210; Van Deth 
2009, 93).  Case studies also serve the heuristic purpose of identifying variables and 
generating hypotheses (Eckstein 1975, 79-138).  “Indeed, one of the most visible and 
important contributions of case study methods has been to identify causal variables left 
out of earlier analyses” (George and Bennett 2005, 254).  It can also determine if a 
theorized outcome is present in the cases under analysis and provides “falsifiable and 
generalizable explanations of empirical phenomena” (Burroway 1998, 6), to theoretical 
propositions (Bennett 2004, 43). 
Most Similar Systems Design selects cases similar on all control variable 
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 152) and many background factors—though these 
are less important—differing only on the dependent variable outcome and test variable 
hypothesized to cause the variation (Levy 2008, 10).  Because this research design 
compares cross-regional cultural, economic, political, and social phenomena at a nuanced 
level of analysis, the close matching of control variables across cases is challenging 
(Plümper et al. 2010, 14), and their perfect matching is impossible (Seawright and 
Gerring (2008, 305).  However, this does not expose a serious flaw in the research 
design; instead, it is a confirmation that all research methods entail tradeoffs. 
…deviant case analysis can, and should, play a positive role in empirical 
research, rather than being merely the ‘tidying-up’ process through which 
exceptions to the empirical rule are given some plausibility and thus 
disposed of. – Kendall and Wolf (1949, 153) 
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Deviant research design identifies and selects outlier cases that deviate as far as 
possible from explanations of typical (control) cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302), 
differing on the dependent variable outcome and test variable’s independent effect.  
Control and test cases are separated for analysis (2008, 304-5).  This design is useful for 
disconfirming (Smelser 1973, 56) or confirming (Creswell 1998, 119), refining (Kendall 
and Wolf 1949, 153), or replacing (Levy 2008, 3) theory about country-level 
observations that appear to have “outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by 
existing theories” (George and Bennett 2005, 215).  While the physical sciences value 
analysis of “seeming exceptions to laws” (Molnar 1967, 1), the social sciences routinely 
discard deviant observations without attempting to explain them (George and Bennett 
2005, 215; Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 92). 
The deviant case selection design is one of the most suitable methods for 
identifying: 
• Boundary scope conditions (Bennett and Elman 2006, 467-8; Collier and 
Mahoney 1996, 66-9). 
• Measurement error (Coppedge 1999, 470; George and Bennett 2005, 220; 
King et al. 1994, 152-83). 
• Omitted variables (Collier et al. 2004, 47, 73, 78; Fearon and Laitin 2008, 
8). 
• Underlying causes (Kazancigil 1994, 214). 
 
For deviant cases, that is, cases that do not follow the causal pattern 
predicted by the theory, within-case analysis gives qualitative researchers 
an opportunity to discover the process that caused the case to diverge from 
the hypothesized outcome. – Collier et al. (2004, 118) 
 
Least Likely design serves to rectify the omission of the social network 
composition variable in the trust and fragile states literature by analyzing its independent 
effects on the GTR under the most unfavorable control variable conditions of fragile 
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states, where its effects are more isolated and therefore more clearly measurable (Gerring 
2007, 233; King et al. 1994, 209).  When state security and contract institutions are 
fragile, the culture is collectivist, and the inter-state market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI 
are absent, but remittances and military and non-military aid are present, the independent 
positive effects of SNC on the GTR are more clearly recognizable.  Isolating its effects in 
unfavorable conditions establishes the conditional boundaries in which variables are 
likely to function as hypothesized (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 23).  The “evidentiary 
support for a theory from a least likely case…provides substantial theoretical leverage, 
and induces a significant shift in our confidence in the theory” (Levy 2008, 12).  
Nevertheless, because context matters greatly in mixed method case analysis, it is not 
sound to assume an unlikely occurrence in one context is likely to occur in a very 
different context.  The claim of the popularized ‘“Sinatra inference’—if I can make it 
there I can make it anywhere” (Levy 2002, 442), is misplaced for small-N case analysis 
(Beach and Pedersen 2016, 49). 
This dissertation claims the fragile state test cases of interest deviate from current 
explanations for the GTR in typical fragile states.  Typical case analysis is less useful at 
this time in the trust and fragile states literature as it only serves to confirm, rather than 
challenge existing theoretical assumptions (Seawright 2016, 502), which contributes less 
to advancing the literature than deviant and least-likely analysis (Flyvbjerg 2006, 13).  If 
a researcher is interested in disconfirming a deterministic proposition, any deviant case 
within the specified population of the inference will suffice (Dion 1998 quoted in 
Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302), while ensuring test cases are both deviant and least 
likely, makes their hypothesis tests much stronger. 
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Procedure 
This dissertation employs George’s (1979, 210) commonly used three-phase case 
study research design updated with procedural modifications suggested by Beach and 
Pedersen (2016), Plumper et al. (2010), and Seawright (2016).  The first phase, 
accomplished in Chapters I-III, entails construction of the research design, which 
clarifies the research problem and question.  It also identifies the class of events and 
related theories of interest, specifies the dependent and independent variables, selects 
appropriate cases, hypothesizes the causal relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables for test cases, and formulates standardized questions asked of all 
cases.  The second phase, accomplished in Chapters III and IV, entails implementation of 
the research design, beginning with the articulation of variable scoring criteria and 
finishing with the presentation of case findings generated from systematic questions for 
all cases.  The third phase, accomplished in Chapters V and VI, entails synthesis of the 
research design, demonstrating the superiority of sociological institutionalism and social 
capital theory as a theoretical framework for explaining social network composition’s 
effect on the GTR through comparing, analyzing, and interpreting the theoretical and 
empirical implications of the Chapter IV findings. 
Case Selection 
The quantitative and much of the qualitative methodological literature have long 
agreed that more observations produce more valid research results (see Eckstein 2000; 
Flyvbjerg 2006; Herriott and Firestone 1983; Seawright and Gerring 2008).  However, 
every research has to balance the number of observations with the depth required to 
answer the research question.  This dissertation retains as many country cases as the case 
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selection criteria, theoretical framework, and data availability allow and as much detail as 
is required to answer the research questions. 
Case selection is the most crucial component of research design for providing 
reliability and “validity of causal inference” (Plümper et al. 2010, 42).  Research design 
may apply different case selection criteria, depending on if its purpose is to analyze 
typical, deviant, most-similar, or most-different cases that favor extreme values on the 
dependent (Y) or test (X1) variable, minimizing or maximizing the difference between 
case environments (Z), or some combination thereof.  The qualitative literature’s 
“imprecise description of their case selection method” (2010, 14) has led to the “I know it 
when I see it” (Stewart 1964, 378 U.S. 184) approach to case identification and 
classification being arbitrarily applied across the empirical literature.  This has resulted in 
rival qualitative case selection techniques that affect boundary specification and 
reliability differently—none of which have gained full support in the literature 
(Seawright 2016, 500).  Selecting the right method is of concern because if scope 
conditions are applied too broadly or narrowly, the range of cases where the hypotheses 
should theoretically hold will be inaccurate. 
This dissertation’s research design adheres to the specific recommendations of 
Plümper et al. (2010, 29) and Seawright (2016, 501), built on advances in the 
methodological literature by Collier et al. (2004); Flyvbjerg (2006, 13); Gerring (2007, 
87–8); King et al. (1994, 124–8); and Levy (2008: 8) and empirical studies by Ragin 
(1992) and Rosch (1978).  They claim theory-guided non-random case selection, and 
extreme values on the test variable (X1) provide the most reliable results, while smaller 
gains are made with extreme values on the dependent variable (Y) and minimizing the 
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difference between case environments (Z).  Therefore, to draw the most sound boundary 
specification and maximize the reliability and quantity and quality of cases, selection 
ensures SNC measures differ greatly between test and control cases. 
This dissertation utilizes a high-low 2x2 case selection typology based on the new 
GTR score and hypothesized SNC values.  It partitions cases into discrete types sharing 
common traits of interest (Stinchcombe 1968, 43-5).  Cases populating this typology and 
those selected for analysis are limited to those SSA states that are fragile, rather than non-
fragile, collapsed, or failed.  Selected cases represent SSA broadly, providing a laboratory 
for comparing parallel background characteristics (Van Evera 1997, 84) of fragile SSA 
states.  The deviant test cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have positive 
dependent (Y), and test (X1) variable values and typical control cases of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe have negative dependent (Y) and test (X1) variable values.  Uniformly 
negative control variable outcomes in control and test cases provide a most-similar 
research environment where there is little reason to think test cases would have wide 
GTR, making them analytically interesting and meaningful. 
Table 6  
2x2 Case Selection Typology 
 ↓Hypothesized Social 
Network Composition 
(X = 0) 
↑Hypothesized Social 
Network Composition 
(X = 1) 
↑Generalized Trust 
Radius (Y = 1) 
(0,1) 
Mali (0.5330) 
Rwanda (0.4381) 
Deviant Test Cases (1,1) 
Burkina Faso (0.4408) 
Ethiopia (0.3998) 
Nigeria (0.3693) 
↓Generalized Trust 
Radius (Y = 0) 
Typical Control Cases (0,0) 
Zambia (0.3280) 
Zimbabwe (0.3064) 
(1,0) 
Benin (N/A) 
Cote d’Ivoire (N/A) 
Table Continued 
Note: Global low GTR score: Peru (0.1979). 
Global high GTR score: Sweden (0.6272). 
 
Variables & Data 
The literature on the consequences of generalized trust has grown, while the 
examination of its causes has lagged.  This dissertation examines the structural causes of 
generalized trust as Bjørnskov (2007), and Bjørnskov (2008) suggest.  The trust and 
fragile states literature provide strong support for security and contract institutions, 
individualism, and inter-state market forces as control variables affecting the GTR.  This 
dissertation advances the literature by fine-tuning these claims and introducing a new 
social test variable, Social Network Composition, composed of fractionalization, 
proximity, and power differential, measuring how the size, strength, connectivity, and 
interaction of groups affect society’s GTR.  Analyzing the structural constraints that 
collectively lead to self-reported trusting feelings between groups, more so than 
trustworthy behavior between groups, is the most accurate measure of the GTR.  This 
research design tests hypotheses on the optimal balance of in-group, generalized, and 
institutional trust levels and radii for creating environments conducive to the widening of 
the GTR and associated positive externalities.  These variables, along with how well 
groups provide for their members’ interests, determine inter-group interaction and if 
outcomes are positive or negative; the GTR only widens through mutually positive 
interaction. 
Generalized Trust Radius 
The precise measurement of the GTR is essential (see Dinesen 2011; Glaeser et 
al. 2000; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), particularly for assessing functions of democracy 
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(see Nannestad 2008; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 2002).  While some of the literature claim 
experiments accomplish this most effectively, others favor surveys.  The trust and 
conflict experimental literature have more of a selection bias problem, as human subjects 
willing to participate are likely to be skewed positively towards the value of the study 
subject (see Pettigrew 1997).  It is clear that social surveys are the most feasible 
mechanism for collecting trust data at the group and society levels and the analysis of 
survey data within case studies, as this dissertation does, is an accepted and common 
practice.  There is a consensus among trust surveyors that it is preferable to measure 
attitudes and values, such as generalized trust, by multi-point scales rather than 
dichotomously (see Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Krosnick and Fabrigar 1997; Schuman 
and Presser 1981). 
A widening GTR is the chief vehicle for the creation of social capital, “but its 
origins remain uncertain and its consequences are yet to be clearly established” (Delhey 
et al. 2011, 800), in part, due to the literature favoring the examination of trust level over 
trust radius.  The vaguely constructed old “standard” trust question measures generalized 
trust level (Bauer et al. 2015, 59) rather than its radius.  For the new GTR measurement, 
“…out-group trust measures the level of trust in remote others, while the trust radius 
measures how strongly remote others are in people’s minds when answering questions 
about unspecified trust” (Delhey et al. 2011, 800).  This reveals that “…when trust in 
remote others is high, a wide circle of people is included in the notion of ‘most people’ ” 
(2011, 800). 
This dissertation uses the Delhey et al. (2011) out-group trust calculation of the 
GTR from the new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery, available in the 
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WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) surveys and is expected to be 
expanded in future waves.  Delhey et al. (2011) and Delhey and Welzel (2012) utilize the 
Wave 5 (51 countries) data, eventually combining Wave 5 and 6 data (76 countries) in 
the subsequent Delhey et al. (2014) and Welzel and Delhey (2015) articles.  These four 
articles encompass a pioneering effort to measure the GTR with greater precision.  The 
WVS has established itself as the most credible, enduring, and utilized global survey 
instrument on social issues, including trust (Knack 2001, 19).  There is a consensus 
among the trust literature (see Bauer 2015, 21; Dekker 2011; Lundmark et al. 2016; 
Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011; van Hoorn 2015) that this new trust 
question battery and out-group trust measurement have inaugurated a new era in the trust 
literature.  Together, they accurately define, isolate, and measure the concept of “the 
stranger,” surpassing all competing social survey research programs in this goal. 
Table 7  
Welzel’s Item Battery on Trust 
I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each 
whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? 
(Read out and code one answer each) 
 
Your family   
Your neighborhood In-group trust 
People you know personally  
People you meet for the first time   
People of another religion Out-group trust 
People of another nationality  
Source: Delhey and Welzel (2012) 
Reprinted with permission. 
 
Miscalculating the Generalized Trust Radius 
The new trust question is an improvement on the old “standard” trust question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
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too careful in dealing with people?” that served as the foundation for much of the trust 
literature’s findings from 1981-2005.  Much of the trust literature agrees, the old 
“standard” trust question is invalid for cross-country analysis at the global scale (Delhey 
et al. 2001, 787; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008, 530) because the concept of trust is 
interpreted so differently between socio-cultural regions.  Torpe and Lolle (2011) and 
Helliwell and Putnam (2004) convincingly support this claim, shedding light on the 
vagueness of the old “standard” trust question.  It “is formulated with such a lack of 
precision that it is unclear what ‘most people’ covers” (Torpe and Lolle 2011, 484), to the 
point that its “capacity to measure trust across cultural divides is questionable (2011, 
493).  It “is perceived differently in different countries” (2011, 489), varying by region, 
making cross-country comparison problematic.  They call into question the validity of 
research using the old “standard” trust question for cross-country analysis, particularly in 
Asia and Africa (2011, 493) as it overestimates Asian GTR and underestimates Africa 
GTR. 
Table 8  
Social Trust in Five Country Clusters (Percent Trusters) 
 Most 
people can 
be trusted 
Trust people you meet for 
the first time (somewhat 
or completely) 
Number 
of 
countries 
West 40.4 41.2 15 
Former East Bloc 20.9 16.3 10 
Latin America 12.9 17.8 8 
Asia 32.3 18.7 10 
Africa 15.4 27.8 9 
Total 25.7 25.8 52 
 
Note: Only countries which have included both questions in the questionnaire are included in 
this analysis. N is in all clusters above 10,000 respondents. 
Source: Torpe and Lolle (2011, 486) 
Reprinted with permission. 
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A New and Improved Generalized Trust Radius Measure 
While this question appears resolved for the old “standard” trust question, it is a 
live debate for the new trust question.  Delhey et al. (2011) agree with Bjørnskov (2008, 
279) that the old question is subject to “…systematic variation in the radius of ‘most 
people,’” (Delhey et al. 2011, 787) making it incomparable across countries.  They also 
agree with Torpe and Lolle (2011) that the new 6-question trust battery and its 
measurement provide improved clarity and validity for cross-country comparison in 
Africa and Asia.  When comparing the measurement of “Confucian and developing 
countries” (2011, 801)—specifically Burkina Faso and Ethiopia—the measurements 
change dramatically when the old question is replaced by the new question (2011, 786).  
For this dissertation, the GTR scores for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe 
increase substantially when using the new trust question and measurement, while the 
score for Zambia remains unchanged. 
While some in the trust literature have proceeded with cross-country statistical 
analysis using the new measurement, many realize further vetting is required.  Delhey et 
al. (2014) claim the new trust question battery and measurement correct the issues that 
plague the old question through calculating the difference between derivative in-group 
and transcendent out-group trust to measure how far beyond one’s group, trust extends.  
Welzel and Delhey (2015) claim the Delhey et al. (2011) multigroup confirmatory factor 
analysis makes the new trust measure valid for cross-country comparison on a global 
scale, with Dinesen (2011), Torpe and Lolle (2011), Nannestad (2008), van Hoorn 
(2014), Welzel (2011), and Welzel and Inglehart (2016) arriving at similar conclusions.  
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Others in the trust literature caution this assumption (see Aleman and Woods 2016; 
Banerjee 2016; Davidov et al. 2014; Donnelly and Pol-Eleches 2012; Mellon 2011).  
While “the radius of trust problem remains resolved” (Delhey et al. 2014, 1260) and it 
does appear “to measure the same latent constructs across groups and countries” 
(Nannestad 2008, 418-9), the concern over the validity of its cross-country measurement 
and comparison continues. 
Refining the Generalized Trust Radius Measurement 
This advancement of the literature has touched off a productive volley of critique, 
defense, and improvement, resulting in a persuasive call to “discontinue using 
unspecified trust, at face value, as a measure of general trust—at least in worldwide 
comparisons” (Delhey et al. 2011, 801).  It has also prompted a call to reexamine the 
findings of studies that depend on the old “standard” trust question (see Adam 2008; 
Inglehart and Baker 2000; Pichler and Wallace 2007).  Van Hoorn (2014) presents 
several valid methodological critiques of the Delhey et al. (2011) trust measure, which 
has prompted modifications.  In response, Delhey et al. (2014) concede they had a 
statistical reporting error on correlation (r = .94), rather than the correct (r = .381), which 
encouraged them to mistakenly claim out-group trust level (intensity of the feeling of 
trust) proxies trust radius (extent of feelings of trust) (Delhey and Welzel 2014, 1261; 
van Hoorn 2014, 1256-7). 
Further, Welzel and Delhey (2015) make two updated claims.  First, derivative 
and transcendent out-group trust have different consequences, with the later correlated 
with “a friendly orientation toward strangers” (2015, 893).  Second, individual human 
empowerment in the form of “emancipation from in-group control opens new 
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opportunities to engage in beneficial exchange with out-group members” (2015, 876) and 
is, therefore, the most critical omitted variable affecting the GTR. 
Limitations on Measuring the Generalized Trust Radius 
Promising research avenues have emerged in the trust literature as a result of the 
new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery and related Delhey et al. 
(2011) GTR measure’s improved ability to isolate a society’s GTR from its generalized 
trust level, in-group trust, and institutional trust.  While the new trust question and its 
technically sophisticated aggregate measure (Delhey et al. 2011, 798) are superior to the 
old “standard” trust question (Lundmark et al. 2016, 39), because determinants of social 
trust vary systematically across both countries and stages of economic and political 
development (Bjørnskov 2008, 279), cross-country comparison is difficult.  
Consequently, this dissertation agrees with those in the trust literature who encourage a 
cautious approach to cross-country generalization of social phenomena, claiming it is 
necessary to isolate the examination of trust to theoretically justified contexts.  The cases 
selected for this dissertation come from similar socio-cultural contexts and are at similar 
stages of economic and political development, so social trust will not vary systematically 
between them, as Bjørnskov (2008, 279) established is a problem for non-similar cases. 
Another limitation of the new trust measure is that it is not useful to measure the 
GTR longitudinally at this time.  While measuring trust over time and at multiple sub-
levels has the potential to expose dynamic societal trends, longitudinal analysis requires 
several decades of observations because normative cultural attitudes such as trust, 
aggregated to the country- and group-levels, do not change measurably annually and even 
change little over the course of a decade (Delhey and Newton 2005, 319).  Since the new 
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trust question has only existed for a decade over two survey cycles, longitudinal analysis 
will not be possible until at least the release of the WVS Wave 7 (2015-2019) survey. 
Social Network Composition 
Fractionalization is the literature’s standard measure of country-level social 
diversity.  It provides the foundation for the Social Network Composition test variable, 
yet it is inadequate alone to explain the social effects on the GTR, as it is limited to 
measuring social homogeneity and heterogeneity in the areas of ethnicity, language, 
religion, and culture.  This requires the addition of physical, technological, and social 
proximity and power differential measures. 
The global measurement of fractionalization began in earnest with the Ethno 
Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) atlas project, which as of 2004, was more than 40 
years out of date (Posner 2004, 850).  It was not until 2001 that Roeder (2001) attempted 
a serious reconceptualization of fractionalization, though as Fearon (2003) and Alesina et 
al. (2003) rightly claim and then subsequently improve upon, it provides an incomplete 
view of the concept.  Following this flurry of productive fractionalization activity, Posner 
(2004) aligned these competing voices in the discourse, while adding his own interesting, 
though not substantially improved, PREG fractionalization measure.  The most suitable 
fractionalization concepts for this research include the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious fractionalization measures.  Fearon’s (2003) cultural diversity 
measure is less suitable because the social network composition variable measures a 
social phenomenon, rather than a cultural one.  While Posner’s (2004) PREG index 
claims to measure something conceptually different from the other indices, the literature 
continues to favor the Alesina et al. (2003) measures, as does this dissertation. 
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Social effects on the GTR may be examined via descriptive network measures, 
which are commonly used in the case study method (Martinez et al. 2003, 5).  Network 
descriptors provide an analytical language and metrics employed at the node and network 
levels that are useful for describing and explaining social network composition 
(Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1447).  Fractionalization may be examined using 
network cliques, which measure ultimate homogeneity, where all nodes are directly tied 
to every other node in the group.  As this is rare, structurally cohesive blocks—where 
most, but not all nodes are directly tied to every other node in the group—are more 
commonly observable.  Related to this measure, the clustering coefficient assesses how 
likely two nodes that are directly tied to the same node are also directly tied to each other.  
Burt’s (1992) constraint measure is valuable for assessing tie strength and cohesion 
within groups.  Tie strength explains tie duration (homophily), intensity (propinquity), 
and reciprocity (transitivity).  In-group trust level (homophily), measures positive 
intensity between group members, though it does not differentiate on what basis a group 
identifies (ethnicity, language, religion, gender, race, age, occupation, education, 
achievement, status, ideology, or values).  As transitivity (perceived mutuality), defined 
as connectivity between actors in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 165) 
approaches network closure (actual reciprocity), more expectations are met in social 
interactions.  Multiplexity (relational strength) is a measure of the variety of types of ties 
a node has. 
In addition to fractionalization, physical, technological, and social proximity and 
power differential may be examined using descriptive network measures at the group and 
societal levels.  Physical proximity may be described and measured by network density, 
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propinquity, and urban and rural ratios.  Network density measures the ratio of how many 
connections exist between nodes in a group or society compared to how many are 
possible.  In fragile states, where many groups are geographically constrained, their 
propinquity (likelihood of proximity of tied nodes), should be high.  Structural cohesion 
and equivalence may serve as a measure of social proximity.  Cohesion indicates network 
interconnectedness, measuring how many nodes may be removed from a network before 
it becomes disconnected.  Technological proximity is measured by groups’ access to 
communications (mobile and landline telephone, radio, television, and internet) and 
transportation (road, rail, and air) networks.  Some in the literature have hastily used 
technological proximity measures alone to proxy social capital; Collier (1998) uses the 
density of telephone networks, and Diamond (2000, 202) suggests radio networks may be 
suitable.  Power differential measures the fractionalization of power in society and 
groups’ relative access to and ability to obtain desired resources, which is affected by 
size, influence over government, military and the market, ownership of territory, and 
ability to meet group members’ interests.  The trust literature has yet to answer whether 
many small groups of relatively equal size and power (multipolarity), two equally sized 
and powerful groups (bipolarity), or a single dominant group (unipolarity) produces the 
most conducive environment for an increasing GTR.  This dissertation addresses this 
question. 
A More Complete Model of Social Network Composition 
Two roads diverged in a wood and I - I took the one less traveled by, and 
that has made all the difference. 
—Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken 
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Each sub-component of the SNC variable affects inter-group interaction, the only 
path to wider or narrower GTR.  Presented here are three models of possible SNC effects 
on the GTR; however, each entails substantial nuance requiring greater explanation. 
Table 9  
Social Network Composition Effect on Generalized Trust Radius 
                        Model 1                      Model 2                       Model 3 
                  Fractionalized               Fractionalized             Non-Fractionalized 
     (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious)   (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious)    (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious) 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
                    Multipolar 
             Power Differential 
              Unipolar or Bipolar 
           Power Differential 
               Unipolar or Bipolar 
            Power Differential 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
                    Proximate                   Proximate               Non-Proximate 
       (Physical, Technological)      (Physical, Technological)       (Physical, Technological) 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
           Initial Incentivization 
             Socially Proximate 
             Initial Coercion 
          Socially Proximate 
     Non-Incentivized or Coerced 
        Socially Non-proximate 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
          Sustained Incentivization 
               Socially Proximate 
           Sustained Coercion 
            Socially Proximate 
     Non-Incentivized or Coerced 
         Socially Non-Proximate 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
              Positive Interaction            Negative Interaction                  No Interaction 
                            ↓                          ↓                           ↓ 
                       ↑GTR                     ↓GTR                      ↓GTR 
 
1. In model 1, mutually positive inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized, 
proximate, most often multipolar, societies where groups are more so 
incentivized than coerced to interact, widening the GTR. 
2. In model 2, mutually negative inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized, 
proximate, most often unipolar or bipolar, societies where groups are more so 
coerced than incentivized to interact, narrowing the GTR. 
3. In model 3, little interaction occurs in non-fractionalized, non-proximate, most 
often unipolar or bipolar, societies, where groups are neither incentivized nor 
coerced to interact, ensuring the GTR does not widen. 
 
As globalization is increasing, most societies are becoming more fractionalized 
and proximate. Therefore, negative and positive inter-group interaction is increasing.  
The more interaction is incentivized and mutually beneficial, the more it is positive and 
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widening the GTR; whereas, the more it is coerced and lopsided, the more negative it is, 
narrowing the GTR.  Societies’ ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization changes 
most slowly, followed by the power differential, while proximities change more rapidly, 
though not uniformly. 
Not all fractionalizations are equal in their ability to produce inter-group 
interaction.  The more ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups there are in a society, the 
more likely one is to run into a stranger, increasing the chances of negative or positive 
inter-group interaction.  However, high ethnic heterogeneity has different societal effects 
than does high linguistic or religious fractionalization.  Ethnic and linguistic identity 
often overlap, but groups feel less intensely about linguistic identity; they rarely have a 
visceral hatred for speakers of other languages.  Without the presence of a bridging trade 
language, it is more difficult for linguistic groups to interact.  Oppositely, different ethnic 
and religious groups may be able to communicate through a common language, but 
depending on how different they are and in what ways, they may feel more or less 
distance from the other group.  Groups identify more often by ethnicity, but more 
intensely by religion.  As the intensity of religious identity increases, the social distance 
felt between groups makes positive inter-group interaction more challenging. 
Fractionalization is no guarantee of inter-group interaction in the absence of 
proximity and either incentivization or coercion.  All types of proximity increase negative 
and positive inter-group interaction, while types of power differential differ.  Physical 
proximity is the most explicit driver of negative and positive inter-group interaction.  
When diverse groups are in physical proximity and sharing resources, it may either turn 
conflictual or cooperative (Ostrom 2015, 183).  Most communications and transportation 
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technologies increase proximity and therefore increase the likelihood of inter-group 
interaction; however, there is variation among types of media and transportation 
infrastructure.  A society’s power differential reflects the fractionalization of power in 
society, group political relations, and the type of interaction that is likely, yet when strong 
enough fractionalization and proximity drivers are present, even a society with a uniplar 
or bipolar power differential may increase interaction.  Groups may be either coerced or 
incentivized to interact by the state, external forces, or other groups; most often, coerced 
relationships become conflictual.  Once initial interaction has occurred and depending if 
it is negative or positive, further effort is required to sustain social proximity. 
Societies’ power differential greatly affects whether inter-group interaction is 
negative or positive. 
Unipolar: Groups’ place in society is established and not easily changed, which 
increases stability and may ease competitive tensions.  The dominant group’s ability to 
enforce the status quo tends to limit incentivized and even coerced inter-group 
interaction.  Because the dominant group does not need to interact with minority groups, 
minorities that are usually unable to meet all of their interests must initiate engagement 
with the dominant group on its terms. 
Bipolar: Dominant groups are self-sufficient enough that they do not need nor 
want to have interests met by other dominant groups.  This produces a tense political 
environment where dominant groups constantly vie for advantage over other dominant 
groups, tending to produce insular societies within a society that interact negatively 
unless a balance of power can be established. 
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Multipolar: Most groups are unable to meet all of their interests, therefore, inter-
group interaction increases.  If groups have unmet interests that other groups can meet, 
there is the opportunity for a symbiotic, rather than conflictual, relationship.  Mutually 
positive interaction depends on what resources groups have access to and what resources 
other groups need. 
State Security and Contract Institutions 
Complex concepts such as the rule of law are composed of numerous differently 
weighted and interdependent institutions (Voigt 2013, 16); therefore, measuring them in 
aggregate sacrifices considerable precision and detail (2013, 3).  As such, this research 
examines security and contract institutions separately.  The control variables (Security 
and Contract Institutions) are measured using a combination of literature favored World 
Bank quantitative global data complemented by Voigt’s (2013, 17) procedure for 
assessing institutions.  Although Voigt (2013, 22) raises the concern of omitted variable 
bias with their use, the World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators for Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence (2016) proxy security institutions and Rule of Law 
(2016) and Control of Corruption (2016) proxy contract institutions sufficiently. 
Voigt’s (2013) procedure is as follows: 
• Step 1: identify and specify the effective institution; 
• Step 2: predict de jure behavior expected from institutional compliance; 
• Step 3: measure de facto observed behavior. 
 
It is useful to analyze conditions and patterns of institutionalization through 
multiple units of analysis, including the group, field, and society, as each faces different 
constraints.  Size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration are related but 
separately measurable characteristics of all types of institutions.  The size of an institution 
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indicates the number of other institutions it likely intersects, while its embeddedness 
indicates the societal depth to which an institution penetrates.  The de jure-de facto gap 
may measure institutional strength and effectiveness, and the longitudinal stability of an 
institution may represent its duration.  The de jure intention of formal rules and 
regulations and the de facto social reality of compliance in fragile states are often worlds 
apart (Voigt 2013, 5).  The difference between the two must be measured (2013, 11) to 
assess conducive environments for the widening of the GTR. 
Individualism 
The control variable (Individualism), which favors loose-knit social ties over 
cohesive inward-looking local loyalties, is measured quantitatively, as suggested by van 
Hoorn (2015, 275), using a combination of Hofstede’s (2001) Individualism cultural 
dimension and the House et al. (2004) Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) measure for In-Group Collectivism.  While the trust and fragile 
states literature recognize these sources as having the best quality and reliability, they 
lack global coverage, which drops several potential cases from this study.  The trust 
literature has also evaluated individualism qualitatively, primarily through ethnographic 
studies of local cultures and comparative studies of primarily developed societies (see 
Buss 2000; Kitayama et al. 1997; Lukes 1971; Realo et al. 2002; Vandello and Cohen 
1999).  What the literature lacks are adequate focused and comparative studies of 
developing societies, particularly in SSA. 
While some in the quantitative cross-cultural literature challenge collectivism’s 
validity as a construct for differentiating cultures (see Brewer and Chen 2007, 147; 
Oyserman et al. 2002; Schimmack et al. 2005), the majority agree individualism and 
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collectivism are both meaningful and measurable cultural characteristics of societies.  
The individualism-collectivism continuum has been used to this end to explain cultural 
differences (see Hofstede 2001; Kagitcibasi 1997; Kim et al. 1994; Oyserman 2002; 
Triandis 1995).  More than a third of the cross-cultural literature claims it provides at 
least a partial explanation for cross-cultural variation (Hui and Yee 1994, 410).  What 
remains under debate is which variants of individualism and collectivism provide 
meaningful and measurable distinctions of cultural dynamics affecting the GTR.  
Contending explanations include: 
• Vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al. 1993, 410). 
• Self-expression values (Welzel 2010, 157-8). 
• Universalism and exclusionism (Minkov 2011, 191). 
• Individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism (Brewer and Chen 
2007, 147). 
• Familism and institutional collectivism (Gelfand et al. 2004). 
• Inclusive collectivism (Mbigi 1997). 
• Corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158). 
 
Combining cultural traits such as universalism, power, or achievement with 
assessments of individualism and collectivism produce entirely different varieties 
(Triandis et al. 1993, 410).  Familism and institutional collectivism are distinct 
measurable concepts (Realo et al. 1997, 459) that differ in scale and intensity.  Some 
mistakenly claim they are equal opposite types of collectivism (see Gelfand et al. 2004).  
The former encourages and rewards collective actions within the family, while the later at 
the societal level.  Intense loyalty to family leaves more people outside one’s in-group 
than when broadened to neighbors or co-workers and much more so than when 
broadened to a whole culture or society.  Exclusionist collectivists weigh personal 
relationships when assessing appropriate behaviors towards others, whereas universalists 
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rely on formal institutions to manage interactions (Minkov 2011, 239).  Whole society 
collectivism (present in homogeneous societies) may exhibit nationalist, totalitarian, or 
even fascist tendencies.  It is at this point where a society’s ethnic fractionalization 
affects its individualism-collectivism. 
Inter-State Market Forces 
The control variable (Inter-State Market Forces) is composed of six related yet 
separately measurable factors: trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, non-military aid.  
These facets of economic globalization enable groups, to varying degrees, have interests 
met without the risk or reward of interacting with other domestic groups.  Literature 
favored data include the World Bank’s 2015 Trade (Percent of GDP), Trade Balance 
(Percent of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows), Net Portfolio Equity Inflows, 
Personal Remittances (received); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 2015 Non-Military Aid (net development assistance); and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2016 US Military Aid. 
Trade as a percentage of GDP is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of the gross domestic product.  Current Account Balance as 
a percentage of GDP is the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, 
and net secondary income.  Also, the Net Barter Terms of Trade Index is calculated as the 
percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, 
measured relative to the base year 2000 (World Bank 2017).  The foreign direct 
investment (FDI) measurement is a valuable indicator of foreign influence in an 
economy.  The World Bank considers “ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary 
shares of voting stock” (2017) to qualify as FDI.  Portfolio equity records passive 
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investment in a country, generally through the stock and bond market.  It provides 
countries and publically traded corporations “a direct way to access financial markets, 
and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility” (World Bank 2017).  Personal 
remittances are person-to-person financial transfers from one country to another or 
compensation from an employer where the two reside in different countries.  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is non-military aid provided to developing countries 
(incomes below $12,267 in 2010 USD) by developed OECD member governments 
designed to promote economic development and welfare (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2017).  U.S. military aid, the most given by any country, is 
provided to countries to enhance their military capability, defense provision, and 
protecting their sovereignty. 
Standardized Questions 
These questions guide the data collection process in the subsequent findings 
chapter. 
Generalized Trust Radius 
• What are differences in in-group and generalized trust by sub-state region, 
age, sex, urban-rural location, vocation, education, and wealth? 
 
State Security Institutions 
• What is the colonial history? 
• What types of insecurity events have occurred and what were their 
outcomes? 
• Does violence or poverty drive its fragility? 
 
State Contract Institutions 
• How do colonial institutions affect modern contract institutions? 
• What is the quality of the state as a contract agent? 
• How has the state managed land tenure? 
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Individualism-Collectivism 
• How wealthy and urban is the population? 
• What type of collectivism does the population exhibit? 
 
Inter-State Market Forces 
• What is the market configuration? 
• How quickly and deeply has it adopted neo-liberal policies? 
• Does the West consider it a geo-politically strategic state? 
 
Social Network Composition 
• What is the fractionalized composition? 
• Is there a unifying trade language? 
• What is the proximity composition? 
• How knowledgeable is the population of other groups in the country? 
• How mobile in the population? 
• How strong and pervasive are network ties between groups? 
• What type of power differential exists and has existed in the past? 
• Is there a history of violence? 
• Does it or has it had a “strongman” leader? 
• What are regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and power 
differential? 
 
Limitations 
Every research is bound by limitations of time, resources, effort, knowledge, and 
access.  The empirical reality, the current theoretical sophistication of the literature, and 
available data limit the types of questions asked, hypotheses claimed, and methods 
employed.  It does not follow that just because the trust and fragile states literature have 
mostly overlooked the effects on the GTR in fragile states, that there are not important 
questions to be asked about them.  This dissertation delimits its focus to effects on the 
GTR in deviant fragile states.  “Case(s) are studied in depth, and over time rather than at 
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a single point” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000, 5) making the temporal and sequential 
(Becker 2000, 225) analysis richer.  
A valid critique of GTR analyses in fragile states is the difficulty in isolating 
state, interstate, and social effects from each other.  It is rare for a social outcome to have 
a single measurable causal factor, and it is possible there are different sets of conditions 
that may lead to the same outcome (Lieberson 1991, 308; Ragin 1987, xxviii).  Thus, 
GTR analyses contend with concerns of equifinality, collinearity, endogeneity, over 
specification, and reverse causation.  Past GTR studies were susceptible to endogeneity 
due to the omitted Social Network Composition variable; this dissertation’s primary 
contribution is rectifying that error.  There are no omitted confounding variables present 
affecting the dependent or independent variables.  While it is difficult to avoid 
collinearity and endogeneity of independent variables in the examination of trust, the 
trust literature has adequately isolated these variables, ensuring each is measuring a 
distinctly different social factor. 
Three concerns remain.  First, contract institutions may interact with inter-state 
market forces through foreign capital management policies.  Second, individualism (a 
cultural factor) may interact with groups’ social network composition (a social factor), 
affecting how willing one is to interact with strangers.  Third, trust is a possible cause and 
consequence of a wide range of social and political phenomena (Zmerli et al. 2007, 41-2), 
which raises the concern that causation may run both directions between dependent and 
independent variables.  Reverse causality does not appear to be a valid concern for the 
GTR because individualism is nearly an antecedent condition of societies and the 
extension of generalized trust does not usually cause strong security and contract 
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institutions in fragile states and has a mixed and weak effect on the various inter-state 
market forces. 
Over specification is a concern for statistical research models.  Qualitative 
methodologists once claimed that small-N analysis must adhere to the limitations of 
degrees of freedom (see Campbell 1975; Lijphart 1971), but more recent literature 
claims, “…it is not helpful to think about qualitative methodology in terms of a degrees 
of freedom problem” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 10).  Instead, the chief methods of 
inference for small-N analysis are through theoretical propositions and within-case 
analysis.  This research addresses each of these methodological concerns and constructs a 
model that is transferable to other most similar research contexts. 
Conclusion 
The primary goal of this chapter is to construct a valid, reliable, and replicable 
analytical framework for explaining the GTR in fragile states.  Three theoretical models 
are presented to explain the GTR under different fractionalization, incentivization, 
proximity, and power differentiated conditions.  These models account for variations in 
economic, political, cultural, and social pushing and pulling forces acting on in-group, 
generalized, and institutional trust to produce societies’ GTR, trust differential, and trust 
composition.  Within this analytical framework, the two control and three test cases are 
evaluated for their model fit through a series of standardized questions asked of each case 
to produce easily measurable and comparable quantitative and qualitative findings. 
This methodology chapter has provided support for the relevancy of the research 
questions, the reasonableness of claims, transparency of its limitations, and rationale for 
the chosen mixed method analytical framework and process for examining the 
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determinants of the GTR in fragile states, implemented through subsequent chapters.  
Chapter IV presents the trust-fragile states literature’s quantitative and qualitative 
findings on the GTR and its determinants for the five test and control cases.  Chapter V 
tests the research hypotheses for each variable through within- and cross-case analysis of 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and policy 
suggestions flowing from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis. 
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CHAPTER IV – FINDINGS 
This dissertation focuses on trust; trust in environments where mutually positive 
inter-group interaction does not come easily.  This chapter reports quantitative and 
qualitative findings separately and organizes them thematically by dependent, control, 
and test variables for each case, providing a sound foundation for subsequent 
comparative analysis and synthesis. 
Quantitative Findings 
Dependent Variable 
Trust is the foundation of a healthy society.  Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) 
recognize a country’s colonial legacy is not the primary cause of underdevelopment, 
although they claim it has lasting effects on intragroup (in-group) and institutional trust.  
Interestingly, however, they do not address its effects on intergroup (generalized) trust.  
The four hundred years long pre-colonial and colonial transatlantic and Indian Ocean 
slave trades, which ended over a century ago, have left a legacy of mistrust between the 
modern African descendants of those ethnic groups targeted by it and their governing 
institutions (2011, 3221).  The institutions formed subsequently in these insecure and 
untrusting environments weakly constrain untrustworthy behavior (2011, 3249), making 
it challenging to increase all types of trust.  The authors claim a spatial correlation exists 
between Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastal regions of Africa, where the slave trade was 
more prevalent and increased modern mistrust.  They test this claim in SSA successfully 
against an Asian sample of countries with similar colonial legacies, which return an 
opposite result. 
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It is difficult to claim that a single institution (the African slave trade) that has not 
formally existed for over 100 years still affects trust in contemporary African coastal 
societies.  Nunn and Wantchekon do so compellingly, although not without 
methodological concerns.  Their research combines “contemporary individual-level 
survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group” (2011, 3221).  They 
produce theory-supported correlations between the slave trade and modern trustingness in 
SSA, advancing the growing literature seeking to explain how cultural factors such as 
trust, affect decision making (2011, 3249) in this context. 
Their trust data comes from the Afrobarometer, a survey which “asks respondents 
how much they trust their relatives, neighbors, and their locally elected government 
council” (2011, 3228).  These questions directly address intragroup (in-group) and 
institutional trust, though they resort to indirect means to obtain the measurement of 
intergroup (generalized) trust. 
…we control directly for the impact of the slave trade on the other ethnic 
groups living in the same location as the respondent.  Our estimates show 
that ethnic groups whose ancestors were heavily enslaved in the past are 
less trusted today – Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, 3223) 
 
They claim it is not problematic to merge Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer, and 
World Values Survey data into the same regressions, claiming that any error produced in 
the analysis is “not the result of differences in the underlying surveys” (2011, 3243).  
However, assuming each survey is measuring the same concepts of intragroup (in-group) 
and intergroup (generalized) trust is tenuous. 
Finally, their assumption of immobile SSA coastal populations is unwarranted.  
While SSA remains the most rural region globally, its urban percentage has increased 
 110 
from 27 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 2014 and is projected to increase to 55 percent 
in 2050 (United Nations 2014, 20).  Moreover, its coastal cities have some of the highest 
urbanization rates in the world, Lagos, Nigeria, Kinshasa, Congo (DRC), and Luanda, 
Angola, each exhibiting over four percent annual growth between 1990 and 2014.  Even 
though there are recognized ethnic homelands throughout SSA, many do not live in the 
same area (town, district, or province) that their slave-traded ethnic ancestors did a 
century to half a millennia ago.   
These findings suggest that analyses of in-group and institutional trust—and less 
convincingly, generalized trust—should include slave trade legacy—and less 
convincingly, coastal proximity—as background factors, if not as independent variables. 
The remainder of this first section presents the quantitative case findings on the 
dependent variable from the WVS new 6-question trust battery data, which is available 
from the WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) for the cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia 
and from Wave 6 (2010-2014) for Nigeria and Zimbabwe.  Case findings, presented 
separately here, isolate the GTR from institutional and in-group trust as well as report 
findings by class, regional, educational, and age effects on the GTR.  The categories of 
“Trust completely,” “Somewhat,” “Not very much,” and “No trust at all” are used to 
report on the three levels of in-group trust (“Your family,” “Your neighborhood,” and 
“People you know personally”) and the three levels of generalized trust (“People you 
meet for the first time,” People of another religion,” and “People of another nationality”). 
Table 10  
New World Values Survey Trust Measure 
Table Continued 
 
 
Note: Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6. 
Trust Differential = In-group – Out-group Trust 
Mean and SD reported for all country observations in both waves. 
Source: Welzel and Delhey (2015) 
Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17. 
 
Country 
Out-Group 
Trust 
In-Group 
Trust 
Trust 
Differential 
Peru (global low) 0.1979 0.5581 0.3602 
Japan (outlier) 0.2980 0.6947 0.3967 
Zimbabwe (SSA low) 0.3064 0.6825 0.3761 
Zambia  0.3280 0.6098 0.2818 
Ghana  0.3690 0.6296 0.2606 
Nigeria  0.3693 0.7179 0.3486 
Ethiopia  0.3998 0.7310 0.3312 
Rwanda  0.4381 0.7611 0.3230 
Burkina Faso  0.4408 0.6840 0.2432 
South Africa  0.4649 0.7079 0.2430 
Mali (SSA high) 0.5330 0.7842 0.2512 
Sweden (global high) 0.6272 0.8292 0.2020 
Mean (global) 0.3862 0.7288 0.3425 
SD (global) 0.0989 0.0638 0.0938 
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Figure 1. Social Trust by Country. 
Note: Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6. 
Source: Delhey et al. (2011) 
Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17. 
 
The GTR scores for the three test cases are considerably higher than the control 
cases.  If they were not, the research design would be “vulnerable to selection bias” 
(Collier and Mahoney 1996, 89-90).  Of the combined N=76 of country observations 
available from Waves 5 and 6 of the WVS survey, the test cases populate the middle 50 
percentile of GTR scores, when the trust-fragile states literature suggests fragile SSA 
states should have much narrower GTR.  The surveys’ observations follow a relatively 
normal distribution with 68 percent of values falling within one SD from the mean, 95 
percent within 2 SD, and 99.7 percent within 3 SD.  Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s GTR 
scores are considerably higher than the trust-fragile states literature suggests and 
Nigeria’s is moderately higher.  Zimbabwe and Zambia’s GTR scores are as the trust-
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fragile states literature suggests they should be, thus their control case status.  Burkina 
Faso (0.4408), scoring higher than 75 percent of the global sample, is more than one 
standard deviation higher than Zimbabwe (0.3064), which scores higher than 25 percent 
of the global sample.  The other three cases are evenly spaced between these with 
Ethiopia (0.3998) scoring higher than 55 percent of the sample; Nigeria (0.3693) scoring 
higher than 46 percent of the sample, and Zambia (0.328) scoring higher than 34 percent 
of the sample. 
Development and fragility do not always predict the GTR.  Recent literature 
(Delhey and Welzel 2012, 61; Fukuyama 1995, 28; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994, 130) 
claims East Asian societies are prone to narrow GTR, even though many have developed 
economies.  All test and control case score higher than Japan (0.298), which should not 
be surprising since its society is highly homogenous, producing high in-group trust and 
low generalized trust.  There are also several moderately developed non-East Asian states 
whose GTR scores fall below the test cases (Brazil (0.3273) and Slovenia (0.3281)) and a 
few developed western states whose GTR scores fall below Burkina Faso (Italy (0.3885), 
Uruguay (0.4214), and Netherlands (0.4221)). 
Case #1: Burkina Faso.  Burkina Faso’s in-group (0.684) and generalized 
(0.4408) trust radii perpetuate trust environments with regional differences.  Those 
regions bordering Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, in particular, have lower in-group and 
generalized trust.  Specifically, the transient Cascades Region bordering Cote d’Ivoire 
has a trust problem as it ranks lowest of all Burkinabé regions for trust in family, 
neighborhoods, and people met for the first time.  Its population even trusts their own 
family completely (69 percent) the least of all regions compared to all other regions 
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averaging 83.9 percent, a difference of 14.9 percent.  Over a quarter of its population 
(26.2 percent) have no trust in their neighborhoods compared to all other regions 
averaging 5.4 percent, a difference of 20.8 percent.  They do not trust at all people they 
meet for the first time at 52.4 percent compared to all other regions averaging 26 percent. 
The Mali-bordered Boucle du Mouhoun and Sahel regions also have a trust 
problem, but it is primarily one of mistrust of those having different religions and 
nationalities.  Half of those in the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (50 percent) do not trust at 
all people they meet for the first time.  More than a third of the Sahel Region (36.9 
percent) and a quarter of the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (29.7 percent) do not trust 
people of another religion at all, this compared to the rest of the regions averaging 9.5 
percent.  They also have fewer people that trust people from another religion completely, 
Sahel (3.9 percent) and Boucle du Mouhoun (3.8 percent), compared to the rest of the 
regions averaging 14.3 percent.  Finally, the Boucle du Mouhoun (36.1 percent) and 
Sahel (35 percent) regions do not trust other nationalities at all more than all other 
regions, which average 12.8 percent. 
Table 11  
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Burkina Faso) 
Base=1534; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 47 3.1 
Somewhat 375 24.4 
Not very much 598 39 
No trust at all 456 29.7 
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 13 0.8 
No answer 12 0.8 
Don´t know 33 2.2 
(N) 1.534 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Table Continued 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 12  
Trust: People of Another Religion (Burkina Faso) 
Base=1534; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 196 12.8 
Somewhat 606 39.5 
Not very much 437 28.5 
No trust at all 209 13.6 
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 17 1.1 
No answer 18 1.2 
Don´t know 51 3.3 
(N) 1.534 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 13  
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Burkina Faso) 
Base=1534; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 138 9 
Somewhat 575 37.5 
Not very much 471 30.7 
No trust at all 253 16.5 
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 24 1.6 
No answer 20 1.3 
Don´t know 53 3.5 
(N) 1.534 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Case #2: Ethiopia.  Ethiopia’s in-group (0.731) and generalized (0.3998) trust 
radii perpetuate trust environments with regional and age differences.  While all 
 116 
Ethiopians trust their families greatly (85-95 percent), young, urban, wealthy, and 
educated Ethiopians have a trust problem.  Trust among the young (under 29 in 2007) and 
the old (over 49 years old in 2007) differ significantly.  The young spent their formative 
years suffering from famine under the rule of the communist regime.  They have the most 
trouble trusting those from their neighborhoods; people they know personally; and people 
they meet for the first time. 
Table 14  
Ethiopian Trust Young v. Old 
 Know Personally Neighborhood Met for the First Time 
Young 15.5 32.7 18.8 
Old 35.3 52.9 31.4 
Difference 19.8 20.2 12.6 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
One-third of Ethiopian urbanites, nearly one-fourth living in the capital, Addis 
Ababa, do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time or that are of a different 
religion, or nationality.  Oppositely, only 12.4 percent of the people of Tigray State 
bordering Eritrea do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time, with all other 
states averaging only 11.9 percent and 15.6 percent respectively for not trusting people at 
all of other religions and nationalities. 
Members of the upper class (39.6 percent) and the university educated (39.8 
percent) are the most mistrusting of people they meet for the first time, while the lower 
middle class (16.3 percent) is the least mistrusting with all other educational attainment 
levels average 20.8 percent.  By contrast, the university educated (28 percent) are the 
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most completely trusting of people of another religion, while those who failed to attain 
their secondary college-preparatory diploma (2.3 percent) are the least. 
Table 15  
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Ethiopia) 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 41 2.7 
Somewhat 349 23.3 
Not very much 726 48.4 
No trust at all 315 21 
No answer 27 1.8 
Don´t know 42 2.8 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 16  
Trust: People of Another Religion (Ethiopia) 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 164 10.9 
Somewhat 379 25.3 
Not very much 609 40.6 
No trust at all 217 14.5 
No answer 60 4 
Don´t know 71 4.7 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 17  
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Ethiopia) 
Table Continued 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 73 4.9 
Somewhat 294 19.6 
Not very much 698 46.5 
No trust at all 272 18.1 
No answer 81 5.4 
Don´t know 82 5.5 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Case #3: Nigeria.  Nigeria’s relatively high mobility, uneven development, in-
group (0.7179), and generalized (0.3693) trust radii produce trust environments with class 
and regional differences.  Wealthy Nigerians are nearly as suspicious of their own 
families as they are of their wealthy neighbors and are divided on the extent of their trust 
of those from other religions and nationalities.  They (77.1 percent) trust their own 
families completely 11.8 percentage points less than all other classes (88.9 percent).  The 
transient lower middle class (16.3 percent) trusts its neighborhoods completely 17.9 
percentage points less than all other classes do, which average 34.2 percent, while 43.8 
percent of the upper class does.  The wealthy are also divided regarding their trust in 
people of other religions, as they are nearly equally split and the most polarized of all 
classes with 28.3 percent trusting them completely and 35 percent not at all.  While all 
Nigerian classes average 25.8 percent in their total mistrust of other nationalities, the 
upper class (25.6 percent) trust them completely the most, while the lower class (5.4 
percent) trust them the least with a 20.2 percent difference. 
Many of the wealthiest Nigerians reside in Lagos, SSA’s largest and the world’s 
sixth largest city when measuring the city proper rather than urban area or metropolitan 
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area (United Nations 2016).  Of those residing in Lagos, only 67 percent trust their 
families completely, 22 percentage points less than in all other areas of the country, 
which average 89 percent.  There are also several regional differences for in-group and 
generalized trust.  Only 8.2 percent of residents of the Middle Belt states in the North 
Central Region trust their neighborhoods completely compared to all other regions 
averaging 28.1 percent.  The Igbo of the South East Region distrust people at all of 
another religion the most (35.4 percent) compared to the rest of the regions at 18.7 
percent, which is a difference of 16.7 percent. 
Table 18  
How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Nigeria) 
Base=1759; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 80 4.5 
Trust somewhat 302 17.2 
Do not trust very much 756 43 
Do not trust at all 621 35.3 
(N) 1.759 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 19  
How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Nigeria) 
Base=1759; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 181 10.3 
Trust somewhat 625 35.5 
Do not trust very much 577 32.8 
Do not trust at all 376 21.4 
(N) 1.759 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
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Table 20  
How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Nigeria) 
Base=1759; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 138 7.9 
Trust somewhat 493 28 
Do not trust very much 674 38.3 
Do not trust at all 454 25.8 
(N) 1.759 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Case #4: Zambia.  Zambia’s in-group (0.6098) and generalized (0.328) trust radii 
produce trust environments with regional differences, primarily regarding in-group trust.  
Zambia’s Central, Western, and Copperbelt provinces are most trusting, while its Eastern, 
Lusaka, North Western, and Southern provinces have various trust problems.  Zambia’s 
Central Province trusts most completely their neighborhoods (35.4 percent), people they 
know personally (36 percent), and those of another religion (27.3 percent).  Those in 
Western and Copperbelt provinces (1.1 percent) distrust their neighborhoods the least. 
Zambia’s Eastern (33.8 percent) and Western (86.2 percent) provinces differ the 
greatest (54.2 percentage point difference) in how much they completely trust their 
family with the average of all provinces being 64.8 percent.  In Lusaka, complete trust in 
one’s neighborhoods is lowest (6.9 percent), while its level of no trust at all is highest (12 
percent), excluding North Western Province (12.1 percent).  Only 3.8 percent of those in 
Southern Province trust completely people they know personally and 2.9 percent average 
for those of other religions. 
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Table 21  
Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zambia) 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 23 1.5 
Somewhat 214 14.3 
Not very much 594 39.6 
No trust at all 624 41.6 
No answer 24 1.6 
Don´t know 21 1.4 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 22  
Trust: People of Another Religion (Zambia) 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 124 8.3 
Somewhat 438 29.2 
Not very much 546 36.4 
No trust at all 316 21.1 
No answer 34 2.3 
Don´t know 42 2.8 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 23  
Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zambia) 
Base=1500; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 48 3.2 
Somewhat 276 18.4 
Not very much 649 43.3 
Table Continued 
No trust at all 453 30.2 
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 2 0.1 
No answer 33 2.2 
Don´t know 39 2.6 
(N) 1.5 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Case #5: Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe’s in-group (0.6825) and generalized (0.3064) 
trust radii produce trust environments with class and regional differences.  Zimbabwe’s 
upper class places more trust in more groups than its lower classes.  They (91.8 percent) 
trust their families completely 12.4 percentage points more than all other lower classes 
averaged at 79.4 percent and people they meet for the first time (11.6 percent), which is 
eight percent higher than the lower classes averaged at 3.6 percent.  Oddly, the upper 
class is divided over complete (28.3 percent) and total lack of (35 percent) trust in 
persons of another religion.  While all classes average 25.8 percent in total lack of trust in 
other nationalities, their complete trust in other nationalities is class-dependent, with the 
upper class (25.6 percent) trusting most and the lower class (5.4 percent) trusting least, a 
20.2 percentage point gap. 
Regionally, minority areas of Midlands (59.9 percent), Masvingo (68.3 percent), 
and Manicaland (71.9 percent) provinces trust their own families completely the least, 
while Shona and Northern Ndebele majority areas average 91 percent.  Masvingo 
Province (1.9 percent) also trusts neighborhoods completely least compared to all other 
provinces that average 17.6 percent.  Those in Mashonaland East Province (35.4 percent) 
do not trust at all people of another religion the most, compared to the rest of the 
provinces’ average (18.7 percent), which is a difference of 16.7 percent. 
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Table 24  
How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zimbabwe) 
Base=1499; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 20 1.3 
Trust somewhat 183 12.2 
Do not trust very much 640 42.7 
Do not trust at all 656 43.8 
(N) 1.499 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 25  
How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Zimbabwe) 
Base=1499; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 54 3.6 
Trust somewhat 508 33.9 
Do not trust very much 656 43.8 
Do not trust at all 280 18.7 
(N) 1.499 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
 
Table 26  
How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zimbabwe) 
Base=1499; Weighted results Number of cases Percent Total 
Trust completely 31 2.1 
Trust somewhat 325 21.7 
Do not trust very much 681 45.4 
Do not trust at all 462 30.8 
(N) 1.499 100 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 
Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17. 
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Independent Variables 
State Security & Contract Institutions 
There is a consensus in the state literature that security and contract institutions 
determine the majority of state fragility, yet how much they affect the GTR remains 
under debate in the trust literature.  This dissertation addresses this debate by 
constructing a hybrid sociological institutionalism and social capital theory theoretical 
framework; unfortunately, their research agendas have remained largely disconnected 
(Thelen 1999, 371, 386-7).  The limited research at their intersection claims social capital 
needs to be embedded in formal institutions to increase (see Berman 1997; Hall 1999; 
Levi 1998; Stolle 2002; Tarrow 1996).  If this is the case, it is imperative to identify 
which formal institutions affect the GTR most. 
Table 27  
Security Institutions 
Country 
 
Political Stability and the Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (2016) 
 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Estimate of 
Governance 
 
Most Stable 100 (Greenland) 1.96 (Greenland)  
Zambia 52.86 0.18  
Rwanda 45.71 -0.05  
S. Africa 42.38 -0.13  
Ghana 40.00 -0.16  
Zimbabwe 24.29 -0.61  
Burkina Faso 15.24 -0.95  
Mali 8.57 -1.55  
Table Continued 
Ethiopia 7.62 -1.57  
Nigeria 6.67 -1.85  
Least Stable 0.00 (Syria) -2.91 (Syria)  
Note: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance). 
Source: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(2016) (N=215) 
Data extracted from source on 09/25/17. 
 
 
Table 28  
Contract Institutions 
Country 
Rule of Law (2016) Control of Corruption (2016) 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Estimate of 
Governance 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Estimate of 
Governance 
Most Effective 
100 
(Sweden) 
2.04 
(Sweden) 
100 
(New Zealand) 
2.30 
(New Zealand) 
S. Africa 58.17 0.07 60.10 0.05 
Rwanda 57.69 0.07 74.52 0.69 
Ghana 54.81 0.00 50.96 -0.17 
Zambia 43.27 -0.30 42.31 -0.40 
Ethiopia 37.02 -0.39 39.90 -0.44 
Burkina Faso 34.13 -0.45 53.37 -0.13 
Mali 22.60 -0.78 29.81 -0.67 
Nigeria 13.94 -1.05 13.46 -1.04 
Zimbabwe 8.17 -1.32 8.65 -1.28 
Least Effective 
0 
(Somalia) 
-2.37 
(Somalia) 
0 
(Equatorial Guinea) 
-1.81 
(Equatorial Guinea) 
Note: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
Sources: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption (2016) (N=215); World Bank – Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: Rule of Law (2016) (N=215) 
Data extracted from source on 09/25/17. 
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Rothstein and Stolle (2008) claim legal, law enforcement, and military “order” 
institutions bear a greater societal expectation of impartiality than other institutions 
(2008, 445) and are therefore most likely to affect the GTR and social capital.  
Institutions may be arranged in an infinite number of configurations (Rothstein 1996, 
572); the literature has left most of them unexplored (2008, 441), and it is unclear 
whether trust in political institutions causes generalized trust or vice versa (2008, 443).  
Together, analysis of order institutions and social mechanisms that trigger individual 
behavior provide the fullest explanation of generalized trust (Hedström and Swedberg 
1998, 12, 23). 
Many in the trust literature assume generalized and institutional trust cannot be 
separated entirely for analysis (see Crepaz 2008; Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 
2003, 199-200; You 2005).  Within this presumed constraint, Freitag and Bühlmann 
propose there is a “top-down approach to producing generalized trust through political 
institutions” (2009, 1556).  However, because their findings are based on the old 
“standard” trust question, they merit reexamination using the new trust question.  Further, 
they claim institutional configurations with low corruption, and income inequality and 
proportional representation may produce generalized trust (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009, 
1554) rather than only institutional trust.  They also claim that 
…the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, health care spending, 
institutional and executive power-sharing, and prominence of democratic-
pluralistic rules do not exhibit any statistically significant influence on the 
development of trust – Freitag and Bühlmann (2009, 1554) 
 
Rothstein and Stolle (2008) provide strong support for state security and contract 
institutions affecting the GTR.  However, Freitag and Bühlmann’s (2009) claim of 
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institutions creating generalized trust requires further critique.  The question of how 
separable institutional and generalized trust is from the other remains unanswered.  Most 
of the trust literature claim them to be two separate phenomena, yet there is not a 
consensus on where institutional designers end and institutions begin, nor where 
institutions end and institutional administrators begin.  Fragile states have weak 
institutions, so even if institutions can elicit generalized trust, it is not possible in fragile 
states.  Therefore, strong security and contract institutions may serve (Smith 2003, 119) 
as a limited and temporary alternate source of the positive externalities associated with 
the widening of the GTR (Chan 2007, 734), although this is rarely realized in fragile 
states.  These quantitative findings present a compelling case for the effects of state 
security and contract institutions on the GTR. 
Individualism & Collectivism 
The most consistent finding is that industrialized, wealthy, and urban 
societies tend to become increasingly individualistic, whereas more 
traditional, poorer, and more rural societies tend to remain collectivistic. 
—Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations 
 
A society’s aggregate individualism-collectivism level is expressed through the 
degree of independence (Hofstede 2001, 93), pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness (House et 
al. 2004, 30) within and between its groups.  This level affects social behavior and is 
mostly antecedent to all other factors affecting the GTR.  Rights, personal interests, 
rationality, and fluidity of group boundaries, rather than duties and obligations to one’s 
group(s), drive individualism, which is associated with a wider trust radius and 
collectivism with a narrower one (van Hoorn 2015, 269).  Hofstede’s (2001) 
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Individualism and House’s (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimensions provide the 
quantitative foundation for the qualitative findings and analysis in subsequent chapters. 
Table 29  
Individualism-Collectivism 
Country 
Hofstede 
Individualism 
(higher = more 
individualist) 
(N=76) 
GLOBE In-Group 
Collectivism 
(practices) (lower = 
more individualist) 
(N=62) 
GLOBE In-Group 
Collectivism (values) 
(lower = more 
individualist) 
(N=62) 
Most Individualist 
91 
(United States) 
3.18 
(Czech Republic) 
4.06 
(Czech Republic) 
S. Africa 65 4.80 5.45 
Zambia 35 5.84 5.77 
Nigeria 30 5.55 5.48 
Ethiopia 20  -  - 
Burkina Faso 15  -  - 
Ghana 15  -  - 
Zimbabwe  - 5.57 5.85 
Mali  -  -  - 
Rwanda  -  -  - 
Least Individualist 
6 
(Guatemala) 
6.36 
(Philippines) 
6.52 
(El Salvador) 
Note: N=52 countries common between Hofstede and GLOBE studies. 
Sources: Hofstede (2001); House et al. (2004) 
Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database and GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on 
06/04/17. 
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Figure 2. Individualism Dimension. 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
No Data available for Zimbabwe. 
Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database on 06/04/17. 
 
The Hofstede (2001) Individualism dimension is measured on a scale of zero 
(low) to 100 (high).  The range represented across the five country cases span a low score 
of 15 (Burkina Faso) to a high score of 35 (Zambia).  Each of the cases scores below the 
global average of 45 and much closer to the global low score of six (Guatemala) 
compared to the global high score of 91 (United States). 
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Figure 3. In-Group Collectivism. 
Source: House (2004) 
No Data are available for Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. 
Data extracted from GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on 06/04/17. 
 
The House et al. (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimension is measured on a scale 
of one (low) to seven (high), taking account of internalized values and actual behavior.  
Each of the five cases scores highly for In-Group Collectivism in their practices.  Only 
Nigeria’s In-Group Collectivism (values) are below the global average.  Only Zimbabwe 
has a moderate difference between its expressed values and actual behavior; therefore, 
Zimbabweans claim to be more collectivist (5.85) than they behave (5.57).  Oppositely, 
globally, countries claim to be less collectivist (5.13) than they behave (5.66). 
Together, Hofstede’s (2001) individualism indicator and House’s (2004) practices 
scale, measure individualism-collectivism along a continuum with a correlation measure 
of −.765 (n = 25) (van Hoorn 2015, 275). 
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A one standard deviation increase in individualism implies an increase in 
the outgroup connotation of trust of almost 40% (.0357/.0896) and a one 
standard deviation increase in collectivism implies a decrease in the 
outgroup connotation of trust exceeding 50% (−.0486/.0944), ceteris 
paribus – van Hoorn (2015, 273) 
 
Some in the literature disagree (Allik and Realo 2004, 31), claiming individualism 
and collectivism are not opposite ends of a continuum (see Triandis and Suh 2002) that 
are stable over time (see Fontaine et al. 2008), and whose “meaning is not constant across 
contexts within the culture” (Fiske 2002, 83-4).  Van Hoorn (2014) further claims the rule 
of law, democracy, income per capita, and income inequality affects how individualists 
and collectivists understand the meaning of “trust in most people” as framed in the WVS 
old “standard” trust question (2015, 274).  There is an ongoing debate, not if 
individualism and collectivism affect the GTR, but how much and in what ways.  The 
quantitative findings on individualist and collectivist cultural traits present a strong case 
for individualism as a nearly antecedent, yet still variable, social condition that positively 
affects a society’s GTR. 
Inter-State Market Forces 
Does generalized trust produce positive market outcomes or vice versa?  Some in 
the literature (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et 
al. 1997; Putnam 1993; and Zak and Knack 2001) “have argued that the causality goes 
from generalized trust to GDP per capita (or GDP-per-capita growth rate), although the 
causality can easily be argued to go both ways” (Chan 2007, 741).  Chan (2007) and 
Polillo (2012) synthesize the pertinent quantitative discourse related to globalization’s 
multifaceted effects on the GTR through the separately measurable sub-factors of trade, 
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foreign direct investment (FDI, foreign portfolio investment (FPI), remittances, military 
aid, and non-military aid. 
The literature is unresolved as to “whether global economic integration can lead 
to national social disintegration, as proclaimed by Rodrik (1997)” (Chan 2007, 733). 
...on the one hand, globalization is understood to be integrative and 
civilizing, increasing people’s mutual dependence on others, and leading 
to greater social trust; on the other hand, globalization is perceived as 
destructive and threatening, making people vulnerable to forces beyond 
their control, and thus affecting social trust negatively – Polillo (2012, 45) 
referencing Guillén (2001); Kaya and Karakoc (2012); and Lizardo (2008) 
 
What is certain is that increasing globalization exposes societies to additional 
external factors such as trade, investment, remittances, and aid that potentially affect its 
GTR.  Non-fragile states are better equipped to take advantage of globalization’s effects 
while fragile states are more susceptible to its adverse effects.  For those states that 
already have extensive capital, infrastructure, patents, and knowledge, it is exponentially 
easier to produce more through the global market.  Another struggle for fragile states is 
that “global integration requires nations to make adjustments in some of their social 
values and practices or be left behind economically” (Chan 2007, 751).  However, if a 
society is already “civil” and homogenous, Bhagwati (2004) and Sen (1999) argue “that 
the transmission of foreign values from globalization benefits national values” (Chan 
2007, 751).  Unfortunately, most fragile states of SSA do not meet these criteria. 
Economic inequality has an intervening relationship with, and non-linear effect 
on, trade and generalized trust.  Chan (2007) argues that a country’s openness to 
globalization increases generalized trust and strengthens informal institutions, “the ‘civic 
glue’ that holds together and governs the society” (2007, 751).  He does not, however, 
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make this claim without qualification, stating, “Economic inequality weakens this 
positive effect” (2007, 751).  The World Bank’s World Development Indicators national 
economic inequality scores he references are estimated by unit-record consumption data 
for all cases except Zimbabwe, which is estimated by grouped consumption data, range 
from 23.1 to 59.3 with a mean of 37.58 and SD of 10.72 over various years.  Zambia has 
the highest economic inequality of the cases with a Gini score of 57.1 in 2010 and 
Ethiopia the lowest at 29.8 in 2005; Ethiopia’s Gini score is 2.6 SD lower than Zambia’s. 
Table 30  
Inequality by Country (selected cases) 
Country Gini Coefficient Year 
Zambia 57.1 2010 
Zimbabwe 47 1995 
Nigeria 46.8 2010 
Burkina Faso 39.8 2009 
Ethiopia 29.8 2005 
Note: Gini Coefficient is composite of nine separate inequality indicators. 
Source: World Bank (various years). 
Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17. 
 
He hypothesizes that at some, yet to be identified, tipping point along this 
continuum, increasing economic inequality, and openness to trade will negatively affect 
generalized trust (Chan 2007, 751).  The Zimbabwean and Zambian control cases support 
this hypothesis, as they have high trade as percent of GDP, high inequality, and a low 
GTR.  Under these conditions, mutually beneficial inter-group interaction is dependent 
on increased institutional trust through easily monitored and enforced institutions (2007, 
734).  Unfortunately, institutional trust is hard to come by in fragile states. 
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Figure 4. Trade as Percent of GDP by Year. 
Note: High and low all-time recorded annual scores per country. 
Source: World Bank 2017. 
Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17. 
 
 
Table 31  
Inter-State Market Forces: Trade 
Country 
Trade (Percent of 
GDP) (2016) 
(N=217) 
Current Account Balance 
(Percent of GDP) (2015) 
(N=217) 
Net Barter Terms of Trade 
Index 2015 (2000=100) 
(N=217) 
Global High 
419 
(Luxembourg) 
25.45 
(Macao SAR, China) 
192.64 
(United Arab Emirates) 
Ghana  89 -7.48 174.50 
Zambia  84 -3.63 165.10 
Burkina Faso  63 -8.05 113.80 
South Africa  60 -3.21 133.10 
Zimbabwe  60 -9.46 113.50 
Rwanda  48 -13.30 156.90 
Mali  47 -4.83 148.80 
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Table Continued 
Ethiopia  36 -6.89 134.50 
Nigeria  21 -3.28 131.50 
Global Low 
22 
(Sudan) 
-42.26 
(Liberia) 
44.09 
(Sierra Leone) 
Note: Most recent data from each source. 
Trade (Percent of GDP): Nigeria and Zambia are 2015. 
Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP): Ethiopia is 2012, Mali and Burkina Faso are 2014, and South Africa is 2016 
Sources: World Bank – Trade (Percent of GDP); Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP; Net Barter Terms of Trade Index 
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17. 
 
Table 32  
Inter-State Market Forces: Investment 
Country 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (Percent of 
GDP) (2015) 
(N=217) 
Portfolio Equity, net 
inflows (BoP, current 
US$) (2015) (N=217) 
Highest Investment 
71.7 
(Ireland) 
350,945,538,584 
(Luxembourg) 
Ghana  8.5 18,140,000 
Zambia  7.5 182,760 
Rwanda  4.0 1,395,122 
Ethiopia  3.5           - 
Zimbabwe  2.8 122,800,000 
Burkina Faso  1.6 65,580,541 
Mali  1.2 2,466,956 
Nigeria  0.7 -486,640,211 
South Africa  0.5 1,639,686,877 
Lowest Investment 
-29.9 
(Marshall Islands) 
-178,267,000,000 
(United States) 
Note: Most recent data from each source. 
Sources: World Bank – Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Percent of GDP); World Bank – 
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$): Ghana is 2010, Burkina Faso and Mali is 2014, 
South Africa is 2016 data. 
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17. 
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Table 33  
Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances 
Country 
Remittances (Personal 
remittances, received 
(Percent of GDP) (2016) 
(N=217) 
Remittances (Personal 
remittances, received 
(current US$) (2016) 
(N=217) 
Highest Receiving 
30.6 
(Liberia) 
62,745,000 
(India) 
Zimbabwe  12.7 2,046,580 
Mali  5.7 802,655 
Ghana  4.8 2,041,692 
Nigeria  4.7 18,956,000 
Burkina Faso  3.3 397,309 
Rwanda  1.9 163,313 
Ethiopia  0.9 641,939 
South Africa  0.3 755,434 
Zambia  0.2 44,321 
Lowest Receiving 0.0 
1,494 
(Suriname) 
Note: Most recent data from each source. 
Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP) and Remittances (Personal remittances, received (current 
US$): Zimbabwe is 2015. 
Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP): Angola, Congo, DRC, Turkmenistan, United States, 
Suriname, Chile, and Saudi Arabia = 0. 
Source: World Bank (2015) 
Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17. 
 
Table 34  
Inter-State Market Forces: Aid 
Table Continued 
Country 
Net ODA (non-military) received 
per capita 10 Year Average 
Disbursement (2005-2014) 
(N=218) 
US Aid (military) 10 
Year Average 
Disbursement (2006-
2015) (N=222) 
Most Received 
2576.11 
(Nauru) 
2,841,356,291 
(Israel) 
Rwanda  88.48 709,711 
Zambia  81.47 408,376 
Mali  70.08 2,559,140 
Burkina Faso  64.42 932,342 
Ghana  59.04 2,896,107 
Zimbabwe  46.02 0 
Ethiopia  35.87 4,106,991 
Nigeria  22.17 6,433,980 
South Africa  20.22 1,707,197 
Least Received 0 0 
Note: Most recent data from each source. 
Net ODA (non-military) received per capita 10 Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014): multiple = 0. 
US Aid (military) 10 Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015): multiple = 0. 
Sources: OECD (2015); USAID (2015) 
Data extracted from sources on 09/27/17. 
 
Polillo (2012) comes to a similar, but more far-reaching conclusion than Chan 
(2007) for the same question.  He claims globalized competition and resulting economic 
inequality have “deleterious effects on social trust” (2012, 60), “decreasing generalized 
trust in the countries most exposed to it” (2012, 45).  He also claims democracies are 
almost certainly more effective incubators of social trust than authoritarian regimes, 
though this is difficult to prove due to the endogenous relationship between democracy 
and social trust (2012, 61); the trust literature is unsure how to identify and prove the 
causal direction with clear empirical evidence.  Confusingly, he qualifies his claims 
stating, “the degree to which a country contributes to global scientific knowledge is 
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positively associated with the probability that its citizens will trust unknown others” 
(Polillo 2012, 59).  Assuming the accumulation of scientific knowledge is a reasonable 
proxy for development, he is claiming the most productive countries in the global market, 
regardless of their level of economic inequality, will increase in generalized trust. 
These quantitative findings on inter-state market forces, centered on trade, present 
a case for their bi-directional effects on the GTR, prompting subsequent analysis of the 
qualitative findings on trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, and non-military aid. 
Social Network Composition 
Alesina et al. (2003) calculate ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, 
leaving out the cultural fractionalization that Fearon (2003) includes.  This study 
increases the number of observations and consistency of measurement criteria over all 
other previous research (Alesina et al. 2003, 182). 
However, it is difficult to evaluate precisely the size of these effects 
because of the strong correlation of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
variables with other potential explanatory variables, especially 
geographical ones.  In the end one has to use theory and priors to interpret 
our partial correlations – Alesina et al. (2003, 183) 
 
Table 35  
Fractionalization (sub-Saharan African Sample) 
Country Ethnic 
(N=180)  
M:0.385 
Linguistic 
(N=185) 
M:0.435 
Religious 
(N=198) 
M:0.439 
Most Fractionalized (global) 0.9302 (Uganda) 0.9227 (Uganda) 0.8603 (S. Africa) 
Nigeria 0.8505 0.8503 0.7421 
Zambia 0.7808 0.8734 0.7359 
South Africa 0.7517 0.8652 0.8603 
Burkina Faso 0.7377 0.7228 0.5798 
Ethiopia 0.7235 0.8073 0.6249 
Mali 0.6906 0.8388 0.1820 
Ghana 0.6733 0.6731 0.7987 
Zimbabwe 0.3874 0.4472 0.7363 
Table Continued 
Rwanda 0.3238 0.0000 0.5066 
Least Fractionalized (global) 0.0000 (Bermuda) 0.0000 (Isle of Man) 0.0028 (Somalia) 
Notes: Higher values = more fractionalization. 
Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Data extracted from appendix table (184-9) on 10/11/17. 
There are regional differences in fractionalization.  While non-European Western 
countries tend towards moderate-low ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and high religious 
fractionalization, East Asian and European (mainly Scandinavian) countries tend towards 
low fractionalization in all three areas.  Sub-Saharan African countries tend towards high 
fractionalization in all three areas except for Muslim-majority countries, which lack the 
denominational diversity of Christian-majority countries.  The 13 least religiously 
fractionalized countries are all Muslim majority and located in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) and SSA.  In SSA, high religious fractionalization indicates a 
highly religious population or a high percentage of syncretism and the presence of 
African Initiated Churches (AICs), most of which are independent and widely vary in 
belief and practice.  Low religious fractionalization in SSA may indicate a spatially small 
country, one that is Muslim-majority, religion’s lack of importance in the society, or the 
presence of a large, unified religion or denomination (e.g., Roman Catholic or Sunni 
Muslim). 
Nigeria is the most comprehensively fractionalized of the cases when considering 
all of the indices from each source followed by Zambia, which is only low in Fearon’s 
(2003) cultural fractionalization measure and does not make the ELF list of the ten most 
fractionalized Africa countries.  Ethiopia is only considered more fractionalized than 
Zambia in Fearon’s (2003) measures; all others favor Zambia.  Burkina Faso and 
Zimbabwe make the list of the ten least fractionalized African countries for PREG and 
ELF respectively.  Zimbabwe is the least comprehensively fractionalized of the cases 
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when considering all of the indices from each source, except the Alesina et al. (2003) 
religious fractionalization measure, while Burkina Faso comes in middle of the pack in 
all measures except the Alesina et al. (2003) religious fractionalization measure, for 
which it is the lowest of the cases.  Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe each have a unipolar 
configuration with a single large and powerful majority group, but they differ in their 
minority group composition with the former having many small minorities and the later 
having a single large minority group. 
These quantitative fractionalization findings present a strong, yet incomplete, case 
for social effects on the GTR.  Societies with the greatest GTR potential are the most 
fractionalized, yet this is only one of several meaningful effects along with proximity and 
power differential, which the quantitative literature pays little attention.  The test cases of 
Ethiopia and Nigeria are highly fractionalized, while Burkina Faso is not and the control 
case of Zambia is highly fractionalized, while Zimbabwe is not. 
 
Qualitative Findings 
Independent Variables 
The quantitative findings presented in the preceding section suggest the balance 
between in-group, generalized, and institutional trust affects the economic, political, and 
socio-cultural composition of societies.  These findings also suggest the measurement of 
the GTR has been inaccurate for SSA, with the Delhey et al. (2011) new trust measure 
providing promise for the advancement of the trust literature in this region.  George’s 
(1979, 210) second phase of case study examination (research design implementation) 
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continues through this chapter’s presentation of qualitative case findings for each control 
and test variable. 
State Security Institutions 
 
As a dog returns to its vomit, so fools repeat their folly. 
—Prov. 26:11, NIV 
  
Case #1: Burkina Faso.  Burkina Faso, colonized by France, having gained its 
independence in 1960 as Upper Volta, is not widely recognized as having a history of 
state fragility, but it does.  Even though it has one of the more peaceful post-colonial 
histories in SSA, it has experienced other forms of fragility, including poverty, weak 
political legitimacy leading to peacefully resolved coup d'états, uneven development, and 
cross-border migration.  In the 2010s it experienced increased conflict and violence 
resulting from the spillover of Islamist extremism from Mali and political unrest in the 
form of multiple successful and failed military coup d'états.  Its culture of strongman 
leadership, common across SSA, has held political leaders in power long after their 
constitutional-democratic terms have expired. 
The Burkinabé have fallen into a cycle of non-procedural, non-violent, power 
transitions that have effectively short-circuited attempted power grabs.  They have 
experienced seven successful post-independence coup d'états (the highest of all SSA) 
(Dwyer 2015, 98), due in part, to a chaotic and vigorous protest culture and undisciplined 
military with one of the highest mutiny rates in SSA (Dwyer 2017, 220).  Each regime 
established by a successive coup d'état has quickly collapsed under the pressure of the 
next one, indicating an active political culture in a weak institutional environment.  
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Protest has served as a relatively peaceful political pressure valve for a society that has 
few trustworthy security institutions. 
Table 36  
Burkinabé Insecurity 
Type Year(s) Outcome 
Military coup d'état 1966-1980 Long-term success 
Civilian power struggle 1974 Parliament dissolved 
Military coup d'état 1980-1982 Short-term success 
Military coup d'état 1982-1983 Short-term success 
Military coup d'état 1983 Failed 
Military coup d'état 1983-1987 Moderate-term success 
Military coup d'état 1987-2014 Long-term success 
Military coup d'état plot 1989 Failed 
Military coup d'état 2003 Failed 
Military coup d'état 2014- Short-term success 
Military coup d'état 2015 Failed 
Military coup d'état 2016 Failed 
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010 
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17. 
 
An increasingly active and emboldened Burkinabé civil society has helped to 
pressure the military-led government to remain within its constitutional bounds but has 
been unable or unwilling to generate sufficient electoral pressure until 2015 to elect a 
stable non-military leader (President Kaboré).  Before this, it repeatedly allowed a return 
to the source of the government’s poor leadership—the military—to replace embattled 
civilian leaders via coup d'état.  The same solution to a recurring problem has produced 
identical results: state fragility.  Burkinabé security institutions do not positively affect 
the GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional. 
Case #2: Ethiopia.  Ethiopia, with the longest political history of any SSA 
country, dating back 3,000 years, successfully resisted Italian colonization; it is one of 
only two SSA states (Ethiopia and Liberia) never to be colonized.  However, freedom 
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from colonial influence has not spared it from insecurity.  Ethiopian insecurity stems 
from a combination of civil war, secession, spillover, and famine.  It has experienced 
fewer coup d'états than the average SSA state, in part because its military has been busy 
managing more severe forms of conflict, such as secession and interstate war with Eritrea 
(McGowan 2003, 357).  However, for the few coup d'états that have occurred, the 
military contributed to their manifestation (Wang 1998, 664).  A Marxist military coup 
d'état in 1974, for example, triggered a protracted civil war lasting 16 years.  Following 
this was a lengthy and costly stalemate resulting in the secession of Eritrea, freeing it 
from an uncomfortable federation with Ethiopia, eventually leading to the Ethiopian-
Eritrean War 1998-2000, which killed an estimated 50,000-100,000 people (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service 2000).  This secession was born of two politically 
separate cultures that valued “absolute victory and zero-sum calculations over 
compromise and joint gains” (Lyons 2009, 168). 
Table 37  
Ethiopian Insecurity 
Type Year(s) Outcome 
Civilian coup d'état 1928 Long-term success 
Military coup d'état 1960 Failed 
Military coup d'état/Civil war 1974-1991 Long-term success 
Military coup d'état 1977 Successful 
Military coup d'état 1977 Successful 
Military coup d'état 1989 Failed 
Secession 1993 Eritrea secedes 
War 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian War 
Only McGowan (2003) includes the two 1977 events. 
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010 
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17. 
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More recently, Ethiopia experienced the eighth worst global decline in freedom 
between 2006-2016 due primarily to land rights conflicts, the state’s use of force against 
its citizens, and proxy conflicts and spillover from Somalia (Puddington and Roylance 
2017, 10), resulting in a highly militarized border (Lyons 2009, 167).  One long-term 
consequence of these conflicts has been food insecurity.  The United Nations estimated 
that 12 percent of Ethiopians were in need of food assistance in July of 2008 (Benequista 
2008).  For all of these reasons, Ethiopian security institutions do not positively affect the 
GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed. 
Case #3: Nigeria.  If the Nigerian state remains intact, it may provide a model of 
constitutional governance for ethnically fractionalized societies (Suberu 2001, 205).  A 
2005 U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) report outlined a possible worst-case 
scenario for Nigeria, estimating that within fifteen years, Nigeria may not survive as a 
country (Population Council 2006, 192).  While there have been some scares, it remains a 
sovereign state, a regional military leader, and a major global petrol economy. 
Britain colonized Nigeria by compelling an uncomfortable union between 
northern Hausa Muslims, southern Yoruba and Igbo Christians, and hundreds of minority 
ethnolinguistic groups residing in their spheres of influence.  This fragmented country 
gained its independence in 1960 peacefully (Sampson 1994, 88), yet this was not a 
foreshadowing of things to come.  Like many post-colonial African states, Nigeria has a 
civil war story.  The Christian Igbo coup d'état and secession attempt in 1966 to establish 
the Republic of Biafra and the northern Muslim counter coup d'état later that year in 
response triggered the Biafra War (1967-1970) (1994, 90).  In the immediate fallout of 
this failed secession attempt, an estimated 1.5 million Igbo fled the North of Nigeria and 
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another 6,000-8,000 died (De St. Jorre 1972, 91).  While the result of the Biafra War was 
a widely disputed 500,000 to 6 million casualties (Wiseberg 1975, 54), 1 million from 
starvation and disease (United States Congressional Record 1969, S1977).  While its 
military considers itself a regional power and substantiates this by providing the majority 
of African Union troops, Nigeria is also one of the most unstable states domestically.  
Even though it has a national police force, local communities often take responsibility for 
their security through vigilantism (Paden 2008, 126).  Some state governments have gone 
a step further to enlist the services of vigilante groups and ethnic militias to maintain law 
and order (Akinyele 2001, 628; Ukiwo 2002, 40).  The federal government’s consistent 
answer to domestic chaos has been a military response to return stability (Paden 2005, 
219).  In this way, the military sees itself as the savior of incompetent civilian leaders; 
however, the military has been less capable than the civilian government of being a 
catalyst for democratic transition and civil society (Ojo 2000, 2).  Military Heads of State 
Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) demonstrate that “military rulers 
‘govern’ no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse” (McGowan 
2003, 340). 
Table 38  
Nigerian Insecurity 
Type Year(s) Outcome 
Military coup d'état 1966 Short-term success 
Military coup d'état response 1966 Long-term success 
Civil War 1967-1970 Failed Igbo Secession 
Military coup d'état 1975 Short-term success 
Military coup d'état 1976 Failed 
Military coup d'état 1983-1985 Moderate-term success 
Military coup d'état 1985-1993 Long-term success 
Military coup d'état 1990 Failed 
Military coup d'état 1993-1998 Long-term success 
Table Continued 
Religious Violence 2000- Ongoing social conflict 
Boko Haram Insurgency 2009- Ongoing armed conflict 
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010 
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17. 
 
Nigeria’s hybrid form of federalism is a product of its civil war and several 
constitutional alterations via “military fiat rather than by constitutional amendment and 
popular ratification” (Suberu 2001, 15).  Some considered Nigeria a collapsed state in the 
1990s (Rotberg 2004, 9).  There have been six major state realignments between its 
independence and the Fourth Nigerian Republic, established in 1999 (Suberu 2001, 15).  
Since the sudden death of President Abacha in 1998, the federal government has become 
more stable and democratic, yet there has been widespread Christian-Muslim social 
violence, petrol conflict, and the Boko Haram insurgency concentrated in the 
Northeastern Region.  Since independence, ethnoreligious conflict has taken an estimated 
three million lives (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), and there were 17,402 politically 
motivated deaths (only second to Congo DRC) recorded between 1990 and 2009, 
resulting from ethnic rioting, religious extremism, and disruption of oil supplies 
(Salehyan et al. 2012, 503).  Nigerian security institutions do not positively affect the 
GTR because they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or 
collapsed. 
Case #4: Zambia.  At independence, “the scarcity of educated manpower was 
extreme” (Lusaka 1968, 709).  The British colonized Zambia as Northern Rhodesia, with 
it gaining its independence peacefully on October 24, 1964.  While it is known to have 
one of the most peaceful histories of all post-colonial states, it is surrounded by states 
whose violent fights for independence (e.g., Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Congo (DRC), 
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Angola, and Namibia) paired with Cold War proxy conflicts, have spilled over its 
borders.  Therefore, its insecurity has mainly been a function of its location in a bad 
neighborhood of states.  The Mozabeze Civil War brought border raids and village 
bombing by Portuguese troops (McKay 1971, 18).  Zambia was the staging ground for 
conflicts of the Rhodesian Bush War and South African Border War.  During the 
Rhodesian Bush War, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) set up 
base camps in Zambia to conduct operations against the white minority-led Rhodesian 
government.  While the South African Border War consisted of conflict between the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN), which spilled over into Zambia. 
Table 39  
Zambian Insecurity 
Type Year(s) Outcome 
Spillover of Rhodesian Bush War 1965-1979 Spillover 
Military coup d'état 1980 Failed 
Spillover of South African Border War 1966-1990 Spillover 
Military coup d'état 1990 Failed 
Military coup d'état 1997 Failed 
Note: Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1980 and 1990 events. 
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010 
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17. 
 
Zambia’s domestic politics has been relatively stable except for two unsuccessful 
coup d'état attempts.  The first one was civilian-led in 1980, led by the civil service 
bureaucracy that was disillusioned by the establishment of a one-party state in 1972 
(Larmer 2010, 391).  The second one was military-led in 1997 that was quickly put down.  
Even so, Zambian security institutions do not positively affect the GTR.  They are fragile 
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and minimally functional as is evidenced by their inability to prevent violent conflicts 
from periodically spilling over their borders, yet the state is not failed or collapsed. 
Case #5: Zimbabwe.  Sub-Saharan Africa has not experienced a unified pattern of 
decolonization.  The relatively peaceful “consensual decolonization” present in many 
British and French colonies was not present in Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, 
where the “entrenched settler regimes had no intention of voluntarily liquidating their 
control” (Weitzer 1984, 329).  The decolonization-fatigued Britain was unable to 
negotiate an independence settlement between the white minority-led Rhodesian 
government and rival factions of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).  This resulted in Southern 
Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence on November 11, 1965, causing Britain 
to impose sanctions and withdraw its support for the government, producing a power 
vacuum and triggering the Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted 14 years (1964-1979) and 
cost 30,000 lives.  The Rhodesian Bush War was not only a fight for independence; it 
was also part Cold War proxy conflict.  Zimbabwe has been one of the bad actors in a 
troubled neighborhood of states, with its internal conflicts spilling over into surrounding 
states. 
On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe became one of the last four states in SSA, along 
with Eritrea, Namibia, and South Africa, to gain its independence and be majority ruled 
(McGowan 2003, 347).  Its history of insecurity is due to the struggle between white 
Rhodesians resisting decolonization and blacks’ seeking independence, which is not 
unique to Zimbabwe, while its modern insecurity is due to a combination of 
authoritarianism and domestic maladministration.  During its post-independence years, it 
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went from having one of the most prosperous economies in SSA to one of the most 
fragile in a few years, due to overextension of the military and capricious land tenure 
policies. 
Table 40  
Zimbabwean Insecurity 
Type Year(s) Outcome 
Rhodesian Bush War (civil war) 1965-1979 Post-colonial independence won 
Entumbane I (civil war aftershock) 1980 Government victory 
Entumbane II (civil war aftershock) 1981 Government victory 
Military coup d'état plot 1982 Failed 
Mozambican Civil War 1982-1992 Stalemate 
Gukurahundi 1984-1987 Government crackdown on opposition 
Second Congo War 1998-2003 Stalemate 
Congo, DRC Kivu Conflict 2004-2009 Played both sides/government victory 
Military coup d'état 2007 Failed 
Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010 
Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1982 military coup d'état plot 
Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17. 
 
The Zimbabwean military has a long history of involvement in domestic politics 
(Williamson 2010, 410), yet Zimbabwe has experienced fewer coup d'états than the 
average SSA state.  This is in part due to the military’s preoccupation with the long civil 
war, and after that, the civilian government keeping the military preoccupied in external 
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, by allowing it to share 
in the spoils of those conflicts (McGowan 2003, 357).  This strategy allowed President 
Mugabe to harness the military’s support to further his domestic agenda and lengthen his 
tenure.  The provision of military support to the Congolese government during the 
Second Congo War (1998-2003), proved popular with the military elite, but drained 
Zimbabwe’s finances, making it perhaps the most unpopular decisions of the regime 
(MacLean 2002, 522).  In 2000, President Mugabe issued the Zimbabwean version of the 
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American Homestead Act of 1862, which seized white Zimbabwean farmers’ lands and 
redistributed them primarily among non-farming black elites.  These two events touched 
off a major depression, hyperinflation, and food scarcity. 
The coercive patterns of the colonial regime transferred readily to the independent 
regime (Weitzer 1984, 530).  The Shona ethnic-majority elite, who have access to plenty 
of capital, maintain power and control by employing the same inequitable tactics of the 
former colonial regime (Moore 2001, 912).  To extend his tenure, President Mugabe has 
employed guerrilla tactics of intimidation and indoctrination against his political 
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), through the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Blair 2002, supra note 35, 149).  He 
honed these skills as a leader in the Rhodesian Bush War (Williamson 2010, 394).  
Opposition candidates and their supporters have even been tortured. 
Fainos Zhou, who nominated the MDC candidate for Mberengwa West, 
was kidnapped and tortured for four days…He was bludgeoned with iron 
bars, and boiling, melting plastic was dripped all over his body…His wife 
was gang-raped and sodomized with an iron bar – Blair (2002, 146) 
 
A further two hundred MDC officials and supporters died, and 200,000 others 
were displaced (see Amnesty International 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; Impunity 
Watch 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008).  Movement for Democratic Change 
supporters, primarily ethnic Northern Ndebele minorities, did not believe justice was 
possible as long as Mugabe was in power.  “As long as Mugabe is there, they [the 
perpetrators] will be sentenced today and tomorrow he will pronounce an amnesty and 
they will be free again” (Bratton 2011, 376 quoting a focus group respondent).  Even the 
November 14, 2017, coup d’état that removed President Mugabe from power, is little 
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comfort for opposition supporters as there are other Shona “heroes of the revolution” 
waiting in the wings to take his place to perpetuate his institutions.  For all of these 
reasons, Zimbabwean security institutions do not positively affect the GTR.  They are 
fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed. 
 
State Contract Institutions 
 If two brothers fight over their father's land, it is a stranger who will enjoy 
there sweat and labour. 
—African proverb 
 
Case #1: Burkina Faso.  While there are worse things than being colonized by the 
French, as the Congolese experience with Belgium can attest, one negative legacy of 
French colonialism in Burkina Faso is its contract institutions.  Weak military institutions 
have perpetuated a culture of strongman political leaders—common in SSA—who 
attempt to extend their tenures unconstitutionally, as was the case with the 27 years of 
semi-authoritarian rule by President Compaoré, ending in 2014.  Even though an active 
grassroots non-violent protest culture has thrived during his tenure, it has not been 
sufficient to improve the state’s quality as a contract agent. 
A minority voice in the land tenure literature claims government programs aimed 
at modernizing and individualizing land tenure for the sake of consistency, may have the 
opposite effect (de Zeeuw 1997, 583).  Still, others claim to increase FDI in the 
agricultural sector will make farmers lives less secure unless land tenure institutions 
move from traditional to “better-defined and enforceable private forms of property 
rights” (Bourdet and Persson 2001, 197).  In 1983, the Burkinabé government 
nationalized all customary lands, though it has been mostly unsuccessful in its goal of 
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displacing powerful chiefs as the regulators of land tenure and transfer (Williams 1996, 
217).  In 1997, it again updated its land tenure policies to manage increasing urbanization 
through the Reforme Agraire Fonciere.  Due to its late entrance into the global market, 
Burkina Faso remains one of Africa's least urbanized countries, yet with a high 
urbanization growth rate, which has caused uncertainty, competition, and conflict 
regarding the management of urban land titles and fraudulent land-titling schemes 
(Harsch 2009, 265).  For these reasons, Burkinabé contract institutions do not positively 
affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional. 
Case #2: Ethiopia.  Because Ethiopia was never colonized, it ironically did not 
have the opportunity to benefit from colonial institutional isomorphism that other, now 
more prosperous, former colonies (e.g., India, Brazil, Nigeria) had.  This is not to argue 
that colonial isomorphism occurred uniformly or positively in most cases.  When 
Ethiopia reformed its land tenure policies in 1991, following the Ethiopian Civil War and 
the fall of the Marxist derg, it abolished all preexisting customary and Marxist forms of 
land tenure, rapidly privatized farm collectives (Crewett and Korf 2008, 203), and 
granted rights to occupants “who were able to demonstrate productive use of land” 
(Williams 1996, 218).  This dramatic shift did not last long and quickly reverted to 
previous derg land policies, because the government prohibited land sales, producing a 
more feudal than capitalist arrangement.  In doing this, the government’s distribution of 
land deeds became politicized by the more dominant Tigray ethnic group following 
elections (Young 1996, 540), where officials would use promises of land as an electoral 
strategy.  Subsequent, Western-influenced, policy changes instituting land certification 
have “resulted in a significant reduction of tenure insecurity and increase in land-related 
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investment” (Deininger et al. 2011, 330).  However, western-modeled land tenure 
systems often prove unsustainable in other SSA contexts (e.g., Madagascar) because the 
cost of maintaining the titling infrastructure outweighs that of the benefits to landholders 
(Jacoby and Minten 2007, 23).  For these reasons, Ethiopian contract institutions do not 
positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional. 
Case #3: Nigeria.  Nigeria’s diverse ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural 
character has presented the state with many interesting contracting challenges.  It 
emerged from colonialism with a “bizarre version of federalism” (Diamond 1988, 155) 
“designed in such a way as to virtually guarantee its failure” (Lijphart 1977, 163).  The 
governing philosophy that created Nigeria’s latest Constitution in 1999 recognizes that 
people are naturally corruptible and that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” 
(Madison 1788).  However, it has only managed to produce minimally functional contract 
institutions at the federal, state, and local government area (LGA) levels, making the state 
an inadequate agent for mediating contract disputes. 
Nigerian contract institutions are shaped by centralizing tendencies of the federal 
government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the regional adoption of Shari 
‘a.  Any one of these is a challenge in itself, but all three converge to shape the political 
environment of Nigeria’s Middle Belt states.  The federal government—as many do—
uses control of the purse strings to leverage behavior of its states.  Nigerian states are 
hyper-dependent on the federal government to sustain even basic services, giving the 
central government outsized influence.  These centralizing tendencies have turned 
Nigeria into a “unitary state in federal disguise” with states “following the money” 
(Williams 1980, 100).  States have even been sub-divided multiple times in relation to 
 154 
changing federal budget allocation policies (see Mackintosh 1962; Osaghae 1992, 189-
90), increasing from 10 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1997, which therein increased 
the number of LGAs from 593 to 774 (Suberu 2001, 108). 
Nigeria’s Land Use Act of 1978 nationalized land ownership and management 
while granting states control over land decisions of their urban areas and LGAs over rural 
areas, which appears to align well with the goals of federalism.  However, this has 
produced a disorganized patchwork of competing homeland claims (Williams 1996, 217).  
A single dominant ethnoreligious group usually drives rural LGA-level indigene-settler 
policy; therefore, each LGA’s policies are unique to and deeply ingrained in each area 
(United States Department of State 2010).  To exacerbate this situation, during the 1991 
LGA reorganization and expansion, Hausa federal legislators pulled off a Texas-style 
redistricting strategy that favored the Babangida administration’s elite supporters (Suberu 
2001, 9).  Following this, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution has allowed indigene groups to 
discriminate further against non-indigenes living in “their” lands, over education, 
employment, and property ownership through the issuance of certificates of indigeneship.  
These policies are centripetal in that they disincentivize migration outside of one’s 
ethnoreligious home area, which limits social, cultural, economic, political, and religious 
inter-group interaction and all of the benefits that come with it. 
While less frequent, religious conflicts have increased between 1950 and 1996 
globally, and are more intense than nonreligious conflicts (Fox 2004, 55).  Nigeria is the 
epicenter of religious conflict in Africa (Salehyan et al. 2012, 504).  Because Nigerian’s 
are highly religious, ethnic territorial and land tenure claims quickly become infused with 
religious significance.  In Plateau State surrounding the city of Jos, at the dividing line 
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between the mostly Muslim north and mostly Christian south, the indigenous, primarily 
Christian Afizere, Anaguta and Berom minority ethnic groups, have pushed back against 
the incursion of northern Muslim Hausa settlers (Ostien 2009, 2).  The Berom threated to 
build a large church to rival the central mosque down the street and claimed the mosque’s 
land is theirs (Suberu 2001, 25).  In another case, the Ife and Modakeke ethnic minority 
groups have fought over land tenure rights with over 3,000 killed in 1998. 
There has been a resurgent demand in northern Nigerian states for Shari ‘a in 
reaction to several decades of capriciously enforced military rule.  Many Nigerian 
Muslims have long been dissatisfied with the secular common law judicial system; 
besides being mired in corruption and delayed justice, it is not rooted in their norms and 
beliefs (Hodkinson 1984, 739).  As the 1999 Nigerian Constitution does not prohibit dual 
legal systems, it is left to the states to decide what combination of common, customary, 
and Shari ‘a legal systems work in their context.  Most of the Muslim-majority northern 
states have opted for full or partial Shari ’a: the fuller version typically banning alcohol 
and prostitution for the whole population (Paden 2006, 147), while the partial version of 
it limits these statutes to only Muslims.  Rabo, the secretary of the Independent Shariah 
Implementation support Committee in Kano, Nigeria says, Shari ‘a is “a total way of life” 
(Rabo 2003); non-Muslims “should conduct their ceremonies in their private 
environments and they shouldn’t disturb peace in the society” (Rabo 2003).  This 
majoritarian attitude has made some non-Muslim minorities feel trapped, surrounded by 
and sometimes subject to, an unfamiliar legal system. 
When any one of these three contract challenges is present (centralizing 
tendencies of the federal government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the 
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adoption of Shari ‘a) it is difficult for contract institutions to have a widening effect on 
the GTR, but when two or all three are intertwined as they are in Nigeria, it is much more 
difficult.  Therefore, Nigerian contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but 
are instead fragile and minimally functional. 
Case #4: Zambia.  In 1970, the Zambian government began appropriating 
expatriates’ unutilized land and by 1975 abolished customary freehold land tenure and 
nationalized it (Williams 1996, 217), replacing it with 100-year leases (Tordoff 1977, 
65).  Twenty years later, Zambia’s Land Act of 1995 was the most publicly deliberated 
piece of legislation (Kaunda 1995, 87).  Its logic was that introducing flexibility and 
choice into the old customary land tenure system through “mechanisms for transferring 
customary land to individually titled state land” (Sitko 2010, 39) would reduce title 
uncertainty and free up land to be used as collateral for credit (Kaunda 1995, 92).  
However, what has emerged instead is a clandestine land market that remains controlled 
by chiefdoms (Roth 1994, 61, 193), which denies woman access and keeps Southern 
Zambian Nkandanzovus’ lands continuously cultivated, reducing its fertility (Sitko 2010, 
36) and causing land shortages and food insecurity.  The HIV/AIDS epidemic has 
exacerbated this situation by often leaving HIV-positive women divorced and without 
land title (2010, 36).  These “measures to accelerate privatization of land have 
encountered strong protest from defenders of peasants’ land rights” (Boone 2007, 581) 
and went under review in 2006.  The amended 2016 Constitution began to address 
sustainable land management practices and transparency in land transactions 
(Constitution of Zambia 2016, Part XIX).  For these reasons, Zambian contract 
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institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally 
functional. 
Case #5: Zimbabwe 
Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our 
real enemy! 
—Robert Mugabe 
 
There are four types of property rights in Zimbabwe: freehold (private), state land, 
communal, and leasehold (resettlement system) (Gwenhamo et al. 2012, 597) as a result 
of highly visible and contested (Boone 2007, 558) land tenure policy reforms, including 
the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000. 
Following independence, the Zimbabwean government resisted taking white 
farmers’ lands because it realized its productive value in their hands.  Since 1980, it only 
led a modest populist resettlement program for a half million citizens who were displaced 
by the civil war by forcibly purchasing millions of acres of land from white farmers 
(Williams 1996, 215).  Only in 2000, out of fear of losing the 2000 parliamentary 
elections (Moore 2001, 916), did President Mugabe, in a fit of kleptocracy, take white 
farms and distribute them to his political base, primarily his inner circle and relatives 
(Power 2003, 4) more so than landless peasants (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 900).  The 
little land the poor did receive was bound by a thirty-day cancelation clause that rendered 
it unsuitable collateral for financing, so owners were unable to make productive use of it 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 38).  This land distribution disorder has 
resulted in “overlapping and even multiple entitlements to the same plots and widespread 
disputed claims” (Bracking and Cliffe 2009, 111).  Formerly productive farmland became 
barren, and by October 2003, half of Zimbabweans were food-insecure, many dependent 
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on remittances (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901); by 2005, unemployment was at 80 
percent; and by 2007, GDP growth rate was negative at -6.1 percent (World Factbook 
2008).  During this period, average life expectancy dropped from 56.4 years (1990-1995) 
to 37.3 years (2005-2010) (World Bank 2017). 
Many Zimbabweans are resigned to the fact that “there will be no magical date on 
which ‘The Old Man’ will die and good governance will be restored” (Bracking and 
Cliffe 2009, 104).  Mugabe-created contract institutions and their effects will endure long 
after his November 14, 2017, removal from office because his regime has created 
informal institutions and networks that shadow formal government institutions to ensure 
their longevity (MacLean 2002, 520).  For these reasons, Zimbabwean contract 
institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally 
functional. 
 
Individualism & Collectivism 
A thumb, although it is strong, cannot kill aphids on its own. 
—African proverb 
Case #1: Burkina Faso.  Few in the trust literature dispute Hofstede’s claim that 
the more poor, rural, and traditional a society is, the more collectivist it will remain 
(2010, 127).  Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries globally, ranking 121 out of 
196 for its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32 
billion (international dollars) and it remains poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of 
$1,595 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017).  It is also one 
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of the least urbanized countries globally (31.5 percent), ranked 167 out of 196 (World 
Factbook 2017). 
Burkinabé society is highly collectivist.  Its people value Familism and tend 
towards a broad institutional, vertical, exclusionist collectivism, in part, because their 
identity revolves around the dominant Mossi ethnic group, which composes a slight 
majority (52.2 percent) of the population.  The Mossi exhibit a rather broad institutional 
collectivism, whereas the many smaller ethnic groups tend to be narrower.  This 
difference may help explain Presidents’ Lamizana (1966-1980) and Compaoré’s (1987-
2014) ease in extending their tenures.  Notwithstanding its religious and cultural 
homogeneity and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, its groups preference the values of honor, 
loyalty (Akkus et al. 2017), survival, solidarity, compassion, and conservatism (Jackson 
2004, 31).  Interestingly, even though East Asian corporate collectivism (2004, 158)—
which may be characterized by what Bellah (1967) would call a Confucianist-Buddhist 
civic religion—is also based on homogeneity, they result in entirely different societies.  
For these reasons, Burkinabé culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a 
position to widen the GTR. 
Case #2: Ethiopia.  Ethiopia meets Hofstede’s (2010, 90) criteria for a highly 
collectivist society.  It is considered a moderate wealth country, ranking 67 out of 196 
globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) of $178 billion (international dollars).  However, when considering its 2016 
GDP PPP of $1,608 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017), 
its wealthy drops substantially.  Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries globally 
(20.4 percent), ranked 184 out of 196 (World Factbook 2017).  It is also one of the least 
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industrialized countries globally with an industrialization intensity index score of 0.16 
(United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014).  Its society is collectivist as 
is evidenced by its groups’ preference for Familism and social organization around small 
villages composed of a dozen or so families (Ben-Ezer 1992, 138).  Despite being 
exposed to Western values in Israel, emigrating Ethiopian Jews remain more collectivist 
than the Israeli-born population (Kurman 2003, 498).  Ethiopian society adheres to a 
moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism.  Its 
three largest ethnic groups (Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray), do not have a history of 
politicizing along ethnic lines (Mengisteab 2001, 22), yet they still have substantial 
conflict.  The Oromo constitute nearly half of the population and are spread throughout 
the country, yet being the largest ethnic group has not secured its dominance.  While 
smaller, the Amhara are more hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian 
collectivist (Levine 2000, 148).  The former tend to look down on the later, and the 
smaller Tigray have found a way to gain political advantage over both. 
Ethiopia has a collectivist identity crisis with “too many heroes and too few 
innovators” (Gudina 1994, 929).  Ethiopian nationalists insist they have a unified identity 
that reaches back thousands of years to the ancient Axum (Sorenson 1992, 247) and they 
rest on this ethnonational legacy and pride in never having been colonized (Ekeh 1990, 
679), rather than working to produce developmental innovations.  There was a short time 
when western progressivism reigned in the 1950s to 1970s, but it did not last long, nor 
did it have a lasting effect.  Pre-civil war Ethiopian collectivism was driven by competing 
horizontal and vertical “themes of equality, self-reliance, the indivisibility of the nation, 
state control of the economy, and the elimination of landlordism” (Donham, 1999, 16).  
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At that time, “there were many voluntary, loosely organized, semi-autonomous 
organizations”…“such as Edir (self-help associations in time of death), Ikub (rotating 
saving and credit associations), and Mahber (associations based on kinship or 
religion)”…“but they were too apolitical and not strong enough to form a cohesive civil 
society” (Kebede 2010, 307) as a democratic protection from the communist derg.  The 
civil war resulted in the rule of the communist derg dictatorship in the 1980s (Sorenson 
1992, 231), strengthening collectivism by providing groups with a common cause, fate, 
and identity, severely restricted resources, strengthened cultural homogeneity, and 
isolating society from external influences (Triandis 1989, 511).  Even after the eventual 
fall of the communist derg in 1987, there remained an absence of attachment to western 
positivism and the rule of law (Brietzke 1995, 37).  Social divisions and identity 
formation continued to be structured along ethnic and class lines, a consequence of the 
derg’s scientific socialism policies.  An eclectic cultural and political history has shaped 
Ethiopia into a unique and collectivist modern society.  For these reasons, Ethiopian 
culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR. 
Case #3: Nigeria.  The means by which Nigerian society organizes itself have 
changed rapidly since its colonization in 1901, having gone from highly tribal3 to more 
aggregated ethnic groups, and more atomized in urban areas.  Nigerian individualism, 
where present, is best characterized as a relational individualism (see Adams and 
Dzokoto 2003) such that individuals consider their network connections to others when 
choosing whether to trust them or not.  “The Igbo are individualistic and egalitarian, 
                                                 
3 While the term “tribal” is considered derogatory in the literature today, it accurately describes this context in 1901. 
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every man considered himself as good as everyone else” (Boahen and Webster 1970, 
166).  In aggregate though, Nigeria is a highly collectivist society; there is variation 
within its extreme diversity, ranging from highly segmented (less rigid) to highly 
structured, the latter being slower to change (Akiwowo 1964, 155).  However, this is not 
always the case; for example, both Pakot and Igbo ethnic groups are segmentary, yet only 
the former has resisted Western influences (Schneider 1962, 144).  Nigeria’s moderately 
institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism has produced a 
hyper-divided society along ethnolinguistic and religious lines.  In highly collectivist and 
heterogeneous democratizing societies such as Nigeria, politicians are incentivized to 
appeal to communal loyalties. 
…a vicious circle ensures the perpetuation of communal conflict in a 
participant political system: aspirant politicians make communal appeals 
and communal demands which exacerbate communal tensions; these 
tensions, in turn, encourage the recruitment of leaders who will make 
communal appeals and demands – Melson and Wolpe (1970, 1122) 
 
Some in the trust literature may question Nigeria’s inclusion as a case based on 
Hofstede’s (2010, 90) collectivist criteria however even though it is a wealthy, 
moderately industrialized, and rapidly urbanizing country, most Nigerians are poor.  It is 
the wealthiest country in SSA, ranked 21 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $1,091 billion 
(international dollars).  However, when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $5,439 per 
capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017), it is less wealthy than 
seven other SSA countries.  Nigeria remains more rural than urban, but that is quickly 
changing, ranked 126 out of 196 at 49.4 percent (World Factbook 2017).  It is a 
moderately industrialized country with an industrialization intensity index of 0.35 
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(United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014) that is unable to refine its 
petroleum.  While its rural areas remain more rigidly structured along age, sex, clan, or 
birth, its urban populations increasingly identify along vocational, educational, and 
income lines.  Nigerian culture is collectivist, yet its urban populations are becoming 
more individualist.  Culture changes slowly, therefore, it will be a long time before 
individualism overtakes collectivism, if ever.  For these reasons, Nigerian culture is 
collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR. 
Case #4: Zambia.  Zambia is a moderately poor, rural majority, and non-
industrialized country, meeting all of Hofstede’s (2010, 90) collectivism criteria.  It ranks 
94 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $65 billion (international dollars) and remains 
moderately poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $3,636 per capita (constant 2011 
international dollars) (World Bank 2017).  It has a rural majority, ranked 138 out of 196 
at 41.8 percent (World Factbook 2017) and is one of the least industrialized countries 
globally with an industrialization intensity index of 0.25 (United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization 2014). 
As the Zambian state has executed formal democratic and capitalist institutional 
modifications, social divisions have uncomfortably formed along class lines, yet its 
people continue to have a low level of class-consciousness (Dresang 1974, 1608).  They 
instead, through a moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist 
collectivism, continue to value rigid social hierarchies, adherence to Familism, and a 
preference for the values of solidarity, compassion, respect, and dignity (Edwards et al. 
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2004, 18).  Zambian social identity remains centered on ethnicity, making it highly 
collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR. 
Case #5: Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe was formerly wealthy, but is now destitute and 
remains highly rural.  It ranks 120 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32 billion (international 
dollars) and becomes even poorer when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $1,860 per 
capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017).  It is also one of the least 
urbanized countries globally, ranked 162 out of 196 at 32.2 percent (World Factbook 
2017). 
Further, it is somewhat surprising that Zimbabwean society is highly collectivist 
because it is not a uniformly, nor highly, fractionalized society.  Zimbabwean 
collectivism rejects Welzel’s (2010) self-expression values and instead values ascribed 
family roles, status (see Bourdillon 1987), and Familism, and tends towards a broad 
institutional, vertical, and exclusionist collectivism, in part, because the Shona ethnic 
group is so large (70 percent of the population) and dominant.  This may also help 
explain President Mugabe’s (1980-2017) ability to have sustained such a long tenure.  Its 
mixture of cultural and ethnolinguistic homogeneity and religious heterogeneity still 
produce rather rigid social hierarchies.  However, its exclusionist collectivism (see Mbigi 
1997) differs from East Asian corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158), even though 
both are found in homogeneous societies.  Zimbabwean culture is highly collectivist and 
is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR. 
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Inter-State Market Forces 
Much wealth brings many enemies. 
—African proverb 
 
Case #1: Burkina Faso.  Burkina Faso has long been a sleepy backwater pre-
colonially, colonially, and now as an independent state.  Not much changed politically 
and economically in the years following Upper Volta’s independence from France in 
1960, as Burkinabé leaders retained much of the semi-authoritarian tendencies of the 
French colonizers.  The state has purposefully been a late adopter of modern institutions 
and engagement in the global economy.  Its largest and most influential ethnic group, the 
Mossi, work to rebuff the adoption of modern institutions that would erode its own 
cultural and political control.  President Sankara’s (1983-1987) refusal to submit to the 
imperialist domination of the global market (Wilkins 1989, 385) typifies this long-held 
attitude. 
The Burkinabé revolution will provide a method of combating hunger, 
thirst and ignorance, but most of all, it will fight against the forces of neo-
colonialism and imperialist domination – Sankara (1984, 143) 
 
He and likeminded leaders believed that accepting foreign aid and investment 
“would spell an end to the Popular Revolution” (Wilkins 1989, 388).  Regardless of its 
anti-globalization rhetoric, since independence, Burkina Faso has attracted neither trade, 
investment, remittances, or aid.  At one time, remittances flowed through the Burkinabé 
diaspora, primarily from Côte d‘Ivoire (9.41 percent of GDP in 1986), but has dried up 
since that country fell into civil war in the early 2000s.  Remittances dropped to a low of 
0.918 percent of GDP in 2004 and leveled out at 3.348 percent of GDP in 2016 (World 
Bank 2017).  Burkina Faso’s developmental challenges are attributable, in part, to the fact 
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that it is a landlocked country with an arid climate in a historically non-geo-politically 
strategic and relatively peaceful region. 
Burkina Faso has begun to make strides to politically decentralize and engage its 
meager economy in global trade since a military coup d’état led by Blaise Compaoré, 
overthrew and killed President Sankara on October 15, 1987.  Since then, it has been a 
World Bank model reformer in its development of neo-liberal policies, which has 
improved its economy absolutely, yet it remains relatively one of SSA’s most 
undeveloped countries (Harsch 1998, 625).  In 1991, it adopted its first IMF and World 
Bank structural adjustment program, which pushed for political decentralization and 
lower social spending (Harsch 2009, 269).  It made a drastic move from Marxist isolation 
to deregulation and privatization of formerly state-owned entities to attract foreign 
investment.  Between 1988 and 1993, this resulted in an increase from three to 13 million 
dollars annually of FDI (World Bank 2017), which is substantial for the Burkinabé 
economy, yet nearly unmeasurable globally.   
Before the 1980s, Burkina Faso was quite peaceful, but due to this rapid 
development, there has been an increase in social conflict.  More than 200 public 
demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, strikes, and riots railing against police violence, 
corruption, and displacement from urban modernization (Harsch 2009, 265) took place in 
30 urban municipalities from 1995 to 2007.  The most prevalent of these was 50 local 
labor disputes in 15 different cities (2009, 278).  Because it had so long been off the radar 
of global traders, investors, and donors, Burkinabé society is behind the development 
curve, even for SSA standards.  Therefore, the potential GTR widening effect that 
consistent trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Burkinabé society is absent. 
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Case #2: Ethiopia.  Non-military aid and remittances subsidize nearly 50 percent 
of Ethiopia’s federal budget (World Bank 2017), while there is a paucity of trade and 
investment.  Ethiopia has little petroleum; therefore, it exports coffee in trade for oil, 
producing a massive trade deficit.  Bilateral economic relations between Ethiopia and 
China increased considerably in the 2000s, where the latter began providing aid and 
trade, in exchange the Ethiopian government has given “unabashed diplomatic support 
for deeper Chinese involvement in Africa” (Adem 2012, 155). 
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in SSA and has a growing diaspora, 
but is consistently in the bottom 10 percent of countries regarding economic development 
(United Nations Development Programme 2018).  Investment is more sustainable for 
income generation, job creation, and development than remittances, so creating and 
fostering an environment conducive to investment, particularly outside of the capital, 
Addis Ababa (Chacko and Gebre 2013, 504), is critical.  However, the government does 
not make it easy for investors to obtain land and financing and there is substantial 
information asymmetry, weak contract enforcement, and capriciously changing policies 
(2013, 495), making investing laborious and risky. 
Therefore, the Ethiopian diaspora is consigned to sending remittances rather than 
investment capital to support family and in-groups, but the results have been mixed.  
Between 1994 and 1997, Ethiopian households relied heavily on remittances in the wake 
of the civil war (see Bigsten et al. 2005), yet they only amounted to 0.107 to 0.355 
percent of GDP.  Since 2000, the Oromo diaspora has funded political activities through 
remittances, donated primarily to opposition parties (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009, 
21).  Remittances received were minimal until 2004, when they increased to 1.32 percent 
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of GDP and have since then varied between 0.806 and 3.23 percent of GDP, figures that 
are still small compared to other SSA states (Klugman 2009: 161).  Knowing 
remittances’ full effect in SSA is difficult since informal remittances average between 35 
and 75 percent of formal remittances in the region (Freund and Spatafora 2005, 22). 
Ethiopia has long been on the receiving end of military and non-military aid as a 
heavily contested Cold War proxy site.  During the Cold War, the communist derg and its 
opposition funneled aid strategically to build domestic political support, resulting in aid 
dependence (Kissi 2005, 128).  Post Cold War, as Ethiopia’s political value waned, it 
received consistently below $1 billion in non-military official development assistance 
(ODA) annually.  Not until 2001, due to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt 
reduction program, did it began to increase, whereby 2009 it rose to $3.8 billion, 
subsidizing 44.7 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP, and has remained at that level since (World 
Bank 2017).  It received $3.2 billion in 2015, the largest in SSA and fourth most globally 
following Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (World Bank 2017). 
Famine has also made Ethiopia dependent on international food aid.  Many in the 
development literature have assumed that agricultural food aid disincentivizes domestic 
food production in receiving countries (see Gelan 2007; Schultz 1960), but they have 
been unable to pinpoint at what threshold and in what contexts this occurs.  Food aid 
accounted for nine percent of Ethiopia’s cereal budget from 1994 to 2006, rising to as 
much as 16 percent in 2003 (Tadesse and Shively 2009, 942).  When limited to only 
those foods that are domestically produced, as food aid rises above 10 percent of 
domestic production, prices for those same domestic products decrease, which is the 
point at which domestic production begins to be disincentivized (2009, 942). 
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Ethiopia has fallen into an aid trap and cannot get out.  Its best minds have left the 
country for better opportunities, and while its diaspora provides remittances, its attempts 
at investment are rebuffed by maladaptive government policies.  An environment of weak 
investment, outsized Chinese market influence, and extensive non-military aid has 
produced a rather non-competitive market where non-military aid has become a crutch.  
For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have 
on Ethiopian society is absent. 
Case #3: Nigeria.  Nigeria is a petrol-federation deeply integrated into the global 
economy; therefore, its success is central to global stability (Paden 2005, 3).  “Crude oil 
production accounts for 90-95 percent of Nigerian export revenues, over 90 percent of 
foreign exchange earnings, and 80 percent of government revenues” (Paden 2008, 12).  
The overdependence on centralized oil revenues and the global petroleum market has 
produced a volatile trade swing from a surplus of $63.7 billion in 2012 to a deficit of -
$6.2 billion in 2016 (Rimmer 1985, 444). 
The negative relationship between economic development and civil conflict is the 
most robust finding to emerge from the conflict literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, 
533), yet it does not appear to hold in Nigeria.  Weak state security institutions scare 
away plenty of potential foreign investment (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), yet many 
more are willing to brave the insecure environment for economic gain, in the oil-rich 
Niger Delta region (Ostien 2009, 3), making Nigeria the largest recipient of FDI in SSA. 
Nigeria has a sizable diaspora because it has the seventh largest population 
globally.  In 2000, its diaspora was over four million (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2012), and in 2016 it had risen to wide-ranging estimates of 
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five to 15 million.  The Nigerian government actively encourages investment of its 
diaspora (Adepoju 2008, 40) as a way of filling gaps left by uneven economic 
development.  However, this occurs more often through remittances than FDI or FPI.  
Remaining well below one percent of GDP until 1993, Nigerian remittances increased to 
five percent of GDP and then dropped to 2.6 percent of GDP ($2.3 billion) in 2004, 
fluctuating from thereon between 1.6 and 13 percent of GDP, to an all-time high amount 
of $21.1 billion, yet only a moderate 4.4 percent of its GDP in 2015 (World Bank 2017). 
A pervasive culture of dependence on the federal government’s oil revenues has 
developed where Nigerian states have little incentive to generate internal revenue or 
create an investing and contracting environment that is safe and conducive to 
entrepreneurial activity.  Its people have developed a “cake-sharing psychosis” 
(Babangida 1992, ii) where they expect to consume without producing.  To fill the gaps 
during volatile trade and investment cycles, Nigeria has also received a substantial 
amount of military and non-military aid, which has made it vulnerable to aid shocks.  
Steadily below $1 billion until 2005, net ODA spiked to $11.4 billion in 2006, only to 
return to fluctuate between $1 and $3 billion from there forward (World Bank 2017).  In 
2005, it experienced a 963 percent increase in aid, the third largest aid shock of any 
country in the 2000s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013, 
63).  It has also been destabilizing to have too few major donor sources, with only two in 
Nigeria (2013, 63).  Neo-liberal structural adjustment policies attached to this aid aim to 
diversify exports, stabilize trade balance, and reduce the excessive public sector, yet 
High rates of recidivism, low rates of completion, and an insignificant 
catalytic effect on other capital flows are presented as evidence that IMF 
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programs and the related conditionality do not work in the way intended; 
or more accurately, often do not work – Bird (2001, 1862) 
 
With many potential traders and investors vying for access to its unrefined 
petroleum, Nigeria has many viable options for engaging with inter-state market forces, 
yet its trade, investment, remittance, and aid policies have produced uneven economic 
development rather than consistent growth.  Its outsized remittances and non-military aid 
overshadow the positive benefits of high trade and investment in its petroleum sector.  
For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have 
on Nigerian society is absent. 
Case #4: Zambia.  For half a century, copper mining and sales composed the 
majority of the Zambian economy, making it wealthy by SSA standards (Tordoff 1977, 
60).  In the 1960s alone, the copper industry made up 60-70 percent of its GDP and 90-95 
percent of government revenue (Larmer 2005, 32).  While the overreliance on this single 
non-renewable resource as an export has influenced uneven cycles of development and 
increased foreign debt, it does not appear to have produced a lasting “resource curse.”  
However, the recent fluctuation of the copper market from a spike up to $3.5/lb. in 
2006—nearly tripling in value—dropping down to $1.3/lb. temporarily in 2009 as a result 
of the global recession, and rebounding back up to $4.5/lb. in 2011, has tested this.   
Zambia has been subject to structural adjustment programs through tied aid, their 
primary purpose to service donor repayments (2005, 44).  Some programs have removed 
food subsidies on staple crops, while others have weakened trade unions’ ability to 
protect wages and jobs (Simutanyi 1996, 837) and the government has shown little 
concern with providing a social safety net or correcting resulting poverty.  Zambia struck 
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a trade deal of Chinese oil for Zambian copper.  Even though large amounts of FDI and 
FPI have not flowed into Zambia by opening its markets in the 1990s, the Chinese have 
been active investors.  Zambia ranks third in SSA and nineteenth globally for Chinese 
foreign investment (United National Conference on Trade and Development 2008).  As 
early as 1971, China had begun investing in Zambia through the Tan-Zam railway, 
financed by a 401 million dollar interest-free loan (McKay 1971, 25).  Some claim this 
new era of Chinese investment is a more humane and inclusive one than the past Western 
era of tied aid (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 86).  Indeed, many SSA economies, 
including Zambia’s, developed rapidly from 2004 to 2008 under Chinese trade and 
investment influence.  However, market openness since the mid-1990s has decreased 
average tariff rates globally and in SSA to around 10 percent to attract trade (World Bank 
2016), which has placed Zambia (4 percent) in a weak bargaining position, leaving it 
vulnerable to becoming entrenched in a mercantilist relationship with China (Kurlantzick 
2007, 140). 
With few options for trade partners and a minimal amount of remittances (0.2 
percent of GDP) (World Bank 2017), the Zambian economy hangs somewhat 
precariously between the West and China.  Most significantly, China’s overwhelming 
influence in Zambia has produced a less competitive market, and its non-diversified, 
copper-rich economy does not always attract well-intentioned investors and donors.  For 
all these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have 
on Zambian society is absent. 
Case #5: Zimbabwe.  The effect of inter-state market forces on Zimbabwe hinge 
on Chinese influence and the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000, where President 
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Mugabe chose autonomy and isolationism over prosperity and global engagement.  
Regardless of potential justifications for doing so, President Mugabe’s seizure of white 
Zimbabwean farmers’ lands in the name of returning them to the original inhabitants, 
turned out to be a foreign policy and agricultural disaster, prompting global 
condemnation and domestic chaos.  It caused a decade of distress and isolationism where 
Zimbabwe’s relatively strong $2,577 GDP per capita, PPP (in constant 2011 international 
$) in 2001, dropped to $1,209 in 2008 and eventually leveled out at $1,860 in 2016.  
Annual GDP growth rates for the years 2002 to 2008 were all negative, reaching double 
digits in 2003 and 2008, prompting the rejection of its currency in favor of the U.S. dollar 
and South African rand.  To counter the effects of hyperinflation, lost trade and 
investment, and food insecurity, remittances from its diaspora rose to 14.2 percent of 
GDP in 2010 (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901) and 15.9 percent of GDP in 2011 (World 
Bank 2017).  However, remittances also carry the risk of exacerbating inflation. 
Zimbabwe has few trade partners and a large trade deficit of $2.37 billion in 2016, 
up from $534 million in 1995 (United Nations Comtrade 2016).  It has a long-suffering 
trade and investment relationship with China that has endured through good and bad 
times.  In 2016, Zimbabwe purchased 13.4 percent of its imports from China in trade for 
Zimbabwean tobacco.  While not large by international standards, in 2013, Zimbabwe 
received $600 million in FDI from China, the third highest amount in SSA (World Bank 
2013).  However, this investment relationship was threatened by President Mugabe’s 
unexpected 2016 enforcement of the dormant 2008 indigenization law requiring foreign 
and white-owned companies to surrender or sell a majority control to black 
Zimbabwean’s or the government (Xinsong 2016). 
 174 
Zimbabwe’s history with tied aid and structural adjustment is mixed.  The 
Economic and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) implemented in the early 1990s 
failed to meet many of its stated goals.  Requisite removal of social safety nets hit the 
working poor hardest, which provided President Mugabe with an enraged and ready 
voting block to keep him in power.  Because of its censured status among the global 
community, sans China, in 2010, Zimbabwe received a rather small amount of ODA non-
military aid ($758 million) (World Bank 2010) to help pull it out of its economic tailspin.  
Zimbabwe, once a flourishing economy, has, since the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 
of 2000, slid deep into economic isolation; therefore, the potential GTR widening effect 
that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Zimbabwean society is absent. 
Social Network Composition 
The friends of our friends are our friends. 
—African proverb 
 
Case #1: Burkina Faso 
Fractionalization 
Burkina Faso is ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, but only moderately 
religiously so, and is culturally homogeneous.  Burkinabé have a strong oral tradition 
rather than a written one; thus their low adult literacy rate of 36 percent (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) is not surprising.  There are 81 
languages (66 indigenous) spoken (Simons and Fennig 2017) in a country the size of 
New Zealand or Ecuador.  This extreme linguistic diversity has the potential to cloister 
groups, yet the French language instituted during colonialism serves as a trade language 
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that has been able to bridge some of this diversity, most easily in urban areas.  Also, even 
though there are many languages, most derive from the same language family. 
The dominant, Mooré-speaking (Gur language family) Mossi ethnic group 
composes over half of the Burkinabé population and is the geographic, cultural, 
economic, and political heart of Burkinabé society.  The Mossi have a strong sense of 
identity and confidence because they have resided in the Sahel region for over half a 
millennium, yet this pride has been tempered with humility by the French colonial 
experience.  Mossi communities are surrounded by a conglomeration of smaller, more 
rural, localized native (Bobo and Senufo), transplanted (Gurunsi and Lobi), and 
regionally spread (Fulani, Gurma, Mandé, and Tuareg) ethnic groups that are rarely able 
to garner sufficient political cooperation to oppose the Mossi.  Most of these groups have 
resided in the region for many centuries, resulting in an isomorphic melding of their 
cultural practices. 
Burkinabé are religiously mixed, with a Sunni Muslim majority and a Catholic 
Christian minority.  Both are highly syncretistic, with traditional spiritualism remaining a 
strong identity driver, which dampens the expansionistic tendencies of these global 
religions.  This syncretism is apparent in the Mossi’s deep need for “privacy about 
personal affairs and plans because disclosure makes one vulnerable to fatal attacks by 
sorcerers and witches” (Fiske 2002, 83).  Religious adherence does not mirror 
ethnolinguistic or political allegiances; there has not been a serious attempt to institute 
Shari ‘a, even in majority Muslim areas. 
Table 41  
Burkinabé Ethnic Groups
Table Continued 
Name Percent Pop. Origin Religion 
Mossi 50.2 Native Sunni Muslim Majority/Christian Minority 
Fulani 9.4 Regionally Spread Sunni Muslim 
Bobo 5.9 Native Sunni Muslim 
Gurma 5.8 Regionally Spread Sunni Muslim 
Mandé 5.3 Regionally Spread Sunni Muslim 
Senufo 4.9 Native Non-Religious 
Gurunsi 4.8 Transplant Traditional Spiritualism Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority 
Lobi 4.7 Transplant Traditional Spiritualism 
Tuareg 2.5 Regionally Spread Sunni Muslim 
Other 6.5 Mixed Mixed 
Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017 
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Upper Volta Ethnic Groups. 
Source: University of Texas Libraries 1968 
Reprinted with Permission. 
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Physical Proximity 
 Physical proximity measures how closely strangers live, work, shop, and play to 
one another, indicating the potential for inter-group interaction if an effective 
incentivization or coercive driving force is present.  Burkina Faso is not an expansive 
country, and its people are moderately mobile, which increases the likelihood of inter-
group interaction; yet, having a highly rural and poor population (Wouterse and Van Den 
Berg 2011, 357) with many small geographically bounded dense network ethnolinguistic 
groups, increases its propinquity, reducing inter-group interaction. 
Migration comes in two forms: continental and intercontinental.  Most Burkinabé 
migration is continental and primarily internal, rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban (Harsch 
2009, 287), which increases physical proximity and inter-group interaction.  The Mossi, 
concentrated in the middle third of the country surrounding the capital, Ouagadougou, are 
more self-sufficient than other ethnic groups, which does not provide it an incentive for 
inter-group interaction.  However, smaller rural groups must have some interests met 
outside the group, which drives them toward regional urban centers such as Bobo-
Dioulasso and the capital. 
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Figure 6. Burkina Faso Population Density. 
Source: LandScan 2000 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Technological Proximity 
 Technological proximity measures how technology makes it easier or harder for 
strangers to access, learn about, and communicate with each other; findings are 
categorized into communications and transportation technologies for reporting.  Members 
of Burkinabé communities communicate face-to-face most often and when not in 
physical proximity, via mobile phone.  They receive news and information via radio 
rather than television or internet, as there are only two television stations and only 14 
percent of its population has internet access (World Factbook 2017).  However, access to 
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cellular networks and radio coverage is not equal, but instead is concentrated in urban 
areas and along major road networks, with greater access among the Mossi and Bobo 
ethnic groups.   
Regarding transportation technology, Air Burkina, the only commercial carrier, 
has but three planes operated out of Burkina Faso’s lone paved airport in the capital city 
of Ouagadougou.  Thus its domestic air transport system does little to increase 
technological proximity.  The only passenger rail line cuts through the country east to 
west, connecting the Mossi with several of the western ethnic groups and Cote d’Ivoire, 
but little else.  Even though its road network is mostly unpaved, wealthy and poor 
Burkinabé’s travel via bus, rather than air, rail, or private vehicle, which increases 
technological proximity since public transportation increases the likelihood that strangers 
will interact. 
Burkina Faso largely skipped the landline telephone revolution and went straight 
to mobile as evidenced by its landline system’s rank of 141 out of 196 and mobile of 74 
out of 196 (World Factbook 2017).  Mobile phone usage has increased rapidly throughout 
SSA (Elegbeleye 2005, 197), especially in Burkina Faso, where districts only a few years 
prior had little to no mobile phone access.  As of 2007, Burkina Faso exceeded 50 percent 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) coverage (International 
Telecommunications Union 2016).  Much of the literature on technology and culture 
assumes mobile phones are “best understood as an expression of the increasing 
'individualisation of society” (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90).  However, in the West African 
context, random strangers do not regularly communicate via mobile phone except for 
business purposes.  Instead, mobile networks are highly insular in the SSA context (Slater 
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and Kwami 2005, 3).  Increasing domestic migration has spread many ethnic groups 
between villages and cities; the mobile phone provides a tie that sustains their networks.  
Instead of atomizing collectivist Burkinabé society, mobile phones serve as a tie 
mechanism for maintaining and strengthening in-group trust within non-physically 
proximate groups (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90). 
Social Proximity 
 The active Burkinabé protest culture regularly places different ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, class, and religious groups in physical proximity and their shared purpose of 
protest often places them in sustained social proximity where they develop lasting 
network ties across groups.  Because the Mossi have such outsized influence over all 
areas of Burkinabé society, they often serve as the hub for network connections between 
the other smaller ethnic groups.  This is what occurred through the progressive 
development and spread of 50 local labor protests in 15 different cities in 2008 (Harsch 
2009, 278).  Once groups begin to have their interest of vocational solidarity met by other 
groups, they tend to be open to having other interests met by them, which further 
strengthens their network ties.   
Religious expansionism that is present in many other highly religious SSA 
countries is not as present in Burkina Faso, perhaps due to the absence of large numbers 
of Pentecostal Christians and Muslims advocating Shari ‘a.  Being a highly syncretistic 
society also makes Burkinabé Christian and Muslim divisions less intense.  This, in itself, 
does not necessarily incentivize religious groups to interact more frequently or intensely, 
strengthening their network ties, but when they do interact, there is less conflict and 
demonization of the “Other.” 
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Burkinabé political parties tend to form based on physical region more than along 
class, ethnic, or religious lines, which keeps party interests more localized and allows 
increasing physical and technological proximity, when present, to strengthen network ties 
between groups.  There is not a clear relationship between the Mossi majority and the 
strength of the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) party (Stroh 2010, 16).  
Instead, one’s geographic home area explains party affiliation better than one’s ethnic 
affiliation (Basedau and Stroh 2009, 7).  However, ethnicity does serve as a driving force 
within parties (Stroh 2010, 1).  When this occurs, party social structure tends to 
fractionalize, weakening party network ties and strengthening intra-ethnic ties within the 
party.  The more a strongman model of governance is present, the more likely a party is 
concentrated in that leader’s home region, which allows him to “control the network and 
protect his self-interest” (2010, 24). 
Power Differential 
 Burkina Faso’s former unipolar power differential was evidenced by minority 
groups’ inability and even strong collective desire, to mount a challenge to Mossi 
cultural, economic, political, and social dominance.  The Mossi have greater access to 
market and state resources, although this has not resulted in extreme inequality and 
deprivation of minority groups; instead, all ethnic groups are relatively poor, including 
the Mossi, because Burkina Faso does not have many resources over which groups may 
compete. 
While one might assume 72.6 percent of a country’s exports coming from gold 
(United Nations Comtrade 2015) would sow discord and uneven development, it has not 
done so.  Burkina Faso does not have a history of ethnic, political, or religious violence.  
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The Mossi’s long, relatively peaceful, if not prosperous, post-colonial hold on power has 
come, in part, through the political dominance of the Congress for Democracy and 
Progress (CDP) party, which has been able to pull a sufficient number minority groups 
into its coalition.  Its long-time leader, President Compaoré (1987-2014), turned Burkina 
Faso into a de facto single-party state from 1996-2014.  Only after his push to remove his 
term limits, claiming, “What I’m doing is legal” (British Broadcasting Company 2014), 
was sufficient protest sparked, setting off the Burkinabé uprising of 2014 that resulted in 
his removal and a reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament and a push for a multipolar 
power differential. 
The composite effect social network composition has on the Burkinabé GTR, 
through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, moderate-high physical, moderate 
technological, and high social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the 
potential to widen the GTR. 
Case #2: Ethiopia 
Fractionalization 
 There is no single cultural, economic, political, or religious heart of Ethiopian 
society, but instead many; the government has seen fit to institutionalize this reality 
through ethnic-based federalism.  Ethiopians are ethnolinguistically heterogeneous and 
moderately religiously and culturally so.  Only 49.1 percent (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) are literate as they have a long oral tradition 
that has inhibited literacy.  There are 90 languages (85 indigenous) spoken in Ethiopia 
(Simons and Fennig 2017), yet urbanized populations and the education system utilize 
English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity.  Ethiopia’s many languages are 
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clustered into four language families (Semitic (13), Cushitic (24) Omotic (28), and Nilo-
Saharan (19) (Hudson 1999, 94).  Within each of these families, there are subtle 
differences, yet when comparing across them, there are many.  Most ethnolinguistic 
groups are native to the region, with only the largest, the Oromo, being regionally spread 
throughout the Horn of Africa. 
Ethiopians are a highly religious, non-syncretistic people with 77.2 percent 
claiming to attend weekly religious services (World Values Survey 2007) and only 3.3 
percent (World Factbook 2016) practicing traditional religions.  There is a slight 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian majority (50-55 percent) (Adogla 2010) and a significant 
Sunni Muslim minority.  While the Oromo and many of the smaller ethnolinguistic 
groups are religiously mixed, Christian and Muslim, the Amhara and Tigray are primarily 
Ethiopian Orthodox.  Both faiths have formed uniquely over many centuries from the 
more recognizable Western and Middle Eastern variants of their respective faiths, with 
Ethiopian Orthodox considered an African Independent Church (AIC).  These groups 
seem different, though less so when compared to other world religions such as Hinduism 
or Buddhism.  Both are Abrahamic faiths that have been shaped by the other over many 
centuries. 
Religion is not the only identity driver for Ethiopians; instead, ethnicity and 
historical nationalistic pride are also important.  Many Ethiopians, regardless of ethnicity 
or religion, are proud to be Ethiopian because of its long-held autonomous existence, 
notwithstanding being a Cold War proxy site and having extensive aid influence.  This 
nationalistic drive has held a diverse assortment of Ethiopians together under the extreme 
duress of the Ethiopian Civil War, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War, and the rule of the 
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communist derg.  Even though the Tigray have outsized political influence, each ethnic 
and religious group feels it has a role to play in the state and perpetuation of nationalistic 
pride; the institution of ethnic-based federalism attempts to accommodate this desire. 
Table 42  
Ethiopian Ethnic Groups 
Name Percent Pop. Origin Religion 
Oromo 34.5 Regionally Spread Mixed (non-Orthodox Christian/Muslim) 
Amhara 26.9 Native Orthodox 
Tigray 6.1 Native Orthodox 
Somali 6.0 Regionally Spread Muslim 
Sidama 4.0 Native Protestant 
Gurage 2.5 Native Mixed (Muslim/Orthodox) 
Welayta 2.3 Native Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority 
Hadiya 1.7 Native Protestant Majority/Orthodox and Muslim Minority 
Afar 1.7 Regionally Spread Muslim 
Gamo 1.5 Native Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority 
Note: Ethnic groups over 1 million. 
Sources: Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority 2007; Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017 
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17. 
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Figure 7. Ethiopian Religion by Region. 
Source: GeoCurrents 2013 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Physical Proximity 
 Ethiopia is a densely populated, rural, and rugged country, which serves to 
increase and decrease its propinquity and likelihood that its many small ethnic and 
linguistic groups will interact.  Increasing Ethiopian physical proximity is driven by 
migration for economic opportunity and internal displacement due to conflict.  Ethiopians 
are a mobile population, due to the Ethiopian Civil War, as well as “overpopulation, 
famine, poverty, land scarcity, governmental agricultural policies, and a lack of 
agricultural resources” (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009, 13), which have forced its many 
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ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups to interact to meet many of their unmet interests.  
In 2009, there were 300,000 internally displaced persons due to violence and famine 
(IDPs) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010, 57).  An estimated 50 to 
70 percent of Ethiopians have migrated either temporarily or permanently (Mberu 2006, 
522-3), primarily from rural to urban areas, because cities provide jobs, attracting 
members of all ethnic and religious groups.  However, rural-to-urban migration decreased 
significantly during the rule of the derg (Berhanu and White 2000, 92).  While the 
modern context is not ideal for increasing generalized trust, it does produce inter-group 
interaction, the first step to that end. 
 
Figure 8. Ethiopian Population Density. 
 187 
Source: LandScan 2000 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Technological Proximity 
 The Ethiopian government owns and regulates most of the 36 radio and six 
television stations that serve as Ethiopians’ primary sources for news and information 
about other Ethiopians.  Because most Ethiopians live in small villages, they 
communicate most often face-to-face with others in physical and social proximity and 
when not in physical proximity, those in urban areas, along major transportation 
corridors, and the wealthy, communicate via mobile phone.  Only 51 percent of 
Ethiopians have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016), and the internet is not highly 
utilized as only 15.4 percent of its population have access to it (World Factbook 2017).  
What access there is to cellular networks and radio coverage is higher in the center of the 
country, where most live, with better access among the larger Amhara, Oromo, and 
Tigray ethnic groups.  Often left out of communications technological proximity are the 
Afar and Somali ethnic groups in the more sparsely populated eastern region. 
Ethiopia’s transportation infrastructure is fragmented.  The quality of road 
networks are spotty, and there exists little passenger rail service.  However, recently, 
desiring to get its coffee exports to the global market more effectively—though not 
having a seaport of its own—it has set out on a massive rail infrastructure project, the 
Chinese-financed and -built Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway—to gain access to Djibouti’s 
seaport.  Realizing its overly ambitious goal, it has scaled back its rail development in 
other areas.  Therefore, Ethiopians do not ride the rails because there are very few of 
them unless one lives in Addis Ababa where SSA’s first light-rail system is located.  
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Ethiopian roads are unsafe.  Ethiopia has the fifth highest number of road fatalities per 
motor vehicle globally (World Health Organization 2015), yet it has one of the fewest 
vehicles per capita (Ethiopian Ministry of Transport 2017).  Therefore, not many 
Ethiopians own and drive private vehicles, yet when they do, people die at high rates.  
The few wealthy utilize the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines, the only commercial carrier, 
which has seventy-five planes operating out of Ethiopia’s 17 paved airports.  The air 
transport system is helpful for increasing technological proximity among the wealthy, yet 
most Ethiopians are poor and therefore travel via public bus, which increases 
technological proximity. 
Social Proximity 
 Class identity is not a strong deterrent to establishing network ties between 
modern Ethiopians.  While there is more wealth in Addis Ababa, most Ethiopians are 
rural and equally poor, having the third lowest GINI (33.2) (World Bank 2010) in SSA.  
While the defeated communist Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) 
recognized the right of self-determination, it viewed class as the primary concern of 
Ethiopian society (Aaron 2005, 57).  However, the victorious Tigreyan People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF) believed the primary cleavage is along ethnic lines (Markakis 
1994, 254) as is evidenced by its selection of an ethnic-based model of federalism.  While 
Amharan culture is most pervasive and the Tigray dominate politics, there also exists a 
strong pan-Ethiopian nationalism. 
War, overpopulation, and famine have forced ethnic and religious groups into 
closer physical proximity, which increases their potential for social proximity through 
sustained network ties.  However, long before the communist derg ruled, Orthodox 
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Christians and Sunni Muslims were in relatively close, albeit, somewhat static, physical 
and social proximity.  Ethiopian Orthodox and Muslim communities are unique among 
their global counterparts.  Neither are highly expansionistic in the way that many 
Pentecostal Christians and Muslim advocates of Shari ‘a tend to be; there has been no 
serious attempt to establish Shari ‘a except in the Afar Region, which is administered by 
the federal government through the Proclamation no. 188 of the Ethiopian Constitution 
(Ethiopian Constitution 1999, 1185).  Being the dominant religious groups, they tend to 
honor the religious institutions in the status quo, rather than challenge them.  Religion has 
not been the conflict intensifier that it is in many other highly religious SSA countries.  
Instead, inter-group conflict is driven by ethno-nationalistic competition, as is evidenced 
by the Eritrean secession and the establishment of an ethno-federation, which has 
provided a buffer between groups.  This model of federalism, through its goal to mitigate 
potential conflict, has served to decrease network ties between ethnic groups; it is but one 
barrier in a society with many drivers of social proximity. 
Power Differential 
 Ethiopians have traded freedom in favor of development.  The Ethiopian 
multipolar ethnic power differential is driven by the power politics of the dominant 
Tigray minority group.  The two largest—though not dominant—groups, the Oromo and 
Amhara, each composes about one-third of the population and are surrounded by a 
conglomeration of much smaller ethnic groups, including the Tigray.  Both groups have 
strong nationalistic identities, as they have inhabited the region for over two thousand 
years, yet their refusal to share power, rooted in their collectivist fear of compromise 
leading to dilution of their distinctiveness (Handler 1988, 49), has left open this 
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opportunity for the Tigray.  “The ideological, ethnic and political differences of these 
groups have made it a monumental task to develop a long-lasting political framework” 
(Engedayehu 1993, 29).  The answer to this dilemma in 1991 was establishing a 
federation of ten ethnic-based states “designed to enhance popular participation in 
governmental and political affairs at the grassroots level” (Keller 2002, 27), the most-
fully ethnic-based federalism of any country (see Turton 2006).  This may appear 
democratic because it provides ethnic groups de jure autonomy and control over their 
regions and has even empowered them to secede if so desired (Selassie 2003, 64), but has 
not afforded all groups a meaningful voice in national politics.  Also, enhancement of 
“group rights do not at all entail the respect of individual rights” (Vestal 1999, 165).  The 
Tigray have been able to dominate the political and military elite through the leadership 
of Meles Zenawi for the last quarter century by gaming this system of ethnic federalism 
and playing the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations off each other. 
Since the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations have not been able to cooperate 
to mount an opposition to the Tigray, they have joined them instead to form an 
uncomfortable alliance through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF).  The remaining 19 regional parties, 12 national parties, and ten parliamentary 
party coalitions representing smaller ethnic groups have not been able to mount a 
challenge to this alliance to the extent that in 2015, the EPRDF won all 547 seats in 
parliament, making Ethiopia a de facto one-party state.  This precarious centralized 
political arrangement disguised as a federation (Keller 2002, 46) has not reduced violent 
conflict.  Instead, it has reduced institutional trust (Brietzke 1995, 35) and has provided 
groups space to “reassert their cultural identity and revitalize their culture, which was 
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suppressed for generations” (Mengisteab 2001, 20).  It has produced ethnic-based 
conflict, in the form of protest, riots, and violence, to the point that the government shut 
down internet access following the August 6, 2016, #OromoProtests that took place 
across more than 200 cities. 
The composite effect social network composition has on the Ethiopian GTR, 
through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, high physical, moderate technological, and high 
social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the potential to widen the GTR. 
 
Case #3: Nigeria 
 
Fractionalization 
 Answering the Nigerian social network composition question requires a religious 
lens.  Nigeria’s old “ethnic problem,” expressed through the Biafra War, has morphed 
into primarily a “religious problem” (Paden 2005, 203).  This has occurred, in part, 
because Nigerians are likely the most religious population globally, having the highest 
service attendance (World Values Survey 2014) and from the state strategically bisecting 
ethnic homelands with new political divisions to weaken ethnic dominance to promote 
state-based identities (Suberu 2001, 5).  This policy is based on the theory that the most 
“successful multi-ethnic federal systems are those in which there is at least a certain level 
of divergence between the constituent units and their ethnic divisions” (Elazar 1993, 
194).  In theory, state-based identities should increase, empowering ethnic minorities and 
placing them on a level playing field to pursue their political agendas (Rothchild 1991, 
39); however, in reality, Nigerian religious identities have grown stronger. 
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Nigeria is one of the most ethnolinguistically, religiously, and culturally 
fractionalized countries globally.  Its tremendous linguistic diversity comes primarily 
from the Niger-Congo language family, while a minority come from the Afro-Asiatic 
language family (e.g., Hausa).  Its overall literacy rate is a low 60 percent (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016) in keeping with many 
oral societies of West Africa.  Many of its hundreds of small ethnolinguistic groups, 
composing 32 percent of the population, are native to the region while many larger ones, 
Hausa-Fulani (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and Igbo (18 percent) together 
composing 68 percent of the population, are regionally spread throughout West Africa.  
Even though there are 527 spoken languages (510 indigenous) (Simons and Fennig 
2017), urbanized populations and the education system utilize English, bridging some of 
the extreme linguistic diversity. 
Since the first recorded settlements in the 9th Century A.D. (Falola and Heaton 
2008, 23), the region has been highly fractionalized.  Had not the British joined the 
northern and southern regions together into a single colony, they would likely be two or 
more separate Yoruba-Igbo Christian-majority, and Hausa-Fulani Muslim-majority states 
today.  The Hausa Muslim culture is more hierarchical while the mixed Christian and 
Muslim Yoruba culture is more representational (Paden 2005, 204), and the Christian 
Igbo culture is more equity-oriented and participatory (Njaka 1974, 139).  This has led to 
widespread misunderstanding about group representation, communication, and 
coordination. 
Table 43  
Nigerian Ethnic Groups
Table Continued 
Name Percent Pop. Origin Religion 
Hausa-Fulani 29 Regionally Spread Sunni Muslim 
Yoruba 21 Regionally Spread Christian Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority 
Igbo 18 Native Christian 
Ijaw 10 Regionally Spread Christian 
Kanuri 4 Regionally Spread Muslim 
Ibibio 3.5 Native Christian 
Tiv 2.5 Native Mixed 
Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017 
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Nigerian Linguistic Groups. 
Source: University of Texas Libraries 1979 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
The isolated institutionalization histories of the north and south are the driving 
force of modern religious identity formation in Nigeria (see Tajfel and Turner 1979, 35).  
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British colonial administrators’ sensitivity to the importance of religion in northern 
Nigeria (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 136) and resulting “Indirect Rule” of the region 
allowed Islam to strengthen (Ojo 2007, 177), as northern Muslims and southern 
Christians were kept apart.  The Nigerian population is a near-religious parity with 46.45 
percent Christian and 45.53 percent Muslim (Johnson and Grim 2013).  There are 
Christian majorities in the South South and South East regions, Muslim majorities in the 
North West and North East regions, and mixed populations in the North Central and 
South West regions.  The current Nigerian model of governance, “may not be as well 
suited to balancing Muslim and Christian religious communities as expected” (Paden 
2005, 208), particularly those in the Middle Belt states. 
Table 44  
Nigeria – Religion by Region 
Region Percent Christian Percent Muslim 
Christian Majority 
South East 96.71 0.30 
South South 93.86 3.36 
Mixed Populations 
North Central 59.44 38.7 
South West 62.74 36.49 
Muslim Majority 
North West 8.94 90.02 
North East 20.79 78.39 
Source: Johnson and Grim (2013) 
Data extracted from source on 03/06/17. 
Physical Proximity 
 Nigeria is a relatively expansive and moderately rugged country, which decreases 
physical proximity.  However, because it has the seventh largest population globally (186 
million) (World Bank 2016) and only the 32nd largest landmass, it is one of the most 
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densely populated SSA countries, increasing physical proximity.  Having a relatively 
large urban population (49.4 percent) decreases its propinquity in urban areas, yet its 
hundreds of small geographically bound, dense network ethnolinguistic groups, increases 
it in rural areas.   
Nigeria has an urban-rural and north-south divide.  While it has a sizable 
diaspora, because it has a large population, most migration is internal, from rural to urban 
and south to north and is typically incentivized by economic opportunity rather than 
coerced by violence.  In the late 1920s and again in the late 1960s there were significant 
population migrations from the south to the north, increasing its share of the population 
from a parity to 57.03 percent in 1931 and 64.42 percent in 1973, respectively (Udo 
1998, 356).  Between 1963 and 1973, the annual intercensal growth rate in the mostly 
rural and less mobile north was as high as 6.8 percent and in the more urban and mobile 
south as low as -0.62 (Adepoju 1981, 33; Campbell 1976, 247; Suberu 2001, 151).  Since 
the 1970s, it has had one of the highest urbanization rates in the world (Paden 2008, 10).  
The population growth rate remains high in 2017, with an estimated 4.3 percent between 
2015 and 2020 (World Factbook 2017).  Therefore, while many members of small ethnic 
groups interact in urban areas, there is a nesting effect for those remaining in ethnic 
homelands, leaving them triply insulated from urban populations and other small ethnic 
groups with whom they are not physically, technologically, or socially proximate. 
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Figure 10. Nigerian Population Density. 
Source: LandScan 2000 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Technological Proximity 
 Nigerians are highly mobile with moderate communications and transportation 
options; however, in rural areas, whom one interacts with depends mostly on religious 
affiliation.  Nigerians communicate face-to-face and via mobile phone when not in 
physical proximity and receive news and information via sixty radio and 106 television 
stations.  The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.7 percent of its population has 
access (World Factbook 2017).  Access to mobile networks and radio and television 
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coverage is widespread.  However, left out of communications technological proximity 
are some rural Muslim-majority states in the North West and North East regions.  An 
active media drives religious expansionism as an estimated 40 percent of state and private 
television and radio station revenues come from religious broadcasting (Ihejirika 2004; 
Ojo 1999, 8).  It is also often the culprit of disseminating misinformation nationally about 
localized conflict events, which triggers subsequent violent events in more distant 
locations (Weidmann 2011, 13). 
Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure is unevenly developed.  It has an extensive 
road network, but most are in poor condition.  Its rail network connects many of its most 
populous cities, but is primarily for cargo and does not connect to the capital, Abuja; as 
well, Lagos is the largest city in the world without a metro rail system.  Domestic air 
travel is relatively inexpensive in Nigeria through one of its 16 commercial carriers 
operating 73 aircraft out of 40 paved airports (World Factbook 2017); at least three of 
these carriers fly domestic routes.  Therefore, poor Nigerians travel via bus and the 
wealthy via air, which is useful for increasing technological proximity between groups. 
Social Proximity 
 Physical proximity increases the likelihood of increasing social proximity and 
stronger network ties between groups.  Nigerian Christians and Muslims, neither very 
syncretistic4, have remained mostly separate due to tribal and British colonial alignments 
until acute post-independence institutional failures unintentionally seeded civil society 
growth by providing opportunities for expansionistic Christian and Muslim groups to fill 
                                                 
4 Only 1.7 percent of Nigerians adhere to traditional religions (World Factbook 2016). 
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basic needs, security, and service gaps for their adherents.  This has resulted in the 
development of two active and separate religious-based civil societies that choose not to 
link their networks for greater effectiveness in filling gaps left by the state 
(Juergensmeyer 2005, 152).  Further, this has grown into a competitive enterprise and 
sustained violent turf war between disparate ethnoreligious civil society groups (Agbese 
1996, 139), where they may choose to extend services to other groups with the purpose of 
increasing political power (Juergensmeyer 2005, 153) or securing conversions (2005, 
157). 
Religious violence is less frequent but more intense.  Non-religiously-motivated 
social conflict related to elections, economic markets, and the environment is more 
widespread in Nigeria but rarely threatens one’s ontological and epistemological 
foundation as religious conflict does.  One example of religious conflict is the fallout 
from the 2002 Miss World pageant that was supposed to be held in Kaduna, Nigeria.   
Provocative marketing angered Muslims to the point of rioting, shutting down the event, 
and the death of over 200 people, exposing Nigeria’s fractured public sphere (Obadare 
2004, 192).  There has also been widespread conflict on university campuses over 
religious symbolism (Paden 2008, 62), proselytizing, and claims on sacred space.  One 
rare counterexample to this trend comes from the city of Kaduna where the inter-religious 
collaboration of Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye has been successful in 
connecting Christian and Muslim civil societies for conflict resolution dialogue. 
Nigerian religious civil societies are in closest physical, technological, and social 
proximity in Middle Belt states and the Southwest Region; however, their interaction 
regularly results in religious or ethnoreligious conflict in the former via indigene-settler 
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disputes (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 130).  In the Christian-dominated Niger Delta, civil 
society effort is focused on environmental sustainability, and in southern urban centers, a 
focus on micro-credit programs.  “Conflicts are unique events and must be understood 
within their own contexts” (Druckman 2005, 9).  The Middle Belt states provide a unique 
environment where religious parity, land conflict, and Shari’ a law intersect to produce a 
religiously polarized civil society.  Poorly constructed and unevenly adjudicated 
indigene-settler policies that reminiscent of rent controls in gentrifying urban centers, 
restrict citizens’ free movement and stagnate the market.  Added to this, conflict triads 
involving Christians, Muslims, and government officials, further complicate relations 
(Roniger 1994, 76).  State officials often view civil society as competitors of power, 
influence, and legitimacy (McGowan 2003, 340). 
The social tie that binds these groups together is often conflict over sacred space 
(Gambo and Omirin 2012, 522).  Both are expansionist religions that are prone to buying 
into demonizing myths of the “Other.”  Christian proselytism, particularly the more 
assertive Pentecostal version (Ihejirika 2009, 12, 20), differs greatly from Islamic Shari ‘a 
and Da’ wah.  Their intentions are similar, but their means to that end are not (Krings 
2008, 64).  Aggressive Renewalist Christian preaching and the unthoughtful construction 
of churches in Muslim-majority areas has escalated conflict, as has the implementation of 
Shari ‘a (Islamic Law)—which does not separate religion from the political and economic 
(Hoexter et al. 2002, 115).  Both of these cause religion to spill out from the private 
sphere into the semi-public and public spheres (Ojo 2007, 176).  Muslims consider 
Nigeria overly influenced by western education, symbols, and legal codes (Gbadamosi 
1978, 536).  Because Nigerians have experienced numerous regime changes, “some say, 
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military and civilian political rule have failed Nigeria, why not try a Islamic theocracy” 
(1978, 528).  The federal government has thereby taken a flexible approach to its 
constitutional separation of religion and state, allowing Muslim religious symbolism to 
adorn public buildings (e.g., bus stops and post offices) (Osaghae 1994, 129).  The 
implementation of Shari’ a criminal code in mixed religious populations throughout most 
northern and some Middle Belt states has caused conflict (Obadare 2004, 178).  Even if 
non-Muslims are not adjudicated under Shari ‘a, it alters the cultural, economic, political, 
and social environment for all citizens.  Further, Hisba (local voluntary vigilante 
enforcers of Shari ’a), attempt to close bars and hotels, even in non-Muslim areas (Paden 
2005, 164).  Social conflict increases when non-Muslim minorities are willing to fight 
back. 
Social conflict is most intense in the religiously-mixed Middle Belt and northern 
cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos, and Bauchi, where settlement patterns fall along religious 
lines (Gambo and Omirin 2012, 133) and highly dense Christian and Muslim 
communities share few network ties.  Kaduna and Jos have gone so far as to zone 
Christian and Muslim neighborhoods in an attempt to control inter-group interaction.  
“By 2002, residents were describing particular areas of Kaduna town as ‘100 percent 
Christian’ or ‘100 percent Muslim” (Human Rights Watch 2003, 5).  The rule of law is 
weak throughout Nigeria, but because these groups are mobile, competing over limited 
resources, highly religious, and physically, but not socially proximate, routine land 
tenure, indigene-settler, and property disputes become spiritualized resulting in 
indivisible sacred space conflict.  Therefore, conflict often serves as the first network tie 
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between these communities and subsequent information asymmetry and 
miscommunication lead to further conflict and strengthening of negative network ties. 
Power Differential 
 The bipolar Nigerian power differential occurs along religious and geographic 
divisions.  However, this does not mean ethic, class, and resource-based conflict does not 
occur.  Religious majorities in each of Nigeria’s 36 states have autonomy to shape 
political institutions to their advantage and to the detriment of local religious minorities; 
this is most pronounced in Middle Belt states.  One-third of Nigeria’s 36 states have a 
religious parity (primarily Middle Belt), while 13 are Christian-majority (all southern), 
and 12 are Muslim-majority (all northern).  Moreover, the more states and LGAs there 
are, the weaker each one is alone, encouraging the formation of alliances between like-
minded political units along religious lines, resulting in “the bipolar cleavages of North 
versus South and Muslim versus Christian” (Diamond 2001, xv).  Religious parity among 
substantial ethnolinguistic diversity (see Igwara 2001) makes Nigeria an excellent test 
case for analyzing power struggles common to federations (Paden 2005, 4) (e.g., colonial 
independence, civil war, resource conflict, religious extremism, and social conflict), 
where there are often no clear winners or losers, leaving all sides hopeful they will 
prevail. 
The Nigerian Constitution forbids the adoption (1999, Ch. I, Part II, Section 10), 
support, or discrimination (1999, Ch. IV, Section 38) based on religion by the federal or 
state governments and protects the freedom of religion for all (Nmehielle 2004, 730), 
however, this has not happened consistently in practice.  Modern religious conflict in 
Nigeria can be traced to the national debate on Shari ‘a at the Constituent Assembly in 
 202 
1977-78 (Osaghae 1994, 123).  Also, since the General Babangida administration 
upgraded Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
1986, “Nigeria appears to have degenerated from a religiously peaceable to a religiously 
polarized federation” (Suberu 2001, 17).  The Nigerian Christian-majority south has 
dominated the economy, while the Muslim-majority north has been successful in 
achieving political dominance (Kukah 1993, 259).  From 1979 to 1999—minus the 84-
day Ernest Shonekan Interim National Government—no Christian had led Nigeria 
(Obadare 2006, 669 citing Agbaje et al. 2005).  Modern Nigerian politics under the 
Fourth Republic is quite active with several dozen political parties, 14 of them active, 
with two highly relevant: the left-leaning All Progressives Congress (APC) and the right-
leaning People’s Democratic Party (PDP).  The PDP dominated the first decade of the 
Fourth Republic, so much so that within the party, it struck an informal power-sharing 
agreement for alternating the nomination of its presidential candidates between a 
Christian and a Muslim (Suberu 2001, 16).  The APC was cobbled together by several 
smaller Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba parties to challenge this PDP dominance and was 
successful in doing so with President Buhari’s 2015 win. 
Nigeria is not all conflict and violence.  The appearance of widespread conflict 
due to the chaotic arrangement of informal and formal Nigerian institutions is often 
mistaken for actual violence (see Fearon and Laitin 1996).  Social conflict tends to be 
concentrated in areas of religious parity, while religion is often not the root cause of 
conflict.  Because religion is quickly becoming the primary means of Nigerian identity, 
economic and political disputes become imbued with religious significance.  When 
Nigerian Christians and Muslims are physically proximate, equally powerful, and 
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governed by an inconsistent rule of law, the intensity of conflict increases (see Ojo 2007).  
In this uncertain and highly competitive political environment, religious groups feel a 
sense of urgency to stake out their claim and ensure the “Other” does not have greater 
access to state resources, land, markets, and public spaces than they do, thus rendering 
some of these disputes indivisible and subject to intensified conflict.  However, 
religiously intensified conflict over land and public space (sacred space conflict), erupts 
in short, intense, localized bursts (Salehyan et al. 2012, 507) and does not often spread.  It 
has altered settlement patterns and land use in the Middle Belt, particularly in Kaduna 
and Plateau states (2012, 509) where each group is large and powerful enough to think it 
can eventually prevail against the “Other.”  What aggravates this type of conflict further 
is when law enforcement sides with either Christian or Muslim communities, which 
produces complex triadic conflict, enemy alliances, and damaging political behavior (see 
Saperstein 2004).  Oppositely, clear religious majorities are present in Christian-majority 
southeastern states and Muslim-majority northwestern states.  In Nigeria’s most populous 
city, Lagos (9 million), which is three times larger than the next two largest cities, Kano 
(3 million) and Ibadan (3 million), there is a diverse mixture of ethnicities, languages, 
classes, and religions. 
The composite effect social network composition has on the Nigerian GTR, 
through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization, high physical, high technological 
and moderate social proximity, and a bipolar power differential has the potential to widen 
the GTR. 
Case #4: Zambia 
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Fractionalization 
 Zambia’s population is ethnolinguistically and religiously heterogeneous, but 
culturally homogenous.  It is more ethnically diverse than linguistically, as most of its 
languages proceed from the common Bantu language family.  There are almost double 
the number of ethnic groups (73) as there are languages (46, with 37 being indigenous) 
(Simons and Fennig 2017).  Zambians have a low literacy rate at 63.4 percent (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015), and their official 
language is English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity between groups.  Just 
four ethnic groups (Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja-Chewa, and Loiz) compose 48 percent of the 
population (Simons and Fennig 2017), the first two being the larger and native to the 
area, while the latter two, smaller and regionally spread throughout southern Africa. 
Zambia’s official religion is Christianity, with 97.6 percent claiming that faith 
(Pew Research Center 2010).  However, Zambian Christianity is not a cohesive body as 
demonstrated by its high religious fractionalization, substantial syncretism, and many 
small and widespread evangelical and African Independent Church (AIC) sects.  The 
remainder of Zambian Christians are the more formally institutionalized Catholic Church 
and mainline Protestant denominations.  The Catholic Church has dioceses represented in 
each province and is more involved in public life as a voice of social justice, while 
evangelical denominations and AICs focus more on church growth and proselytism. 
Table 45  
Zambian Ethnic Groups 
Name Percent Pop. Origin Religion 
Bemba 21 Native Christian 
Tonga 14 Native Christian 
Table Continued 
Nyanja-Chewa 7 Regionally Spread Christian 
Lozi 6 Regionally Spread Christian 
Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017 
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Zambian Linguistic Groups. 
Source: Zambian Translators International 2017 
Reprinted with Permission. 
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Figure 12. Zambian Ethnolinguistic Groups. 
Source: Muturzikin.com 2007a 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Physical Proximity 
 The Zambian population is sparse and spread out, which decreases its physical 
proximity, yet it is not a particularly rugged terrain, increasing its potential for physical 
proximity in the presence of effective incentives or coercion.  It has a moderately 
urbanized (44 percent) population, which grew at a rate of 4.2 percent between 2000 and 
2010 (Zambian Central Statistical Office 2013, 25).  Because it is a highly mobile 
society, there is the potential for domestic isomorphism between ethnic regions, which is 
evident by its homogeneous culture. 
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Zambian rural to urban migration patterns are driven by economic development 
and opportunity (2013, 1) more than conflict and violence.  The many smaller 
geographically concentrated ethnic groups do not migrate from their home regions to 
other ethnic home regions, but instead to urban areas in their region and eventually on to 
where the most jobs are located in the Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces.  Between 2000 
and 2010 rural eastern and western provinces have lost population to the more urban 
Copperbelt and the Copperbelt has subsequently lost population to neighboring Lusaka, 
the capital region, rising as high as 10.4 percent of the Copperbelt’s population in 2010 
(2013, 10).  This migration pattern does not place ethnic groups in proximity to each 
other except in the few large urban centers.  Therefore, home area ethnic populations are 
not in physical proximity. 
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Figure 13. Zambian Population Density. 
Source: LandScan 2000 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Technological Proximity 
 The Zambian state built an extensive—by SSA standards—landline 
telecommunications infrastructure, but it is mostly idle as only one percent of the 
population utilize it while 75 percent have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016).  The 
rapid diffusion of mobile technologies has made its landline infrastructure unsustainable 
to develop further; such is the state of many of its industries and infrastructure.  While 
Zambians primarily receive domestic news and information via sixty-eight radio stations, 
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their access to other southern African societies through electronic communications is 
quite limited.  The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.5 percent (World Factbook 
2017) of its population has access to it, severely decreasing its ability to benefit from the 
experiences of other societies facing similar challenges (Larmer 2005, 43). 
What exists of Zambia’s transportation infrastructure is relatively sound thanks to 
Chinese investment and trade of Zambian copper for development of its transportation 
sector (see Brautigam 2009).  This deal has primarily worked because China is the 
world’s largest consumer of copper (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 87) and Zambia 
requires the increased reliability of its transportation network to bring its copper and 
other exports to market.  As a result, the Zambian national government has awarded 
many Chinese companies contracts for road, railway, and airport infrastructure building 
and maintenance (2010, 88).  Traders, investors, and donors have mustered sufficient 
buy-in from Zambians to launch infrastructural projects, but once off the ground, 
maintaining them has proven difficult.  As a result, much of its road network has gone 
through cycles of growth and deterioration, to the point that by 1980, it was valued at 
US$2.3 billion, shrinking to US$1.5 billion by 2000 (World Bank 2010). 
Zambia does not have the most extensive rail network in SSA, but because it has 
relatively forgiving terrain, access to external financing, the incentive to get its copper to 
market, and a relatively peaceful post-colonial development period, its rail system is in 
better condition than many of its neighbors.  Because Zambians do not own many private 
vehicles and domestic air travel is almost non-existent and prohibitively expensive with 
only one carrier, they ride the rails and public buses.  The more urban and centralized 
Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces have the best access to all of these communications 
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technologies and transportation infrastructure and are therefore the most technologically 
proximate. Mostly left out of technological proximity are the more sparsely populated 
Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces. 
Social Proximity 
 An HIV/AIDS prevalence of 12.4 percent (UNAIDS 2014), rising as high as 16.2 
percent in 1998 (World Bank 2017), directly affecting over one million people and much 
more indirectly, has made even the most straightforward decisions complicated.  The 
Zambian cultural, economic, political, and social structure has been altered by 
individuals’ purposefully planning daily activities so to avoid contact with particular 
people or groups for health or taboo reasons, choosing whom to consider for marriage, 
and means for how to care for infected group members (Frank 2009, 34).  This has 
resulted in an added layer of network separation between ethnic groups.   
Zambia’s economic growth has been primarily limited to urban areas, increasing 
economic inequality to the sixth highest Gini (57.1) globally (World Bank 2015), which 
has produced an extensive urban-rural divide and network separation.  The government 
has perpetuated this growing divide since independence by subsidizing maize meal 
consumption “to benefit urban constituencies, particularly the unionized workers in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt” (Simutanyi 1996, 833).  Linguistic diversity does not serve 
as a barrier to social proximity since English is the official and primary trade language.  
The highly syncretistic nature of Zambian Protestantism and Catholicism (12 percent 
prevalence of traditional spiritualism) (World Factbook 2016) and the lack of competing 
global religions reduces the expansionistic nature of Christianity in this context, which 
both decreases inter-group interaction and conflict. 
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Power Differential 
 While Zambia is not an ethnic-based federation, its administrative divisions are 
predicated mainly on Zambia’s four major politically cohesive ethnolinguistic groups 
(Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi, and Tonga) (Dresang 1974, 1606).  The Zambian economy is 
concentrated in Bemba and Tonga areas (Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces), leaving all 
other areas dependent on them.  Its post-colonial multipolar power differential has been 
kept in balance by strongman President Kaunda and the socialist United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) from 1964 to 1991.  His strategic management of competing 
ethnic groups through the distribution of copper wealth, allowed him to establish a 
unipolar de jure and de facto single-party state.  However, under sustained pressure, he 
eventually allowed multiple competitive parties, which promptly unseated him.  This has 
spurred an active democratic society with competitive elections, though not free from 
corruption. 
The Zambian civilian government has strategically managed the military through 
recruitment.  As well, recruitment of Northern Rhodesian and eventually Zambian law 
enforcement officers expanded from five ethnic groups to twelve (Haantobolo 2008, 92) 
representing all regions, with most posted outside their home region.  Consequently, no 
single ethnic group could dominate the military or law enforcement institutions 
(Lindemann 2010, 10).  Later, during the Second Republic, the fruits of this strategy 
shown in that each major ethnolinguistic group has cycled through top military leadership 
positions (2010, 13). 
The composite effect social network composition has on the Zambian GTR, 
through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization and cultural homogeneity, 
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moderate physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and vacillation 
between a multipolar and unipolar power differential does not have the potential to widen 
the GTR. 
Case #5: Zimbabwe 
 
Fractionalization 
 Zimbabwe is moderately ethnolinguistically homogeneous, highly cultural 
homogenous, and religiously heterogeneous.  Zimbabweans are highly literate (87 
percent) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016), and 
their languages usually align with their ethnic groups.  There are 21 languages (16 being 
indigenous) spoken in Zimbabwe (Simons and Fennig 2017), with all of them receiving 
official state language status, which tends to reinforce divisions between groups.  
However, English, commonly spoken in urban areas, relieves some of this tension.  The 
most dominant ethnolinguistic group, the Shona, compose 70 percent of the population, 
while the largest minority, the Northern Ndebele, make up 16 percent.  There are also a 
dozen much smaller ethnic groups, half native and the other half regionally spread.  
Zimbabweans are highly Christian (85 percent) with a Protestant (Anglican and 
Methodist) majority and Roman Catholic minority. 
Table 46  
Zimbabwean Ethnic Groups 
Name Percent Pop. Origin Religion 
Shona 70 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Northern Ndebele 16 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Tswa 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Kunda 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Nsenga 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Manyika 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Ndau 1 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Table Continued 
Venda 1 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Kalanga 1 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Tswana 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Lozi 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Nambya 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Tsoa 1 Native Protestant Christian 
Tonga 1 Regionally Spread Protestant Christian 
Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017 
Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Zimbabwean Ethnolinguistic Groups. 
Source: Muturzikin.com 2007b 
Reprinted with Permission. 
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Physical Proximity 
 Zimbabwe is a relatively compact country with a forgiving terrain, which 
increases the likelihood of physical proximity.  Zimbabweans are a highly mobile 
population, though this does not result in close physical proximity between ethnic groups.  
Being a highly rural population (67.8 percent) (World Factbook 2017), concentrates its 
urban populations in the cities of Harare and Bulawayo.  Much of Zimbabwe’s lack of 
physical proximity is explained by the history of the Shona and Northern Ndebele 
ethnolinguistic groups, which are two strong nations contained in one state.  The Shona 
occupy the northeastern and central Mashonaland provinces surrounding the capital 
Harare, deeply rooted in the area for over a millennium, while the Northern Ndebele have 
resided primarily in the Matabeleland provinces in the southwest of the country 
surrounding Bulawayo for nearly 200 years.  During the Rhodesian Bush War, violence 
was the most common driver of internal migration and in the years following, economic 
deprivation and political turmoil.  Nearly a quarter of Zimbabweans of all ethnic groups, 
but more so Northern Ndebele, fled to South Africa and Botswana in the mid-2000s due 
to food insecurity and hyperinflation (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 21) 
resulting from President Mugabe’s land policies.  Many others remain internally 
displaced because of Mugabe’s gentrification plan, Operation Murambatsvina, which 
uprooted over half a million of Zimbabwe’s most impoverished citizens (United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme 2005). 
 215 
 
Figure 15. Zimbabwean Population Density. 
Source: LandScan 2000 
Reprinted with Permission. 
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Figure 16. Zimbabwean Food Insecurity – June 2008. 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP) 2008 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
Technological Proximity 
 The Shona-led government controls the few radio and television stations through 
which Zimbabweans receive their news and information.  The internet is not highly 
utilized, as only 23.1 percent of its population have access (World Factbook 2017).  
Cellular subscription rates are 83 percent (World Bank 2016) therefore when group 
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members are not physically proximate, they can remain technologically proximate, 
though this does not increase technologically proximity between groups.  The Shona and 
Northern Ndebele have greater access to these communications technologies than do 
smaller ethnic groups. 
Zimbabwe’s rail and road networks are adequate.  There are nearly 200 airports 
(17 paved) indicating its developing past and yet few travel by air via the only carrier, the 
government-owned, Air Zimbabwe, which has been in and out of business during the 
2010s due to financial difficulties.  Zimbabwe’s terrain and physical size do not 
necessitate air transport, and thus its air transport network does little to increase 
technological proximity.  Oppositely, its 3,427 km rail network and extensive road 
system connect much of the country.  Therefore, Zimbabweans travel via “chicken bus,” 
rail, and because they have the third most vehicles per capita in SSA, the wealthy travel 
by private vehicle. 
Social Proximity 
 The Shona and Northern Ndebele have an almost religious adherence to their 
ethnic identities and homelands.  Their shared British colonial experience did not unify 
them nor produce many strong network ties even though they fought against a common 
enemy in the white settler regime.  When the threat of their common enemy was 
removed, hostile feelings between them returned and increased—every group needs an 
enemy to define itself (see Volkan 1988).  In the absence of social proximity, 
isomorphism has not caused their informal institutions to converge, but they have instead 
developed separately and differently. 
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The HIV/AIDS epidemic has ravaged and restructured Zimbabwe’s already 
complex society.  Multiple layers of social complexity ensure that those infected from 
one ethnic group are doubly or triply isolated from those in other groups.  It has resulted 
in a substantial drop in average life expectancy for Zimbabweans, from 61.92 years in 
1986 to a low of 40.68 years in 2002 and rebounding back up to 59.61 in 2015 (World 
Bank 2015).  Its national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate rose to a high of 28 percent in 1997 
and has since come down to 13.5 percent in 2016 (UNAIDS 2016), which is still over 1 
million infected and many more millions affected. 
Not even this common, potentially network-tying, experience has produced 
isomorphism between Shona and Northern Ndebele institutions.  The infection rates vary 
significantly between these groups; Northern Ndebele areas (Matabeleland South at 21 
percent) are almost double that of Shona and other ethnic minorities (Manicaland at 10.5 
percent) (Zimbabwe Health and Child Care Ministry 2016).  The reality of potential 
physical proximity, yet deep social separation between these groups is evident in the two 
districts with the highest (27.6 percent in the Bubi District of Matabeleland North 
Province) and lowest (6.6 percent in Gokwe North District of Midlands Province) 
infection rates (UNAIDS 2014, 11), being separated by only two districts and a span of 
170 miles.  HIV/AIDS spread so rapidly throughout the Northern Ndebele because they 
are highly mobile within their home region.  The more mobile populations are more 
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than settled populations (International Organization for 
Migration 2002, 1). 
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Power Differential 
 Modern Zimbabwean administrative divisions are predicated mostly on pre-
colonial Shona and Northern Ndebele territories, which the British eventually codified.  
Its post-colonial unipolar power differential has been cemented for 37 years by Shona 
strongman, President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
Party (ZANU-PF).  His status as the hero of the independence movement was established 
through the Rhodesian Bush War victory over the white minority rule of Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesian Front (RF).  The eventual merger of Nkomo’s competing Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) with his own Zimbabwe African National Liberation 
Army (ZANLA) to form ZANU-PF during the Third Chimurenga, afforded him 
legitimacy among the Shona and proper fear among the Northern Ndebele.  Additionally, 
his symbiotic relationship with the military elite has secured its long-term allegiance until 
on November 14, 2017, when President Mugabe was removed from power through the 
Zimbabwean military’s progressive coup d'état, writ, “national democratic project” 
(Chiwenga 2017). 
As the president’s authoritarian grip on the state has been gradually 
slipping in the face of growing opposition, the military has grown more 
and more involved in politics – LeBas and Mangongera (2014, 68) 
 
Former Vice President Mnangagwa replaced Mugabe, but the Zimbabwean 
military wanted to make “it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover” (Moyo 
2017).  However, some outside observers claim, “If it looks like a coup, walks like a coup 
and quacks like a coup, then it's a coup” (Onyango-Obbo 2017). 
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Figure 17. Zimbabwe Election Results – First Round (Parliamentary Seats) – 2008. 
Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 2008 
Reprinted with Permission. 
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Figure 18. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Seats – 2017. 
Source: Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) 2017 
Reprinted with Permission. 
 
The composite effect social network composition has on the Zimbabwean GTR, 
through ethnolinguistic and cultural homogeneity and religious fractionalization, low 
physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and a unipolar power 
differential, does not have the potential to widen the GTR. 
 
Conclusion 
These findings provide insight into where the GTR discourse has been, its current 
state, and ideas for the direction it may go, revealing there is broad support for the 
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comprehensive examination of a social cause of the GTR.  While the literature is justified 
in focusing first on state security and contract institutions and their well-documented 
effects on the GTR and giving secondary attention to the cultural effects of 
individualism-collectivism and market effects of globalization, a social focus extending 
beyond fractionalization is overdue.  Fractionalization suffers from collinearity; the 
literature is unsure how ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization affect each other 
and which has the greatest effect on the GTR.  Democracy presents another collinearity 
concern; the literature is unsure if it causes generalized trust or vice versa.  Nonetheless, 
fractionalization has provided the literature a valuable base upon which to build a social 
explanation for the GTR.  When including findings on proximity and power differential 
in addition to fractionalization, the size and quality of the literature on the social effects 
on the GTR grows substantially. 
The time has also come for the trust literature to focus on the GTR rather than 
generalized trust level and to focus on its social causes, rather than its consequences.  
Generalized trust is a discrete phenomenon from in-group trust, yet it is less conceptually 
separable from institutional trust.  This complexity arises because “people” legislate, 
execute, enforce, and interpret institutions.  This overlap makes each substitutable for the 
other on a limited basis for achieving similar positive externalities.  A high level of 
inequality is not as much of a problem in non-fragile states because a high level of 
institutional trust can substitute for low generalized trust.  However, when examining 
theories of trust in fragile states, it is essential to know in what context one may substitute 
one for the other. 
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These findings reveal that each case’s security and contract institutions are weak, 
yet minimally functional, rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed.  Each of 
their cultures is highly collectivist and economic relations tend towards export 
dependence and concentration and aid rather than balanced and diversified trade.  While 
control cases exhibit common fractionalization, proximity, and power differential 
patterns, deviant test cases exhibit different patterns. 
The trust literature suggests a wide GTR is a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition of a non-fragile state.  Narrow GTR are possible in non-fragile states, and wide 
GTR are possible in fragile states.  It also finds social diversity and state fragility are not 
sufficient conditions to produce an untrusting population; instead, a SSA society’s slave 
trade legacy may explain its in-group and institutional trust compositions.  While not all 
fragile states are highly fractionalized, many are; though this does not mean they are 
conflict-ridden, untrusting, and untrustworthy societies.   
Chapter V follows by interpreting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing 
within- and cross-case findings through a most similar least likely multiple comparative 
deviant case analysis of the findings for each of the five selected cases, testing social 
network composition’s effects on the GTR. 
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CHAPTER V – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS 
Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before 
breakfast. 
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
 
The third and final phase of George’s (1979, 210) case study design (synthesis of 
findings) is implemented here through a most similar least likely multiple comparative 
deviant case analysis.  The most similar, least likely, and deviant parts are accomplished 
through the case selection process, where control variables affect the dependent variable 
as negatively as possible, making necessary and sufficient claims very difficult to 
achieve.  The two control and three test cases are most similar on control variable inputs 
and background factors, while they differ on the test independent variable input and 
resulting dependent variable outcomes.  The two control cases are typical cases, while the 
three test cases are deviant outliers in that their dependent variable outcomes are 
unexpected and are least likely in that their control variable inputs negatively affect the 
dependent variable.  The analysis is comparative in that case inputs and outcomes are 
compared, and research hypotheses are tested across all cases for each control and test 
variable (cross-case analysis) and variable interrelations are compared and synthesized 
per case (within-case analysis). 
The hypotheses for the control cases (Zambia and Zimbabwe) claim all 
independent control and test variables have a GTR narrowing effect.  The hypotheses for 
the test cases (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) claim all independent control 
variables have a GTR narrowing effect, while the independent test variable has a GTR 
widening effect.  Most hypothesis claims are either confirmed or affirmed.  Control 
variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that all test and control cases are highly 
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collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state security and contract 
institutions and unstable inter-state market forces, having a narrowing effect on the GTR.  
Test variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that the test cases have highly 
fractionalized and proximate societies with large power differentials, producing a 
widening effect on the GTR despite the GTR narrowing effect of the control variables. 
There is predictability within complex systems of interaction.  Sociological 
institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework through 
which analysis of findings is conducted, where competing explanations for case outcomes 
are compared and tested using hoop and smoking gun tests through within-case and 
cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in unfavorable fragile SSA 
state environments.  This framework explains how institutions and social networks 
constrain behavior and how regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and 
power differentials shape different trust environments.  Voigt’s (2013) three-step process 
for examining the de jure-de facto gap of formal and informal institutional conditions 
(size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration), patterns (coercive, normative, 
and memetic isomorphism and institutionalization or deinstitutionalization), and 
structures (rules, norms, and scripts) is used for institutional analysis at group and 
societal levels.  Collective action is made possible by embedding institutions in social 
networks; therefore, measuring and describing social network structures matter.  
Descriptive social network measures explain how strong and pervasive network ties are 
between groups by describing connectivity between groups within a society.  One 
category of network measurement is social cohesion, which measures “the number, 
length, and strength of paths that connect actors in networks” (Galaskiewicz and 
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Wasserman 1994, 7).  Greater social cohesion leads to shared views and behavior (Burt 
1987, 1289).  Cohesion measures: cliques, density, and structurally cohesive blocks 
describe the strength of in-group trust.  Tie measures: homophily, propinquity, 
transitivity, and multiplexity describe the environments within and between groups that 
make bridging ties more or less likely.  These measures are essential to examine because 
it is through weakly tied structurally equivalent nodes that networks connect through 
inter-group interaction and where the GTR may widen. 
 
Cross-Case Analysis 
This section first examines how the control variables affect the GTR across all 
cases; and finally the primary focus, the testing of SNC’s effects on GTR across all cases. 
 
Control Variables 
Each case’s security and contract institutions are weak, yet minimally functional, 
rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed, and their cultures are highly 
collectivist, both producing a GTR narrowing effect.  There is variation present in how 
trade, investment, remittances, and aid affect the GTR that must be explained.  While all 
test and control cases have low investment, their trade, remittances, and aid measures 
vary.  Zambia has relatively high trade and low remittances, and Zimbabwe has moderate 
trade, which could have a GTR widening effect, but they have not.  This indicates that 
these control cases have a good fit but prompts the question of how much trade, 
remittances, and aid affect the GTR, at least in these cases.  Of the test cases, Burkina 
Faso has moderate trade, Ethiopia has only moderate remittances, and Nigeria has only 
moderate non-military aid, which suggests minor weaknesses in test case selection.  
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These potential GTR widening effects are examined thoroughly to ensure they do not 
have a substantial GTR widening effect. 
State Security Institutions 
 
How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states? 
 
H2:  Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius 
in fragile states. 
 
State security institutions is the first control criterion for widening or narrowing 
the GTR.  State security institutions are minimally functional in all test and control cases, 
ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases.  This passes a smoking-gun 
test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that security institutions have a negative 
effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases.  This also passes a hoop test, disproving 
the state security institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  
Both control cases also have minimally functional security institutions and a narrow GTR 
as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit. 
When highly functional, state security institutions (e.g., military and law 
enforcement) provide society with an institutional trust-rich environment, where fear of 
internal and external threats of violence from states, non-state actors, other groups, or 
one’s group are minimized.  Institutional trust removes barriers to inter-group interaction 
and offers opportunities to widen the GTR.  Low-security environments, oppositely, 
encourage groups to close ranks to protect group interests or when very low, force or 
incentivize groups to take their security interests into their own hands through vigilantism 
and seeking interests outside the group through violence.  A secure interest-seeking 
 228 
environment is one of the most important factors required for groups to feel safe having 
their interests met by other groups. 
Social conflict is increasing across SSA and in each of the five cases in particular.  
There were 141 social conflict events recorded in SSA in 1990, increasing to 422 in 2010 
(Salehyan 2012, 506).  The increasing trend of protest and conflict is a byproduct of the 
early stages of democratization (Scarritt et al. 2001, 801) resulting from increasing inter-
group interaction in fragile environments characterized by low legitimacy and weak 
capacity (see Herbst 2000; Obioha 2008; Van de Walle 2001).  Some military and law 
enforcement standard protocols have transferred from the West to these cases through 
coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism; however, this has been insufficient to 
produce secure environments.  Law enforcement institutions in each case suffer from the 
competing goods of selecting officers from local communities, which increases 
legitimacy but also increases the likelihood of corruption and favoritism.  Even in Zambia 
(52.86), the most peaceful of the cases according to the World Bank’s 2016 Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism measure, security institutions are fragile 
and not widening the GTR.  The small and poorly trained and educated Zambian Defence 
Force has had few coup d'état attempts and has had difficulty managing conflict spillover 
from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Congo, DRC.  One would then expect it to have a 
much wider GTR with such a politically stable environment, but it does not. 
Even though the Burkinabé (15.24) have developed a relatively peaceful protest 
culture that has served as a needed pressure valve, recent Islamic spillover has occurred 
from Mali, and unstable leadership transitions have kept entrenched military leaders in 
power, perpetuating security institutions that sow mistrust between society and the 
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military.   A desertion problem weakens the relatively small and undersupplied military; 
therefore, it is not surprising that many Burkinabé consider it illegitimate and ineffective.  
While it has carried out many coup d'états and supplied political leaders, Burkinabe 
norms, behaviors, and scripts do not take their cues from the military.  Even more fragile 
security institutions persist in Ethiopia (7.62) and Nigeria (6.67) where specific regions 
are perpetually violent environments indicating highly negative inter-group interaction 
and narrower GTR in those areas.  Civil war, secession, and food insecurity have 
dominated Ethiopia since the 1970s and freedom has declined since 2006 due to land 
rights conflicts, state use of force against citizens, proxy conflicts, and spillover from 
Somalia.  The strong Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is saturated with Tigray 
leaders, which makes the isomorphic transfer of high-quality western protocols unevenly 
implemented, whereas the centrally controlled Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) fails to 
provide standard operating procedures across very different regional contexts.  Local 
populations view them as outsiders, and many engage in vigilantism to take care of their 
own security needs.  The Nigerian Armed Forces are deeply embedded in society, 
affecting many other state institutions and has a far reach, providing the most troops for 
the African Union (AU).  It is so strong that it has developed a habit of stepping in to 
relieve the citizenry of ineffective civilian leaders.  Even so, Nigerian domestic security 
institutions are minimally functional and struggle to manage intense ethnic, religious, and 
petroleum conflict.  While improving since the nationalist-induced Biafra War (1967-
1970) that killed upwards of six million people, the large, but ill-equipped Nigerian 
Police (NP) that handles law enforcement at the federal level fails to provide consistent 
enforcement across diverse contexts.  This encourages many communities to pursue their 
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security needs through vigilantism.  Because there are rarely mutually understood scripts 
shared between Christian and Muslim groups, information asymmetry increases while 
each seeks to meet its interests.  Further, when the military has periodically overtaken the 
civilian government to restore stability, it has weakened institutional trust. 
Finally, one might also expect Zimbabwe (24.29) to reside near Ethiopia and 
Nigeria, but because it has a unipolar power differential, the government has been able to 
keep a tight rein on its population’s behavior.  Its security institutions were born out of 
the disjointed and violent Rhodesian Bush War for independence against an entrenched 
settler regime that was also permeated with Cold War proxy conflicts, making it a source 
of spillover for neighboring countries.  Built on this security foundation, authoritarian 
maladministration of the military produced a major depression, and Mugabe has 
employed guerrilla tactics to intimidate political opponents.  The powerful Zimbabwean 
military has not attempted many coup d'états but has instead served as a tool of Mugabe 
to build political support among his base and instigate fear among ethnic minority groups, 
narrowing the GTR.  Corruption and Shona favoritism are concerns in the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP).  In-group trust suffers among Zimbabwean ethnic minorities 
who, because of severe upheaval, have difficulty even trusting their family members and 
neighbors. 
State Contract Institutions 
 
How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states? 
 
H2:  Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius 
in fragile states. 
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State contract institutions is the second control criterion for widening or 
narrowing the GTR.  State contract institutions are minimally functional in all test and 
control cases, ensuring they are not causing wide GTR in the test cases.  This passes a 
smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that contract institutions 
have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases.  This also passes a hoop 
test, disproving the state contract institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the 
SNC hypothesis.  Both control cases also have minimally functional contract institutions 
and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit. 
Formal contract institutions are initially shaped through the legislative process, 
find fuller meaning through the judiciary, and are legitimized by the citizenry.  When 
highly functional, state contract institutions provide society with an institutional trust-rich 
environment with less information asymmetry and more fairly adjudicated contracts.  
Greater institutional trust often leads to increased opportunities to widen the GTR.  This 
context also lacks common barriers to positive inter-group interaction.  By contrast, poor 
contracting environments encourage adverse selection leading to moral hazard and 
increased transaction costs and conflict over competing claims.  Groups may choose to 
take what they claim is theirs by force rather than rely on slow, unfair, and corrupt justice 
institutions.  With these barriers removed, groups feel greater confidence having their 
interests met by other groups. 
 Contracting in SSA is centered on the rule of law, controlling corruption, and 
land tenure policy.  Similar to their security institutions, as per the World Bank’s Rule of 
Law and Control of Corruption measures for 2016, all cases score below the global mean.  
Also similar to security institutions, Zambia has the most functional rule of law (43.27) 
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and second most effective control of corruption (42.31) of the cases reflected in its 
relatively progressive, though varying regionally in its success.  The Ethiopian rule of 
law (37.02) and control of corruption (39.90) are not much worse.  While the Burkinabé 
rule of law (34.13) is on par with Ethiopia, its control of corruption (53.37) is the most 
effective of the cases because of the implementation of recent structural adjustment anti-
corruption policies.  As with security institutions, Nigeria’s rule of law (13.94) and 
control of corruption (13.46) are some of the worst globally.  Finally, while Zimbabwe 
may not be a highly violent environment, its terrible rule of law (8.17) and control of 
corruption (8.65) create an unpredictable contracting environment for agents, which 
decreases institutional trust and narrows the GTR. 
When it comes to land, the cases manage the principle-agent problem poorly as 
they lack the specialization required to maintain a Western-style land tenure system.  The 
coercive isomorphic transfer of colonial contract institutions has affected the 
development of land tenure regimes in four of the five cases, sans Ethiopia.  Pervasive 
authoritarian strongman executive leadership has stunted legislative and judicial branches 
where contracts are written and adjudicated. A massive wave of land tenure policy 
modernization occurred in the 1990s and 2000s prompted by a donor-led second wave of 
structural adjustment.  More than 20 countries accounting for more than 80 percent of 
arable land in SSA (Boone 2007, 566) including Burkina Faso in 1997, Zambia in 1995 
and 2006, and Zimbabwe in 1992 and 2000, sought to modernize, individualize, and 
capitalize their longstanding customary land tenure regimes based on birthplace and tribal 
affiliation with the purpose of increasing land registration and titling to make it more 
productive and profitable.  These productivity-driven policy adjustments put many 
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subsistence farmers at risk of losing their land titles.  These governments have had 
difficulty wresting control of land rights from tribal leaders because the former often 
have less legitimacy than the latter.  However, if market forces prevail, the privatization 
of land holdings is likely to increase as land values are driven higher by population 
growth and growing land scarcity (Boserup 1965, 77). 
The fragile Burkinabé state has not been able to wrest full control of its land 
tenure regime from tribal leaders, making it a weakened and ineffective contract agent.  
Tribal leaders still have great legitimacy, which has made it difficult for the government 
to embed modern land tenure policies. Merely codifying formal land institutions has not 
provided the government legitimacy when behavior and scripts remain anchored to 
legitimized informal Burkinabé norms. 
During the Cold War, Ethiopian contract institutions were subject to competing 
Western and communist coercive isomorphic forces.  Its rapid cycling of 
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization between communism and privatization 
produced disjointed and weakly institutionalized land tenure policy and land insecurity.  
The weakness of their encoding and enforcement alike have allowed land titles to be 
misused by Tigray politicians as political favors within their political networks to ensure 
electoral victories.  Through this means, the Tigray, an ethnic minority, has been able to 
game and shape the political system and institutions to its benefit.  The state has realized 
that it is expensive to maintain a Western-style land titling infrastructure and has been 
mostly unwilling to prioritize it. 
As with all federations, Nigerian contract institutions struggle to find the balance 
of power between the central state and political sub-units.  It has erred on the side of 
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exerting enormous influence over states through a land tenure regime.  When effective, 
contract institutions penalize or incentivize behavior, but the incentivization structure for 
Nigerian state agents to serve principles impartially is broken.  It begins with the 
imperfect Constitution, which allows indigene discrimination against settlers regarding 
education, employment, and property ownership, which disincentivizes migration outside 
one’s ethnic home area.  As well, because Nigerian’s are highly religious, indigene-settler 
disputes easily become infused with religious significance. 
The Zambian government was relatively well-intentioned in its attempt at making 
the land market more stable and productive through a far-reaching Western model, 
Zambia’s Land Act of 1995, which was updated in 2006 and embedded in the 
Constitution in 2016.  However, this has produced the unintended consequence of a 
clandestine land market controlled by chiefdoms, which regularly deny women access to 
land title and abuse most fertile lands, producing land shortages and food insecurity.  
Many have lost confidence in the Zambian “rules of the game” due to continually unmet 
expectations.  Land tenure disparity adds to growing economic inequality and affects 
means of capital exchange and effective scripts for meeting interests. 
The Zimbabwean government has tried hard to avoid having its land tenure 
policies affected by western coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism.  To combat 
this magnetic pull, President Mugabe needed an equal and opposite force, which required 
him to forego serving as a neutral agent in land adjudications.  He enacted sweeping 
seizures of white farmers’ productive farmlands to give to non-farming blacks, many of 
whom were his sycophants.  The Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 created a 
vast and embedded contract institution that affects institutions as far ranging as the 
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finance industry and commodity pricing and constructed new social norms and scripts.  
An unintended consequence of this rapid deinstitutionalization was a black market that 
emerged for not only luxury imports but also basic needs.  These new landowners could 
not use the land as collateral for financing due to statutes limiting its use.  Most were not 
skilled farmers, which caused food insecurity and eventually hyperinflation and major 
economic depression.  The haphazard way in which this occurred produced many 
overlapping land entitlements and ensuing conflicts over claims. 
Individualism 
 
Cross the river in a crowd and the crocodile won’t eat you. 
—African proverb 
 
How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states? 
 
H3: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
 
Individualism-Collectivism is the third control criterion for widening or 
narrowing the GTR.  All test and control cases have collectivist societies, ensuring it is 
not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases.  This passes a smoking-gun test and 
rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that collectivism has a negative effect on the GTR 
as hypothesized for all cases.  This also passes a hoop test, disproving the individualism 
alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  Both control cases have 
collectivist societies and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case 
fit. 
Individualism and collectivism are but two of many cultural traits these cases’ 
populations exhibit, yet they are the ones that most affect the GTR.  Pragmatically, 
individualism and collectivism are strategies for controlling norms, scripts, and behaviors 
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in a given space (Mitchell et al. 2000, 980).  Prior to the implementation of modernizing 
policies first through colonialism in most of the cases and then through structural 
adjustment programs for all, collectivism served as an effective means of organizing their 
groups and societies.  Because their groups tend to be highly dense actual small-world 
networks (see Milgram 1967), sustained transitivity is difficult to achieve between 
groups.  However, when a society values individualism, in-group ties and biases weaken, 
which tends to reduce information asymmetry of other groups, increasing the possibility 
of inter-group interaction and having interests met outside the group, which widens the 
GTR. 
These cases did not experience the Enlightenment in the same way Western 
Europe did.  Martin Luther’s 95 Theses served as the sparking event to diminish the 
Catholic Church as the institutional intermediary between God and man.  John Calvin 
subsequently removed collective dualism from its cultural prominence, putting in its 
place less restricted individual agents (Buss 2000, 13).  Made possible from this de- and 
re-institutionalization, were the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
(1789) and the American Bill of Rights (1774), which have served as isomorphic 
templates for so many subsequent constitutions. Mostly free of Enlightenment 
institutions, children in these cases and across SSA are taught collectivist scripts that 
subordinate the individual to the community, so they do not even imagine it is in the 
realm of possibility that they as individuals can solve problems alone (Poovan et al. 2006, 
18).  They have an unknown unknown problem. 
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There 
are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we 
don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we 
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don't know we don't know – Donald Rumsfeld (2002) 
 
All cases are highly collectivist and exhibit a broad or moderately institutional, 
vertical exclusionist collectivism.  While they have high urbanization rates, they are some 
of the least industrialized and least wealthy countries globally.  When comparing 
available data for the Hofstede (2001) individualism and House et al. (2004) collectivism 
measures, Nigeria, followed by Zambia, the two cases that entered globalization earliest, 
are also the least collectivist; this is not to say they are individualist societies as they are 
still quite collectivist.  Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe, the three cases with 
stronger socialist histories, remain more collectivist. 
Burkinabé society, most being poor and rural, revolves around the dominant 
Mossi culture, which has a strong preference for the values of honor, loyalty, solidarity, 
compassion, and Familism.  Universalists require trustworthy institutions; these are not 
present in fragile states.  Thus Burkina Faso and the other cases are institutional 
exclusionist collectivists that weigh and preference personal relationships when making 
behavioral choices. 
Ethiopia appears only moderately poor when consulting standard economic 
measures, but most of its population is very poor.  It is also one of the most rural 
populations with most living in small villages.  Some of its ethnic groups are more 
collectivist than others are.  Of its two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara are more 
hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian collectivist.  The Tigray has 
played off these cultural differences to shape political institutions to its benefit.  Ethiopia 
is often measured pre-derg and post-derg.  Pre-derg Ethiopian society was shaped by 
competing horizontal (equality and nationalism) and vertical (self-reliance and 
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centralized economy) collectivism.  The derg oddly strengthened vertical collectivism by 
isolating society from western influences; providing a common cause, fate, and identity; 
and severely restricting resources.  The derg’s scientific socialism continues to influence 
modern ethnic and class structures. 
Nigeria is one of the more industrialized countries in SSA and is wealthy, but 
most of its people are not.  While most of the population is highly collectivist, there are 
pockets of individualism that are increasing.  Nigeria exhibits extreme diversity from 
group to group along the individualism-collectivism continuum.  Christians and Muslims 
tend to remain loyal to their members regardless of merit.  There is widespread 
miscommunication between hierarchical Nigerian Hausa, representational Yoruba, and 
equity-oriented egalitarian and participatory individualist Igbo.  Urban populations are 
less collectivist than rural ones.  As urbanization increases, ethnic groups move gradually 
from collectivism towards individualism and tend to feel less solidarity within their group 
and greater solidarity with multiple other groups.  However, while Nigeria is rapidly 
urbanizing, nearly half its people remain rural. 
Zambia’s moderately poor, non-industrialized, rural-majority population remains 
centered on collectivist ethnic identity; as much of society claims some variation of 
Christian identity, there is less need for religious positioning between groups.  There is 
growing tension between the state’s individualism-driven policies and entrenched highly 
collectivist ethnic and religious leaders.  Zambia’s extremely high inequality stems from 
a combination of its higher vertical, rather than horizontal collectivism and increasingly 
capitalistic policies.  The privilege of shaping culture and institutions is reserved for the 
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elite in this highly collectivist and unequal context.  While Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and 
Zimbabwe are moderately vertical, Zambia is exceptionally so and Ethiopia, mildly so. 
Zimbabwe, the once relatively prosperous breadbasket of Southern Africa, is now 
mired in maladministration-induced poverty.  Zimbabweans value ascribed family roles, 
status, and Familism, which make their rigid social hierarchies change slowly.  The 
highly collectivist Zimbabwean environment encourages the perpetuation of flawed 
scripts about the “Other” between Shona and Northern Ndebele, which tend to remain 
loyal to their members regardless of merit. 
Inter-State Market Forces 
 
It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence. 
—Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges 
 
How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states? 
 
H4a: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states. 
 
H4b: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the generalized 
trust radius in fragile states. 
 
Inter-state market forces is the fourth and final control criterion for widening or 
narrowing the GTR.  While state security and contract institutions and individualism are 
long-standing and well-supported hypotheses in the trust literature, inter-state market 
forces is multifaceted and, therefore, more complicated.  Trade, investment (FDI and 
FPI), remittances, and aid (military and non-military) compose the majority of financial 
and physical capital that flows between countries; varying combinations of these inputs 
affect the GTR differently.  A state’s economic model (command, mixed, or market) 
affects how it integrates into the global market and how readily coercive and normative 
isomorphic influences affect the trajectory of its economic institutions.  While most 
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developed economies are market/mixed hybrids, four of the five cases, excluding Nigeria, 
have experienced extensive vacillations in economic policy between command 
(Marxist/socialist) and market (neo-liberal structural adjustment) and all cases have 
lingering, strongly embedded and pervasive traditional economies that they have found 
challenging to reduce.  The below tables sort the hypotheses, results, and level of support 
for each facet of this control variable.  The low investment hypothesis is the strongest in 
all test and control cases, followed by high aid, low trade, and finally high remittances. 
Table 47  
Inter-State Market Forces: Trade 
Country  Hypothesis Result Support 
Burkina Faso Test Cases Low Moderate Strong 
Ethiopia Low Low Strong 
Nigeria Low Low Strong 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
Low High Weak 
Zimbabwe Low Moderate Moderate 
 
The majority of the trust literature agrees that low trade produces narrow GTR 
and high trade produces wide GTR; however, not all types of trade have an equal or even 
positive effect.  Increasing trade increases economic growth, but growth is not a 
sufficient proxy measure for the GTR.  Trade diversification provides greater 
macroeconomic stability, a more competitive market environment forces greater 
efficiency, and low labor costs increase competitiveness.  However, there are some 
potential negative externalities.  All types of trust may diminish in the short-term when 
an economy opens itself to the global market before rebounding in the long-term after a 
critical mass of its population feels the benefits of trade and growth.  Increasing trade 
increases exposure to external shocks and in the short-term, structural adjustments in 
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uncompetitive sectors hurt the poor the most.  While absolute poverty is decreasing in 
these cases, relative wealth is not catching up so quickly to rising global averages. 
Two of the three test cases (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have low trade, ensuring it is 
not what is causing wide GTR in those cases.  The remaining test case (Burkina Faso) has 
moderate trade; however, due to subsequent detailed analysis, it is also clear that trade is 
not what is causing its wide GTR.  The majority of Burkinabé are poor.  Burkina Faso 
lacks quality economic institutions, which affects how increasing trade translates into 
increasing growth and the positive externalities associated with it (see Rodriguez and 
Rodrik 2000).  For its increasing economic growth to benefit the poor and widen the 
GTR, low tariffs, infrastructure, and access to technology and finance are required 
(World Bank and the World Trade Organization 2015, 7), all things Burkina Faso still 
lacks.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed and the null hypothesis rejected, 
confirming that low trade has a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test 
cases.  This also passes a hoop test, disproving the trade alternative hypothesis, which 
affirms the SNC hypothesis. 
Zimbabwe’s moderate and Zambia’s high trade and a narrow GTR means trade is 
present but is not having a GTR widening effect.  This indicates either that there is a 
control case misfit or that not all forms of trade are equal in their ability to widen the 
GTR, requiring further analysis.  The latter is more plausible because high trade as 
percent of GDP does not indicate how well a country fares in the trade relationship, only 
that it is deeply connected to the global market.  Zambia (84 percent), Burkina Faso (63 
percent), and Zimbabwe (60 percent) get more than half their GDP from trade, while 
Ethiopia (36 percent) and Nigeria (21 percent) much less.  For Zimbabwe, this measure 
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does not indicate how broadly connected it is to the global market because it is heavily 
dependent on only two countries, South Africa to purchase the majority of its gold and 
tobacco and secondarily, China its iron ore in exchange for petroleum.  The World 
Bank’s Net Barter Terms of Trade Index (2015) suggests none of the cases is being taken 
advantage of in the global market as they have positive terms of trade between 113.50 
and 165.10; whereas another SSA country, the global low, Sierra Leone, is much lower 
(44.09).  However, all cases have a negative Current Account Balance between -3.28 and 
-9.46, whereas another SSA country, the global low, Liberia, is much lower (-42.26).  
Zimbabwe (5.0) and Zambia (4.0) have low tariffs, which provide a stronger trade 
environment than the test cases of Burkina Faso (7.4), Nigeria (11.3), and Ethiopia 
(12.4), yet they have narrow GTRs.  Zambia’s economic growth rate has been high and 
relatively stable, along with Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s, while Zimbabwe’s has been 
erratic and Nigeria’s negative.  Uneven growth may have more detrimental effects on a 
society’s generalized trust than negative growth that is spread relatively evenly 
throughout society.  Therefore, these control cases have a weak to moderate case fit.  It is 
more likely that the type of trade present in Zambia and Zimbabwe serve to narrow rather 
than widen the GTR, rejecting alternative hypotheses claiming all types of trade have the 
same effect on the GTR.  Also weakened are neo-colonial (e.g., dependency and to a 
lesser degree, world-systems theory), claims that high trade produces greater negative 
(e.g., inequality, poverty, and uneven development) than positive externalities.  
Increasing trade and resulting economic growth does not increase inequality (Dollar and 
Kraay 2004, 47).  Trade is but one facet of inter-state market forces.  When other inter-
state market forces have a GTR narrowing effect as they do in most of these cases, 
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increasing trade alone may not be sufficient to produce positive externalities (e.g., reduce 
poverty or widen the GTR).  Therefore, both control cases support the trade hypothesis 
through a straw-in-the-wind test.  This does not affect the strength of the test case 
hypotheses, only their control case fit. 
Table 48  
Inter-State Market Forces: Investment 
Country  Hypothesis Result Support 
Burkina Faso Test Cases Low Low Strong 
Ethiopia Low Low Strong 
Nigeria Low Low Strong 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
Low Low Strong 
Zimbabwe Low Low Strong 
 
The majority of the trust literature agrees that low investment (FDI and FPI) 
produces narrow GTR and high investment produces wide GTR.  Increasing investment 
increases economic growth.  All test and control cases have low investment, ensuring it is 
not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases.  The World Bank’s Foreign Direct 
Investment (2015) and Portfolio Equity (2015) scores reveal that none of these cases is a 
corporate or personal investment destination.  All cases have single digit FDI and little 
FPI.  Having a large Portfolio Equity deficit is not detrimental to Nigeria.  It means that 
Nigerians have financial capital to play in the global market, but the rest of the world is 
not betting on Nigeria.  Neither are corporations betting on Nigeria because it is not a 
low-corruption investment-friendly environment.  This passes a smoking-gun test and 
rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that low investment has a negative effect on the 
GTR as hypothesized for all cases.  This also passes a hoop test, disproving the 
investment alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  Both control cases 
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have low investment and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case 
fit. 
Table 49  
Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances 
Country  Hypothesis Result Support 
Burkina Faso Test Cases High Low Weak 
Ethiopia High Low Weak 
Nigeria High High Strong 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
High Low Weak 
Zimbabwe High High Strong 
 
Much of the trust literature agrees that high remittances produce a narrow GTR 
and low remittances produce a wide GTR in fragile states.  Increasing remittances does 
not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade and 
investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed 
states), may remittances have temporary economic growth and GTR widening effect.  
Some in the trust literature and many development practitioners claim remittances are 
holistically good for society (International Monetary Fund 2005, 6).  However, the long-
term costs of remittances far exceed the benefits.  While a country’s balance of payments 
may enlarge, and the receiving community may consume more (Cattaneo 2005, 2) and 
enhance their job prospects (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001, 6), remittances increase 
inequality for the rural segment of the population (see Capistrano and Santa Maria, 2007, 
9) and “create incentives that lead to moral hazard problems…they have negative effects 
on economic growth” (Chami et al. (2003, 21).  Narrowly allocated, large remittance 
infusions to particular communities or groups have the potential to increase inequality, 
disrupt the labor market, and weaken the economy.  The IMF’s 2005 Financial Action 
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Task Force on money laundering (FATF) recommendations for regulating remittance 
transfer services may restrict illicit transfers, but do little to correct these problems. 
One test case (Nigeria) has high remittances, ensuring it is not what is causing a 
wide GTR.  This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming 
that high remittances have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for Nigeria.  
This also passes a hoop test, disproving the alternative remittances hypothesis, which 
affirms the SNC hypothesis.  The other two test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have 
low remittances; however, when analyzing in detail, this does not appear to have a 
substantial positive effect on their GTR.  These cases fail to pass a smoking-gun test in 
neither case having high remittances; this weakens the hypotheses but does not disprove 
it.  One control case (Zimbabwe) has very high remittances and a narrow GTR as 
hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.  The other control case (Zambia) has 
very low remittances and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit.  However, this 
does not affect the test case hypothesis.  Instead, it indicates that of the inter-state market 
forces, high remittances is often, but not always, a necessary condition for a narrow GTR. 
The intention of receiving communities and their diaspora may be to invest their 
community’s human capital in stronger markets to live off the dividends produced 
(Chami et al. 2003, 22).  This may produce positive externalities for the receiving 
community but often produces negative externalities for other groups.  This does not 
indicate that all receiving communities are inherently lazy as Schapiro et al. (2013, 57) 
explore, but the institutions that form around communities receiving large remittance 
allocations tend to create a script of entitlement and inter-group inequality.  Therefore, 
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there is variation in remittance effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on 
the GTR. 
A community’s dependence on its diaspora’s remittances is not an indicator of a 
stable home economy.  A country like Liberia (30.6 percent of GDP) is highly dependent 
on remittances and has an inactive economy.  The World Bank’s Personal Remittances 
Received (2016) indicator shows Zimbabwe (12.7 percent of GDP) to be the only of the 
cases with substantial per capita remittances.  While Nigeria has nine times more absolute 
remittance inflows than Zimbabwe, it is only 4.7 percent of its GDP—still high globally.  
For each of the other three cases, remittances make up a relatively small percentage of 
GDP, particularly Zambia (0.2 percent of GDP), yet this is an indicator that their 
populations have less ability to migrate to developed economies to produce human capital 
dividends for their home country communities than populations in other regions. 
Table 50  
Inter-State Market Forces: Aid 
Country  Hypothesis Result Support 
Burkina Faso Test Cases High High Strong 
Ethiopia High High Strong 
Nigeria High Moderate Moderate 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
High High Strong 
Zimbabwe High High Strong 
 
Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced 
into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both 
understanding and action than foreign aid – Morgenthau (1962, 301) 
 
There is variation in aid effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on 
the GTR.  Much of the trust literature agrees that high aid (military and non-military) 
produces narrow GTR and low aid produces wide GTR in fragile states.  Increasing aid 
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does not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade 
and investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed 
states), may aid have a temporary positive economic and trust effect.  This is not to 
discount the postive effects of aid as there have been major advancements in the 
eradication of diseases.  This does not excuse the fact that most often, massive aid 
infusions increase currency fluctuations, encourage corruption without sufficient 
accountability and transparency, and are often mismanaged.  So much of the 100 billion 
dollars allocated annually in aid is untraceable (Easterly and Pfutze 2008, 23).  The aid 
industry too easily makes the causal leap from capital and technology to peaceful regimes 
without fully considering the many potential causal paths of economic development, 
social stability, and democratic institutions intervening variables (Morgenthau 1962, 304-
5).  It is unlikely that a program constructed for Dire Dawa, Ethiopia will be effective in 
Choma, Zambia because of these many potential differences.  Aid data quality and 
availability are sub-par because there are too many donors and practitioners seeking 
short-term returns on their time, energy, and capital investments in fragile state markets 
that are unlikely to provide anything but long-term dividends. 
Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high aid and wide 
GTR as hypothesized; ensuring aid is not what is causing a wide GTR in those cases.  
The remaining test case (Nigeria) has only moderate aid; however, due to subsequent 
detailed analysis, it is also ensured that its lower aid is not what is causing a wider GTR.  
While Nigeria’s aid as a percentage of its GDP is smaller than the other cases, the 
absolute amount of aid it receives is quite large.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed 
for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate aid has 
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a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.  All test cases also pass a 
hoop test, disproving the high aid alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC 
hypothesis.  All control cases have high aid and a narrow GTR, meaning aid’s presence is 
not having a GTR widening effect.  This indicates a good control case fit. 
There is a minority voice in the trust literature and among practitioners in the 
development industry claiming aid widens the GTR in fragile states (see D’Onofrio and 
Maggio 2015).  While strong claims may be made for increasing inequality narrowing the 
GTR (see Uslaner and Brown 2005), there is less evidence that increasing aid decreases 
inequality, not that it is impossible.  In cases where aid is effective in reducing economic 
inequality, it could widen the GTR (D’Onofrio and Maggio 2015, 25).  However, donors 
are attracted to “invest” in low-income countries that demonstrate relatively wide GTR 
where there is a higher likelihood of a return on investment; therefore, they self-select 
trusting populations.  It is unlikely that aid has much of a GTR widening effect on a 
society that is already relatively trusting.  Therefore, reverse causality is a problem when 
claiming increasing aid widens the GTR.  This alternative hypothesis may be rejected. 
Israel is the majority recipient of US military aid as measured by the USAID 10-
Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015).  Ethiopia and Nigeria, being strategic states, 
have received the most of the cases, while Zambia and Burkina Faso, relatively non-
strategic states, have received little, and Zimbabwe, being under EU and US sanctions, 
has received none recently.  Aid and its effects are complicated to measure; measuring 
absolute versus per capita makes a substantial difference in these cases.  Nigeria is more 
than 11 times the size of Zimbabwe’s population, and all of the other cases populations 
together are less than Nigeria alone.  While Nigeria, as measured by the OECD (2014) 
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Net ODA 10-Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014), has received an extensive 
absolute amount of aid, when measuring per capita and as a percentage of its economy 
(0.5 percent of GNI), it is quite small.  The other four cases, exhibit a history of aid 
dependence with it composing between 4.6 and 11 percent of GNI). 
Burkina Faso came to embrace neo-liberal structural adjustment later than most 
SSA countries.  This is because, on the supply side, it has never been high on the west’s 
priority list as it is not highly geo-politically strategic.  On the demand side, the 
Burkinabé have an anti-imperialist Marxist isolationist history that has resisted all types 
of isomorphic reach of the global market.  The politically motivated Mossi, benefiting 
from their isolationist status quo, had an interest in not globalizing too rapidly.  During 
President Sankara’s administration, he resisted capitalist influences longer than many 
other countries.  However, this anti-globalization script must not have been embedded too 
deeply in Burkinabé society, because it only took the assassination of President Sankara 
to rewrite it.  With the President Sankara-Compaoré leadership transition, Burkina Faso 
rapidly deregulated and privatized its economy, becoming a structural adjustment model 
reformer, which produced more FDI and social conflict.  The Burkinabé are only now 
beginning to embrace globalization norms, behaviors, and scripts because of reaping the 
positive effects that a mixed economy and increased trade and investment have begun to 
bring. 
Ethiopia is among the top 10 percent of least-developed countries, in part, because 
its government economic institutions make investing and obtaining land and financing 
laborious and risky.  Many potential investors have concluded that the risk-reward 
proposition is not worth it.  Its economic institutions produce insufficient incentives to 
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trigger and embed neo-liberal behavior and norm changes.  It retains some institutional 
remnants of a command economy from its communist derg legacy when it was caught in 
an ideological tug-of-war between the former Soviet Union and the west.  It has resisted 
deinstitutionalizing and structurally adjusting its economy but has been glad to accept 
aid, which has produced a deeply embedded culture of aid dependence.  Excessive food 
aid disincentivizes domestic food production among the Oromo and Somali regions.  
Thus, the Ethiopian state is held together by non-military aid and remittances, which 
subsidize nearly 50 percent of the federal budget.   
Nigeria has a different economic development pattern than the other four cases as 
fluctuating petroleum revenues compose a large part of its economy, which along with 
large remittances and some aid has produced economic shocks and uneven development.  
It is an insecure place to do business, yet that does not dissuade many western petroleum 
investors.  The West considers Nigeria one of the most geo-politically important states in 
SSA for its petroleum, its massive population, and its global reach.  The Nigerian 
economy is 21st largest globally and largest in SSA when measured by GDP, PPP, and 
3.5 times larger than all the other four cases’ economies combined.  However, because it 
is also a highly populated country, its per capita economy (GDP, per capita PPP) is only a 
little over half the size of the other four economies combined—still, a large economy that 
faces different constraints and opportunities than the other cases.  Economic institutions 
governing natural resources are deeply embedded but not very agile, making it difficult 
for other sectors to adjust when the global oil market shifts.  The federal government’s 
dependence on petroleum revenue has bred state- and LGA-level dependence, which has 
isomorphically transferred flawed economic institutions throughout Nigeria, providing 
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little incentive for productivity in other sectors.  As state and LGA governments rely on 
federal petroleum revenues to meet basic needs, norms, behaviors, and scripts are being 
rewritten. 
Zambia was one of the earliest and most successful SSA post-colonial states to 
pursue democratic governance and a mixed market economy.  It has the highest Polity IV 
democratic ranking (Marshall et al. 2016) and human development index (HDI) score 
(hdr.undp.org 2015) of the cases.  However, democratization and high trade as a 
percentage of GDP have not produced the norms and behaviors that lead to a wide GTR.  
Due to a paucity of bureaucratic expertise, the Zambian state has found itself in a 
borderline mercantilist relationship with China, depending on its copper exports to fund 
the government.  This has weakened its other sectors of the economy.  Paired with high 
inequality, an ineffective social safety net, fragile security and contract institutions, and a 
collectivist society, this has produced a narrow GTR. 
Zimbabwe is not necessarily geo-politically significant, but it initially garnered 
the global community’s attention due to its conflict spillover into neighboring states and 
subsequently due to its self-destructive pattern.  Former President Mugabe was—is—a 
Zimbabwean institution.  Over 37 years he shaped its formal institutions, which have 
affected Shona and countrywide norms, which will make them difficult to change.  Even 
in his absence, the Mugabe political network remains mostly intact embedded in the 
ZANU-PF party.  Mugabe institutions have not only produced many unintended 
economic consequences but have produced an institutional and generalized trust poor 
environment.  As Mugabe did not take queues from the west; therefore, Zimbabwean 
institutions have been largely shielded from those coercive and normative isomorphic 
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pressures, producing unique, though not particularly effective institutions.  It has tried to 
insulate itself from the global market through isolationism and a command economy, 
which has made it less prosperous.  Zimbabwe’s Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 
2000 damaged the economy.  Trade, investment, and aid all decreased sharply and 
remittances, food insecurity, hyperinflation and sanctions increased.  China has been one 
of Zimbabwe’s only trade and investment partners through these tough times as Mugabe 
drove its economy into the ground.  Zimbabwe’s Indigenization Law (2016) amended in 
2017, has threatened even that relationship, requiring large foreign-owned natural 
resource companies to sell majority ownership to the government or indigenous 
Zimbabweans. 
Disrupted economies and uneven development can hurt institutional and 
generalized trust.  Economic shocks, even by wide trade swings, may increase volatility; 
the smaller the economy or sector, the more shocking (Giovanni and Levchenko 2009, 
562; Easterly and Kraay 2000).  Volatility triggered by years of violent conflict and 
socialist leanings has encouraged the small economies of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to 
insulate their economies against external shocks by growing or retaining large public 
sectors (see Ebeke 2011, 89; Rodrik 1998, 1011).  Public sector employment statistics are 
notoriously inaccurate for SSA (Hoffmann 2003, 1); particularly for Burkina Faso that 
does not report them plainly anywhere and Nigeria that reports an obviously 
underreported 1.6 percent (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics 2010).  Ethiopia (29.5 
percent) and Zimbabwe (20.9 percent) have the most extensive public sectors of the 
cases, and Zambia (9.7 percent) possibly the smallest, having more so liberalized its 
economy (International Labour Organization 2017).  Nigeria, once rid of military 
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regimes, has grown its economy steadily.  Ethiopia and Burkina Faso the smallest of the 
economies when measuring GDP, per capita PPP, have had modest growth since 
instituting select market reforms, doubling their economies over the last quarter century, 
while Zimbabwe, avoiding most reforms has lost half its economy.  The bloated 
Ethiopian and Zimbabwean bureaucracies paired with their weak economies is a repellant 
to GTR widening forces of trade and investment and a magnet for the GTR narrowing 
forces of remittances and aid, as these cases demonstrate.  Therefore, many economic 
model changes can be made in each of these cases, particularly Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, 
to make inter-state market forces a more positive force on the GTR. 
 
Social Network Composition 
 
For we are by nature social, before we are political or economic, beings. 
—Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument 
 
How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states? 
 
H1: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the generalized 
trust radius in fragile states. 
 
The most fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the 
most potential generalized trust.  However, this potential often goes unrealized in fragile 
SSA states and has gone mostly unrealized in these control cases.  Most fragile SSA 
states are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized (Alesina et al. 
2003, 183), to the point that many have no ethnic, linguistic, or religious majority 
(multipolar) (Fearon 2003, 207).  Colonial divisions increased African states’ already 
high ethnic fragmentation of tribal divisions (Scarritt 2008).  The trust literature has 
relied too heavily on fractionalization to explain social effects on the GTR, ignoring 
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alternative social explanations.  The fractionalization measure alone is limited in its 
ability to capture highly fragmented, bipolar, multipolar and balanced, dominant 
majority, or dominant minority (Reilly 2000, 163) social network compositions.  As well, 
temporal variability of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity produces potential 
collinearity and endogeneity of fractionalization indices. 
Advancement of the trust literature requires explaining how incentivization and 
coercion increase inter-group interaction to widen the GTR.  This explanation requires 
the addition of measuring groups’ physical, technological, and social proximity and 
power differential.  Fractionalization and proximity increase inter-group interaction, 
while power differential and incentivization structure determine if it is positive or 
negative.  The test variable, Social Network Composition, is an improved and well-
rounded social variable adding physical, technological, and social proximity, and power 
differential to fractionalization, which broadens the social effect being measured, 
reducing omitted variable bias of fractionalization alone.  This section answers the social 
research question by interpreting, comparing, and analyzing each component’s 
configurational effect on the GTR across the five cases, demonstrating what set of 
conditions is required to produce the hypothesized outcome.  Analysis either confirms, 
affirms, weakens, or rejects the hypothesis through straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking 
gun, or doubly decisive tests of necessity and sufficiency.  This analysis is limited to the 
five SSA fragile state cases, with an emphasis on the test cases.  Generalizations are 
made to theoretical types of cases rather than specific empirical cases. 
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Fractionalization 
The more fractionalized a fragile state, the more likely strangers are to interact 
and therefore, the more potential GTR variability exists, whether negative or positive.  
The level and combination of types of fractionalization have only a small effect on 
whether the outcome is negative or positive, instead, that is more a function of the 
combination of a society’s power differential and whether interaction is incentivized or 
coerced.  The fractionalization hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering 
each of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization indicators. 
Table 51  
Social Network Composition: Fractionalization 
Country  Ethnic Linguistic Religious 
Hyp Result Support Hyp Result Support Hyp Result Support 
Burkina 
Faso 
Test 
Cases 
High High Strong High High Strong High High Strong 
Ethiopia High High Strong High High Strong High High Strong 
Nigeria High High Strong High High Strong High High Strong 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
Low High Reject Low High Reject Low Mod Weak 
Zimbabwe Low Low Strong Low Low Strong Low Mod Weak 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Ethnic fractionalization is the first test criterion for increasing inter-group 
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR.  All test cases are highly ethnically 
fractionalized according to Alesina et al. (2003); each case is in the top 32nd most 
ethnically fractionalized countries globally (Nigeria 9th; Burkina Faso 28th; and Ethiopia 
32nd) and has a wide GTR as hypothesized.  Ethnic fractionalization does not determine 
whether the interaction is negative or positive.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed 
for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that ethnic fractionalization 
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has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.  All test cases also 
pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the 
SNC hypothesis.  One control case (Zimbabwe) has low ethnic fractionalization and a 
narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high ethnic 
fractionalization (21st) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR.  This does not affect the 
test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit. 
There is no doubt in the fractionalization literature that Nigeria is one of the most 
holistically fractionalized countries globally.  There are many ways to describe Nigeria, 
but regarding ethnic fractionalization, dividing the country into three types of regions is 
instructive.  The first type is rural Muslim regions.  The northeastern and northwestern 
corners of the country characterize this type, where its large and insular Muslim-majority 
Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups have high homophily, propinquity, transitivity, 
and reciprocity.  These areas are not highly fractionalized, but are more homogenous; 
since these are highly rural regions, they compose only a small percentage of the total 
population.  The second type is home areas of Nigeria’s hundreds of small ethnic 
minority groups, most being concentrated in the Middle Belt region.  Besides rising 
urbanization and ethnic groups converging on each other, another primary driver of high 
ethnic fractionalization is the government’s bifurcation of ethnic home areas to reduce the 
cohesion and tie strength of politically engaged ethnic networks.  The state purposed to 
promote state-based identities over ethnic but has had limited success.  State-based 
identities have not formed; instead politicized ethnoreligious identities have formed.  
Paired with indigene-settler policies that incentivize protecting one’s ethnic home area, 
these policies have increased inter-group interaction in already highly fractionalized 
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regions, producing intense social conflict, which has overshadowed the GTR widening 
occurring in the third type of region.  The third type, and making up the largest 
population, is highly dense and ethnically diverse southern urban centers such as Lagos, 
Ibadan, Ogbomosho, Benin City, Warri, Aba, and Port Harcourt, where urban life 
requires inter-group interaction, toleration, and compromise, which widens the GTR.  
From an etic perspective, the high levels of inter-group interaction in these urban centers 
may appear conflictual, but urban Nigerians view this chaos positively. 
The Mossi have long represented the geographic, cultural, economic, and political 
heart of Burkinabé society and institutions and therefore, exert a centripetal force on the 
many much smaller surrounding ethnic groups, drawing them into its network orbit.  This 
serves to increase inter-group interaction and multiplexity and transitivity of network ties 
between groups.  Because the Mossi have not been a heavily coercive force, increased 
inter-group interaction has resulted in a wider GTR. 
Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federal system, a response to its high ethnic 
fractionalization, has produced some unintended consequences.  In some ways, this 
system is the antithesis of Nigerian federalism, yet it has produced some of the same 
results.  This system is not built to cannibalize ethnic groups as Nigeria’s does, but 
instead provide greater regional autonomy and opportunities for coalition building for 
smaller, less powerful ethnic groups that rarely have a voice in parliament.  What has 
become institutionalized instead is a four-way ethnopolitical tug-of-war between the 
Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray, leading to an unusual and fragile alliance 
between them that has strengthened their ties and increased institutional gridlock, leaving 
smaller ethnic groups regionally isolated without the means or venue for expressing their 
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political interests to obtain a piece of the federal pie.  The Tigray ethnic minority’s highly 
active and unusual political role has generated much political agitation among Ethiopia’s 
many smaller ethnic groups, but it has not turned into violent conflict.  Atomization of 
political interest seeking based on ethnic, regional, and national interests has developed 
rather than a coalition-building atmosphere, which has made inter-group interaction 
uneven and less predictable.  The result is relatively positive, yet fragile high inter-group 
interaction based on a variety of ethnopolitical interests. 
It is evident that Zambia has high ethnic fractionalization, given the existence of 
73 ethnic groups in a country a little larger than the state of Texas.  It is difficult to find 
an SSA country with low ethnic fractionalization, thus compromises on control case 
selection are necessary.  The Bemba and Tonga do not possess the cultural magnetism of 
the Mossi of Burkina Faso; however, the pull of the promise of wealth and the push of 
rural poverty have drawn Zambia’s 71 smaller ethnic groups into the Bemba’s Copperbelt 
Province and subsequently to the Tonga’s Lusaka Province and consequently to a small 
degree, into their social networks.  However, the extremely high economic inequality that 
has resulted from development policies has served to decrease in-group trust, but not 
increase generalized trust, producing a narrow GTR. 
Zimbabwe is not ethnically fractionalized, ranking 109th of 190 countries with the 
dominant Shona far outnumbering the next largest Northern Ndebele and twelve much 
smaller ethnic minorities, each making up less than 1 percent of the population.  The 
Shona social network dominates Zimbabwean economic and political institutions and has 
a repellant centrifugal effect on surrounding ethnic groups, resulting in weak inter-ethnic 
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network ties and strongly rooted regional ethnic identities.  In this environment, the GTR 
is much more likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen. 
Linguistic Fractionalization 
Ethnicities and languages often share the same boundaries, but not always.  
Linguistic fractionalization is the second test criterion for increasing inter-group 
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR.  Linguistic fractionalization may serve 
as a barrier to inter-group interaction in the absence of an institutionalized unifying trade 
language through which groups may easily communicate while retaining their linguistic 
distinctiveness.  Therefore, the presence of a trade language weakens this variable’s claim 
on affecting the GTR.  All test cases are highly linguistically fractionalized according to 
Alesina et al. (2003); each being in the top 32nd most linguistically fractionalized 
countries globally (Nigeria 11th; Ethiopia 18th; and Burkina Faso 32nd) and have a wide 
GTR as hypothesized.  Groups are more likely to interact if there is a common trade 
language tying their networks together, but as a result become less linguistically diverse.  
As with ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization does not determine whether 
the interaction is negative or positive.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test 
cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that linguistic fractionalization has a 
positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases, yet its effect is weaker than 
ethnic and fractionalization.  All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the 
homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  While 
Burkina Faso confirms the hypothesis more strongly, its lack of a widespread trade 
language is an interesting issue that may have adverse repercussions for future positive 
inter-group interaction.  One control case (Zimbabwe) has low linguistic fractionalization 
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and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high linguistic 
fractionalization (7th) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR.  This does not affect the 
test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit. 
The mimetic isomorphic transfer and resulting institutionalization of the English 
language in Ethiopian and Nigerian urban centers and educational institutions bridges 
their high linguistic fractionalization, increasing network transitivity between those social 
networks, but less so in rural areas.  English produces greater inter-group interaction in 
Nigeria than Ethiopia because its population is more highly urbanized and educated.  
Having a common language for market exchanges eases tensions between groups that 
have myriad other differences; therefore, a common trade language serves to widen the 
GTR in these cases.  While the Mossi draws smaller ethnolinguistic groups into its orbit 
and social networks, communication is more challenging because Burkina Faso lacks a 
widespread unifying and institutionalized trade language to tie its many ethnic and 
ethnolinguistic groups’ networks together.  The Mossi compose half the population and 
speak Mòoré, but the smaller ethnic groups do not.  Moreover, while French may be the 
official language, its normative isomorphic colonial transfer adhered weakly to society 
and is only spoken regularly by 15 percent of the population (Kone 2010, 9).  While 
increased positive inter-group interaction occurs because of increased multiplexity and 
transitivity of network ties between groups, the quality of communication without a 
common trade language may be questionable. 
While Zambia has 73 ethnic groups, it has about half that number of linguistic 
groups.  Bemba is such a dominant language that nearly half the population speaks it 
while the Bemba ethnic group only comprises 21 percent of the population.  While 
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English is not the first language of many, it serves as a bridge between linguistic group 
networks.  Zimbabwe, the one exception again, ranks at 85 of 102 countries for linguistic 
fractionalization with the dominant Shona far outnumbering all other ethnolinguistic 
groups.  While having little linguistic fractionalization has the potential to increase 
communication quality within the Shona ethnolinguistic group, it also means there is less 
generalized trust potential between groups.  In this environment, the GTR is much more 
likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen. 
Religious Fractionalization 
Religious fractionalization is the third test criterion for increasing inter-group 
interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR.  The trust literature is divided on how 
religious fractionalization affects the GTR producing a rival hypothesis that must be 
addressed.  Like linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization may serve as a 
barrier to inter-group interaction when two conditions are present.  If religious groups are 
incredibly different (e.g., Buddhist and Muslim), sharing very little ideological common 
ground and have few other drivers of inter-group interaction, their members will be 
insulated from other religious groups and unprepared to interact when it does occur.  In 
this situation, the barriers produced by information asymmetry and demonizing myths are 
too pronounced for the GTR to widen.  This occurs in the Middle Belt states of Nigeria 
where Christian and Muslim groups do not realize the ideological commonality that 
exists.  However, outside of this region, this is not the case.  While all three test cases 
have mixed Christian-Muslim populations, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’s have been 
integrated longer.  French colonialism did so for Burkina Faso in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries and for Ethiopia, their Christian and Muslim populations have been mixed for 
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many centuries, allowing them to build some common ideological language to ease 
communication.  Nigeria does not have an extensive inter-religious history, but there are 
many modern drivers of inter-group interaction, hence, there is intense social conflict.  
Therefore, religious fractionalization increases inter-group interaction in all test cases, 
widening it more in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia than in Nigeria where the incentive 
structure differs. 
One test case (Nigeria) is highly religious fractionalized according to Alesina et 
al. (2003), being the 15th most religiously fractionalized country globally and has a wide 
GTR as hypothesized.  The remaining two test cases, Ethiopia 56th and Burkina Faso 
72nd, out of 214 countries, are still moderately religiously fractionalized, ranking in the 
top 34 percent of countries globally, meaning their religious groups are more likely to 
interact and much more so if they share some ideological commonalities.  As with ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalization, this does not determine whether the interaction is 
negative or positive.  Therefore, a wide GTR always occurs when high religious 
fractionalization is present in all three test cases.  Religious fractionalization is readily 
observable in Nigeria, and in Ethiopia, due to its unique inter-religious history and 
Burkina Faso due to its cross-cutting of ethnic and religious adherence.  Therefore, a 
smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming 
that religious fractionalization has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all 
test cases.  All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative 
hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  According to the Alesina et al. (2003) 
fractionalization measure, the two control cases are religiously fractionalized at 16th 
(Zimbabwe) and 17th (Zambia) globally; however, when factoring how different religious 
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groups are from each other, these cases become only moderately fractionalized.  Still, 
because they were hypothesized to have low religious fractionalization and a narrow 
GTR, they both have a slight control case misfit.  This does not affect the test case 
hypothesis. 
Religious fractionalization does not sufficiently account for how different 
religious groups are from each other; instead, it focuses on how many different groups 
there are.  One society may be 97.6 percent Christian (Zambia), but because there are 
numerous relatively similar evangelical sects and African Initiated Churches (AICs), the 
measure considers it as religiously fractionalized as a country (Nigeria) that has a parity 
of much more different Christian and Muslim sects.  Zambian and Zimbabwean religious 
fractionalization is primarily based on Christian denominationalism, so most share a 
common Christian ideological language.  Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, 
because they have resided in proximity for centuries, have also cultivated a common 
Abrahamic ideological language, while the Burkinabé have a little less so and Nigerian 
Christians and Muslims have much less so.  Therefore, the quality of religious difference 
matters, not only the quantity of the groups. 
Christian- and Muslim-majority countries also differ systematically in their 
religious fractionalization with the latter being the least religiously fractionalized 
globally.  The cases include two clear Christian-majorities (Zambia and Zimbabwe), one 
slight Christian-majority (Ethiopia), one Christian-Muslim parity (Nigeria), and one 
slight Muslim-majority (Burkina Faso).  In SSA, the presence of AICs and high overall 
syncretism is an indicator of high religious fractionalization; however, some are more 
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different than others are.  While Burkina Faso is Muslim-majority, it is one of the more 
religiously syncretistic Muslim populations globally, influenced heavily by Sufism. 
Religious fractionalization varies widely by region in Nigeria.  While there are 
many different Christian sects in the Niger Delta and surrounding states, there are very 
few Muslims, lowering its actual religious diversity.  Similarly, in northern regions, 
Christian populations range between only 10-20 percent, lowering their religious 
fractionalization.  Oppositely, in Middle Belt states and the South West Region, there is 
higher religious, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization.  The strongly felt presence of 
AICs in Nigeria indicate the normative isomorphic transfer of colonial Christian 
institutions had difficulty sticking.  Although, its relatively low level of syncretism 
indicates the opposite may be true.  What is certain is Nigerians feel they are the most 
religious people on earth (Christians and Muslims alike) and prove it by their global 
highest self-reported weekly religious service attendance (World Values Survey 2014).  
Nigerian Christians and Muslims imbue all things with religious significance.  Therefore, 
when there are indigene-settler conflicts in Middle Belt states, religion often escalates the 
conflict into violence.  Because Nigerians identify most readily by religion, network 
transitivity increases within Christian and Muslim networks but less so between them, as 
there are few weakly tied nodes.  Separate Christian and Muslim civil societies take care 
of their own first, providing little incentive for Christians to have their interests met by 
Muslims and vice versa.  However, substantial centripetal coercive forces are pushing 
them together in this region, producing extreme social conflict and a narrower GTR, 
opposite of those incentivizing forces in southern urban centers producing a wider GTR.  
Ethiopia is highly religiously fractionalized, and its people identify religiously, but more 
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so ethnically.  The large and deeply embedded Ethiopian Orthodox Church and slightly 
smaller and less embedded Muslims have a long and unique shared religious history that 
goes back millennia, producing connected networks with high homophily and 
multiplexity, but low propinquity, which results in a wider GTR.  The Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church is an institutional marvel as it is not the result of coercive or memetic 
isomorphic pressures as are so many modern SSA religious institutions.  Instead, its 
norms, behaviors, and scripts are largely emically produced and sustained.  The 
Burkinabé population is also highly religiously fractionalized with a Muslim majority and 
a Catholic minority.  Its people are highly syncretistic with many of its ethnic groups 
crosscut by religious adherence.  It is a small enough and religiously mixed enough 
country that there has not been an attempt to institute Shari ‘a, even in Muslim majority 
areas, which is a sign of peaceful inter-religious relations and a wider GTR. 
Zambia’s moderate religious fractionalization is due primarily to highly religious 
and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority) populations.  There 
are many small evangelical and AIC sects, but a tiny non-Christian population, meaning 
there are few religious differences across the population.  While colonial Christian 
institutions have affected Zambia’s religious trajectory, AICs have had such a strong and 
atomizing effect that there has not been an isomorphic convergence of Zambian religious 
institutions.  Zimbabwe’s moderate religious fractionalization is also due primarily to 
highly religious and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority) 
populations.  Their AICs differ from their Protestant and Catholic religious groups, but 
not nearly as much as from other world religions, therefore, the spectrum of religious 
difference is quite small across the society.  Colonial Christian institutions have weakly 
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transferred to Zimbabwe—the Rhodesian Bush War served to sever ties with many 
outside influences.  Zimbabwean AICs are also quite independent, producing little 
network transitivity between religious social networks.  There are regional differences in 
religious fractionalization and trust between religious groups.  Populations in 
Zimbabwe’s heavily Shona Mashonaland East Province do not trust those of other 
religions the most.  There is no single religious center of gravity for these populations.  
Therefore, Zimbabwean and Zambian populations occupy a narrow band on the religious 
spectrum and are less religiously fractionalized than the Alesina et al. (2003) measure 
suggests. 
 
Proximity 
The Proximity Principle states that humans assume proximate objects are of the 
same type.  Therefore, groups with increasing physical, technological, and social 
proximity are perceived by all as more similar, deeming interaction to be more 
appropriate and likely, increasing social ties and social cohesion.  The proximity 
hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering all of the physical, 
technological, and social proximity indicators. 
Table 52  
Social Network Composition: Proximity 
Country  Physical Technological Social 
Hyp Result Support Hyp Result Support Hyp Result Support 
Burkina 
Faso 
Test 
Cases 
High High Strong High Low Reject High High Strong 
Ethiopia High High Strong High Low Reject High High Strong 
Nigeria High High Strong High Mod Mod High Mod Mod 
 
Table Continued 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
Low Low Strong Low Low Strong Low Low Strong 
Zimbabwe Low Low Strong Low Low Strong Low Low Strong 
 
Physical Proximity 
Physical proximity, also termed geographic or spatial proximity in other literature, 
is the fourth test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or 
narrowing the GTR.  Whole society or group physical proximity may be measured using 
a combination of population density, urbanization, terrain, and mobility and migration 
patterns.  All three of the test cases are highly physically proximate as hypothesized.  
While SSA societies are urbanizing at a high rate, they remain the most rural region 
globally.  All three of the test cases are in the top 14 for highest urbanization rates 
globally (Burkina Faso 3rd, Ethiopia 10th, and Nigeria 14th), meaning their ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious groups are increasingly likely to interact.  Therefore, a wide GTR 
always occurs when high physical proximity is present in all three test cases.  A smoking-
gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that 
physical proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.  
All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis, 
which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  Both control cases have low physical proximity 
because they are highly rural.  Zimbabwe is 108th out of 231 for urban growth.  While 
Zambia has the 22nd highest urbanization rate, it remains highly rural.  This does not 
affect the test case hypothesis but instead suggests a good control case fit for Zimbabwe 
and a little less so for Zambia. 
Science fiction and perhaps e-commerce, the stock market, online education, or 
the drone industry can imagine a future where little physical proximity is required to meet 
interests.  However, fragile state institutions are ill-equipped to provide sufficient 
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safeguards for non-proximate interaction to produce generalized trust.  There are too 
many negative externalities present for agents to ensure compliance with contracts 
between principles, the primary one being information asymmetry.  Principles are unable 
to use their full assortment of senses to collect and process information about other 
principles and potential cost and effort required of them, to arrive at sound decisions.  
Inadequately monitored agents may take advantage of information asymmetry through 
adverse selection, producing a moral hazard by taking on more risk than principles were 
expecting, negatively influencing future interactions. 
In the cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria, the high physical proximity between their 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups is a mixture of incentivization and coercion, due to 
high population density, urbanization growth, and a history of war and famine.  The few 
young, urban, wealthy, and educated Ethiopians have a deficiency of generalized trust 
with other ethnic and linguistic groups, but not religious groups.  Ethiopia has an 
overpopulation problem even though it is highly rural and rugged.  Due to its high 
urbanization rate of 4.8 percent (World Bank 2016) and its population’s concentration in 
the center of the country, there is less of a chance of in-group network cliques and 
structurally cohesive blocks forming, meaning inter-group interaction will be higher.  
Although it has a history of war, famine, and ethnic division, its low inequality has 
produced a relatively more trusting environment where the GTR may widen. 
Nigeria has a highly dense population and a high urbanization rate of 4.3 percent 
(World Bank 2016) concentrated in seven cities with over 1 million highly mobile 
residents spread throughout the country, which has increased competition intensity 
without the required institutions to manage it.  Past conflictual relations can affect 
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modern relations, such as the intense mistrust Christian Igbo continue to have for Hausa-
Fulani Muslims stemming from the Biafra War.  Ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups 
that were once able to keep their distance are finding themselves incentivized or coerced 
into greater inter-group interaction.  Often one group is incentivized while another is 
coerced.  In moderately urbanized Middle Belt states, inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
interaction is perceived as incentivized for settler groups seeking better economic 
opportunity and perceived as coerced for indigene groups, which feel trespassed.  In 
southern urban centers, populations are becoming more socially atomized, lowering in-
group trust, which produces incentives for inter-group interaction.  Because state 
institutions are fragile, this has, however, not resulted in increased institutional trust. 
Highly rural Burkina Faso lacks a history of violence; however, rapidly rising 
urbanization to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso by young people incentivized by the 
promise of jobs, independence, and a life that is not possible in their ethnic home areas, is 
producing uneven trust development.  Its border regions that do experience conflict 
spillover and intense migration have trust problems.  Regions bordering Mali where 
spillover conflict is most prevalent, have a deficiency in generalized trust, while regions 
bordering Cote d’Ivoire, where there is a history of heavy migration, have a deficiency of 
in-group and generalized trust.  Burkina Faso’s high physical proximity is incentivized by 
recent economic opportunity, being a geographically small country with gentle terrain, 
and its 5.7 percent urban growth rate (World Bank 2016).  When Burkinabé contract 
institutions do not function well—which is often—physical proximity makes norms and 
behaviors more easily monitored, enhancing inter-group knowledge, which keeps 
principles more honest and reduces myth building about other groups.  Principles are also 
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more predictable because they can observe multiple interactions of other principles, 
thereby better understanding the scripts they follow.  This environment made it easier for 
disparate groups to build sufficient momentum for the collective action that resulted in 
the 2014 Burkinabé Uprising, which was a sign of growing generalized trust throughout 
its civil society rather than its decrease.  A reorganization of social networks through the 
moving from in-group trust to generalized trust can be a conflictual process in the short-
term that results in long-term stability. 
Zambia has low physical proximity due primarily to having one of the lowest 
population densities in SSA—half the density of the next lowest case (Zimbabwe) and 
ten times less than the highest case (Nigeria).  Its incredibly high economic inequality 
and high urban growth rate (4.1 percent) (World Bank 2016) from rural areas to the 
Copperbelt Province and from there to Lusaka Province, incentivized by economic 
opportunity, has driven a divide between urban and rural populations, even between those 
of the same ethnic and/or religious group.  Those remaining in ethnic home areas have 
high propinquity and are doubly or triply isolated from interaction with other groups.  As 
urban Copperbelt and Lusaka continue to grow and as capitalist and democratic 
competition continues to increase, class instability will increase, producing a narrower 
GTR. 
Zimbabwe’s low physical proximity is a product of having a low urban growth 
rate and two strongly independent, but highly rural nations residing in one state.  Even in 
Shona and Northern Ndebele ethnic regions, there is only a modest urban growth rate (2.4 
percent) (World Bank 2016).  Its people have a history of violence, deprivation, turmoil, 
and mistrust, which has increased ethnic groups’ regional entrenchment rather than 
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mobilizing them to interact to meet their interests.  This physical distance and 
disconnected networks increase the creation of demonizing and dehumanizing myths 
about other groups, particularly between the Shona and Northern Ndebele. 
Technological Proximity 
Technological proximity (communications and transportation) is the fifth test 
criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR.  
Finding highly technologically proximate states in SSA is difficult.  Technological 
proximity is measured through the prevalence and strength of communications and 
transportation infrastructures, technologies, and institutions that govern their use and 
constrain populations’ behavior.  While most communications technology and 
transportation services increase inter-group interaction, mobile phones actually increase 
in-group communication and trust more so. 
Only one of the three test cases (Nigeria) is moderately technologically 
proximate.  It passes a smoking-gun test, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming 
that technological proximity has a GTR widening effect in Nigeria as is hypothesized.  It 
also passes a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis, which 
affirms the SNC hypothesis.  Burkina Faso has low technological proximity because of 
its weak infrastructure, while Ethiopia because of the state’s authoritarian control of 
technology.  Neither pass a smoking-gun test, so are not able to reject the null hypothesis 
and confirm the hypothesis.  They also do not pass a hoop test, unable to disprove the 
non-proximate alternative hypothesis.  Zambia and Zimbabwe have a good control case 
fit.  Zambia, like Burkina Faso, has low technological proximity because of its weak 
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infrastructure, while Zimbabwe, like Ethiopia, has low technological proximity because 
of the state’s authoritarian control of technology. 
Technological proximity adds to the multiplexity of ties throughout society, but 
each type does so differently.  Increased availability of mobile technology may increase 
the proximity of non-proximate nodes in an existing network but is rarely used to create 
new ties between networks.  Radio and television are one-way communication 
technologies that have the potential to connect a large segment of society indirectly.  
Increased availability of private vehicle transport may increase the physical proximity of 
non-proximate nodes in a network, but strangers are not interacting during the process of 
transportation, whereas public forms of transportation place strangers in proximity to 
generate new network ties as well as strengthen ties in existing networks. 
Increasing transportation technological proximity (roads, rails, and ports) also 
increases physical proximity.  When roads do not wash out during the rainy season, and 
public transportation runs on time, proximity is increased between communities, reducing 
the effort and time required to interact, making inter-group interaction more likely.  
Unaccompanied by physical proximity, communications technological proximity via 
radio, media, internet, and television, is a recipe for miscommunication and exploitation.  
However, as globalization increases, it provides additional means for monitoring agents 
and principles that were once unavailable or unnecessary.  These technologies serve as a 
one-way conduit between groups that may either enhance existing out-group myths or 
discredit them.  With the increasing globalization of capitalism and democracy and the 
emergence of big data, the internet of things (IoT) has the potential to change how 
communication, monitoring, and transactions occur.  This has already begun to transform 
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the principle-agent relationship in developed countries and will slowly, but eventually do 
so in developing countries.  When the principle-agent relationship becomes better 
monitored through technological proximity, researchers must decipher how much is 
generalized trust shared between principles and how much is institutional trust credited to 
the monitoring institutions. 
Communications and transportation innovations disseminate isomorphically, but 
unevenly.  Mobile telecommunications technology—and there are many types (e.g., 
voice, text, social media)—may have a GTR narrowing or widening effect.  Maintaining 
strong in-group ties with non-physically proximate group members via technology makes 
it more difficult to establish new network ties with other physically proximate groups.  
While there are cases where social media has served to produce collective action among a 
wide diversity of people (e.g., Arab Spring), when used by tightly bounded groups, there 
are not weakly tied nodes to serve as a communications bridge between groups.  While 
the democratization of information through the internet has not developed strongly in 
SSA, mobile telecommunications networks have become a lifeline between non-
proximate group members separated by urbanization, serving to perpetuate and 
strengthen group norms, scripts, and in-group trust.  In all cases but Ethiopia, which is 
much lower, around 80 percent of populations have mobile subscriptions, and many of 
their neighboring countries (e.g., Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana) have nearly 1.5 
mobile subscriptions per resident.  This indicates that Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana 
are more economically developed and that Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe have the technological means for keeping non-physically proximate group 
members’ networks tied.  Even though Nigeria is equally industrialized as South Africa 
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and much more so than Botswana, Ghana, and the other cases, because such a high 
percentage of its people are poor, they are not able to utilize mobile technology as 
readily, which suggests Nigerians also may have slightly reduced in-group trust.  A high 
percentage of Ethiopians are also poor.  Ethiopia has one of the lowest per capita mobile 
phone usage rates in SSA at 50 percent (World Factbook 2017), with only wealthy 
urbanites in Addis Ababa using mobile technology regularly.  Therefore, Ethiopians are 
more likely to have lower in-group trust as well. 
Large and deeply embedded radio and television networks play a unique role in 
Nigerian society.  Wealthy expansionist religious groups are permitted to spread their 
message and misinformation about other religious groups freely through these 
technologies because they keep these media institutions in business.  This has shaped a 
hostile one-way communications environment between religious groups, perpetuating 
religious conflict.  The Ethiopian and Zimbabwean governments attempt to control 
information about groups through their ownership of the few radio and television 
stations, which instead of producing stability, has the unintended consequence of 
reducing institutional trust and fomenting out-group myths in the absence of accurate 
information.  The more free-market oriented Burkinabé and Zambians—at least more so 
than Ethiopians and Zimbabweans—have relatively free and accurate one-way 
communication through private radio networks. 
Many Nigerians are poor, but the state is not.  The government funds many poorly 
managed urban transportation infrastructure projects, which makes some regions more 
technologically proximate than others are.  Lagos is the most technologically proximate, 
while rural North West and North East Muslim populations are mostly left out of 
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technological proximity.  Because there are many relatively inexpensive domestic air 
carriers, an extensive airport infrastructure, and poor road and rail networks, the wealthy 
tend to fly domestically, while the poor utilize more interactive public transportation such 
as busses.  Many Ethiopians are poor, and so is the state.  Regional differences in 
technological proximity are also urban-rural.  While Addis Ababa residents and 
surrounding areas enjoy access to greater communications and transportation 
infrastructure, including SSA’s first light-rail system, the more rural eastern and western 
regions have reduced technological proximity.  Because Ethiopian roads are some of the 
most deadly in the world and most are too poor to own private vehicles, the wealthy take 
advantage of the state-owned airlines, while the poor utilize more interactive public 
transportation such as busses.  Burkina Faso has little communications or transportation 
infrastructure because it is a late developer.  Road, rail, and air transportation 
infrastructures are meager, and most Burkinabé remain poor, so all utilize more 
interactive forms of public transportation such as busses.  Similar to Lagos and Addis 
Ababa, Zambian residents of Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces are more technologically 
proximate, while their rural Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces are much 
less so.  Boom and bust road infrastructural development has produced a fragmented 
transportation network, but years of peace have enabled the construction of a decent rail 
network.  Therefore, all Zambians travel by the more interactive public transportation of 
trains and buses.  Zimbabwe’s prosperous history allowed it to build decent road and rail 
networks that are now in disrepair.  The poor travel by public rail and bus within their 
home regions and the few wealthy by private vehicle as the state-owned Air Zimbabwe 
airline is now defunct, being replaced by the Mugabe-owned Zimbabwe Airways. 
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Social Proximity 
Social proximity is an indicator of sustained negative or positive network 
connectivity and the sixth test criterion for narrowing or widening the GTR respectively.  
Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high social proximity and 
wide GTR as hypothesized; ensuring social proximity is one of the causes affecting a 
wide GTR in those cases.  The remaining test case (Nigeria) has moderate social 
proximity due to its unique religious parity.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for 
all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate social 
proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.  All test 
cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the socially non-proximate alternative hypothesis, 
which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  All control cases have low social proximity and a 
narrow GTR as hypothesized.  This indicates a good control case fit. 
Social proximity occurs in two phases: initial interaction and sustained interaction 
and is measurable through a variety of descriptive network measures.  Initial interaction 
may occur between strangers, but if the incentivized or coercive force is removed, future 
interaction is less likely.  While sustained interaction is a requirement for a narrower or 
wider GTR, a wider GTR is dependent on sustained positive interaction.  Inter-group 
interaction is driven by either incentivization or coercion, tools for getting someone to do 
what one wants. 
An incentive is an offer of something of value, sometimes with a cash 
equivalent and sometimes not, meant to influence the payoff structure of a 
utility calculation so as to alter a person’s course of action – Ruth W. 
Grant (2006, 29) 
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Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provide a framework for 
explaining how incentives and coercion are applied through institutions within and across 
networks and how network structure affects how it flows to affect inter-group interaction 
through bridging ties.  Incentivized and coerced inter-group interaction establish or 
strengthen negative or positive ties between networks.  These may take the form of 
pushing or pulling forces.  A pushing force may be a group not meeting its members’ 
instrumental interests, while a pulling force may be if another group can meet a group 
member’s instrumental interest more efficiently or effectively.  These forces influence 
whether group members seek to have their interests met within or outside the group.  
Communal magnetism is a pulling force attracting group members to the group.  In 
individualist societies, communal magnetism is weak, because other groups can provide 
similar positive communal externalities.  However, in collectivist societies (all of the 
cases), communal magnetism and in-group trust are strong, requiring greater force to 
produce inter-group interaction.  Fragile states provide plenty of coercive pushing force; 
what is lacking in the typical control cases is greater incentivized pulling forces.  This 
dissertation explains how there are greater incentivized pulling forces in the test cases 
than in the control cases, producing a wider GTR. 
Every inter-group interaction consists of part in-group, generalized, and 
institutional trust, which require separation for analysis.  While the interest of community 
and solidarity drives in-group trust and derivative out-group trust, this is not true of 
generalized trust.  The amount of cultural attraction between principles and trust credited 
to strong institutions responsible for managing the interaction, limit the amount of 
generalized trust.  When principles perceive their sustained interaction as mutually 
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positive, the GTR widens; how much it widens depends on how much the positive 
interaction is credited to cultural attraction and institutions. 
Coercive interactions limit one or more principles’ choices, resulting in 
unbalanced interest outcomes, while incentivized interactions are more often balanced.  
Principles behave differently when the source is external to the principles (e.g., the state, 
and agent, external intervention, sanction) than when the source is one of the principles.  
This can lead to dynamic enemy-of-my-enemy triadic relations. 
Incentivization and coercion are best understood as a continuum, where most 
often the more coercive the environment, the narrower the GTR; however, coercion is 
conditional.  At the coercive end of the continuum are unbalanced, violent zero-sum 
interactions between untrusting and untrustworthy powerful and powerless principles 
governed by incompetent or corrupt agents and inflexible and untrustworthy institutions.  
A little less coercive are proscriptive and prescriptive state laws that provide few options 
for adherence and where penalties far outweigh the crimes (e.g., Wilson and Kelling’s 
(1982) broken windows theory).  At the incentivization end are mutually positive 
interactions between trusting and trustworthy free, well-resourced, and equally powerful 
principles governed by competent agents and flexible and trustworthy institutions.  A 
little less incentivized are relatively peaceful, yet imbalanced interactions between 
slightly bounded principles governed by decent agents in a competitive institutional 
environment. 
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Figure 19. Inter-Group Interaction Continuum. 
 
The longer mutually positive inter-group interaction is sustained, the more 
generalized trust is created, and the fewer negative externalities associated with agent and 
principle monitoring are present because expectations are regularly met, and scripts are 
better understood.  The homophily, propinquity, and transitivity of principles’ ties 
strengthen, serving as a bridge between group networks.  Fractionalized, proximate, and 
incentivized societies usually, but not always, produce wider GTR and fractionalized, 
proximate, and coercive societies often produce narrower GTR, while the less 
fractionalized, proximate, and incentivized or coerced societies are, the less they interact. 
All cases, being fragile states, have more coercive than incentivized 
environments.  However, this does not preclude the widening of the GTR, as it is possible 
for generalized trust to increase in coercive environments.  Fragile states utilize coercion 
Inter-Group Interaction Continuum
Zero Sum Unjust Competitive Cooperative
Coercive                                       Incentivized 
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more than incentivization because it is more effective for meeting short-term, though not 
long-term, interests5.  Since these cases are fragile, the state is not the only source of 
coercion and incentivization for their populations.  Depending on a state’s fragility 
composition, a dominant group may exert sufficient coercive or incentivizing influence as 
it seeks its interests or the international community may employ coercion and 
incentivization through structural adjustment, sanctions, and military pressure.  Some, but 
not all, of these meaningful nuances are observable through the security and contract 
institutions and inter-state market forces control variables.  There is broad variation 
among the cases’ social proximity.  Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have the most 
coercive environments of the cases, while Burkina Faso has recently moved from a rather 
non-coercive and non-incentivized environment to one that is more incentive-rich and 
Zambia tends towards policies that do not highly incentivize nor coerce inter-group 
interaction. 
Ethiopia’s history is full of many coercive and incentivized institutions, which 
have produced a socially proximate environment.  The deeply embedded Ethiopian 
Orthodox and Muslim religious groups, together composing more than three-fourths of 
the population, have a long shared history that has established a multiplexity of relatively 
weak, but peaceable network ties over many centuries.  The Ethiopian derg (1974-87) 
established many coercive institutions that forced physical proximity and negative inter-
group interaction.  The Ethiopian government had a difficult time rebounding from the 
derg-induced economic depression of the 1980s, but from 1991-2004, it finally regained 
                                                 
5 This is not to say that non-fragile states do not also give preference to short-term implications when making policy choices.  The 
Achilles heel of all statecraft is the short-term incentivization of politics that produces moral hazard for subsequent administrations. 
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traction and began to develop on an above global average trajectory.  China has shown 
some interest in Ethiopia by investing in Ethiopian water supply, wastewater, and 
hydroelectric supply and the state has responded by developing military collaborations 
with China.  While the derg legacy has produced many negative externalities for modern 
Ethiopians, one positive effect is the lower-than-average inequality, which eases positive 
network ties between groups and classes.  Following the fall of the derg, the Eritrean 
secession in 1991, strengthened some and weakened other social networks.  That which 
remains has been restructured through the institution of ethnic-based federalism designed 
to decrease ethnic tension through making ethnic groups more regionally autonomous 
and less physically, technologically, and socially proximate.  What has happened instead 
is the Tigray minority group has manipulated this institution to embed itself in state 
institutions and use the military to both coerce and incentivize the Amhara, Oromo, and 
Southern Nations ethnic groups into a coalition to sustain the political status quo.  This 
has served to disconnect smaller regional ethnic groups from federal political networks, 
though not social ones, relegating them to concentrate their political efforts and network 
building regionally and through extrajudicial means than through the stacked parliament 
where they do not have a voice.  This constant political and social upheaval has 
weakened the homophily, propinquity, and cohesion of both ethnic and nationwide 
networks and strengthened multi-ethnic regional ones. 
China has courted Nigeria, and it has reciprocated by exporting large amounts of 
petroleum and developing military collaborations with China.  As of 2010, Nigeria and 
Zambia had the most Chinese investment offerings of the cases (China Business Review 
2010).  This trade relationship is valuable enough to China to have sent the Chinese 
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National People’s Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004.  The primary 
means by which Nigerians identify has shifted since independence from ethnic to 
religious.  The Nigerian military’s many successful coup d'états and the state’s attempt to 
manage increasing inter-group interaction inherent to modernization through an 
increasingly granulated federal power structure purposed to weaken ethnic identities and 
strengthen state-based identity has had the unintended consequence of strengthening 
religious identities instead.  Nigerians have always been religiously bifurcated Christian 
and Muslim, south and north respectively, but the British, during their colonial rule, 
purposefully isolated their networks and institutions, leaving them unpracticed in the art 
of living peaceably together.  As a result, modern Christian and Muslim networks often 
lack ties and difficulty locating structurally equivalent nodes between them.  The federal 
government’s attempted monopolization of the provision of public goods by controlling 
so many of the resources groups require has made state governments overly dependent, 
creating a “climate of passive clientelism” (Gray 1993, 157) as they follow the 
government gravy train rather than seek to have their interests met through other groups 
in the market or civil society.  The federal and state governments, however, are not 
effective in meeting groups’ interests.  They often distribute goods unevenly, producing a 
sense of inequality between groups (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 82).  Gaps in 
government services create unintended opportunities for inter-group interaction; 
however, religious groups attempt to fill these gaps for their members only, unless 
sufficient incentivization or coercive force prompts engagement.  Religious identity 
touches every other area of life: cultural, economic, familial, political, spatial, and social.  
Neighborhoods in the Middle Belt cities of Jos and Kaduna have become institutionalized 
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as nearly 100 percent Christian or Muslim.  This combination of deeply embedded 
homogenous ethnoreligious indigene communities and mobile settler communities, 
fragile land tenure policies, and deficiency of resources has pitted these religious groups 
operating on very different scripts against each other in a competitive race for a piece of 
the LGA, state, and federal resource pies.  This has resulted in perceived indivisibility 
and spiritualization of land disputes, what the literature calls sacred space conflicts (see 
Hassner 2003).  Each of these ethnoreligious networks is highly dense, structurally 
cohesive blocks with strong homophily and propinquity.  This has served to tie 
expansionist Christian and Muslim social networks together temporarily and sporadically 
through negative ties.  Rapidly urbanizing Lagos, nine percent of the Nigerian population 
and other southern urban centers, are a different context, one that is religiously mixed, 
but where religion is not the only important identity of its residents.  These cities are 
chaotic, but not violent.  Their residents have learned better than most how to manage a 
plurality of interests in a weak institutional environment, which has produced a wider 
GTR. 
Burkina Faso has a less coercive history of state maladministration, sanctions, 
structural adjustment, and military pressure than Ethiopia or Nigeria.  The Burkinabé lack 
deeply embedded ethnic and religious animosities, which has allowed their social 
networks to build ties.  The 27 years of President Compaoré’s strongman rule served to 
keep group networks reasonably connected rather than isolated.  The active 
Burkinabé protest culture resulting in recent social upheaval has created positive network 
ties between allied groups, increasing homophily and propinquity between their social 
networks, however, decreasing institutional trust in the government, producing negative 
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ties with groups tied to the government.  It may have benefited Burkina Faso delaying the 
opening its economy to inter-state market forces longer than many other SSA states.  
Since 1991, Burkina Faso has been a model neo-liberal structural adjustment reformer in 
partnership with the IMF and the World Bank and has been rewarded by a relatively 
consistent and even development path, following a nearly identical trajectory as the 
global GDP per capita, PPP average (World Bank 2016).  It has not engaged with China 
as the other cases have; even going so far as to maintain diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. 
Zambia has also not experienced as coercive of an environment as Ethiopia and 
Nigeria through internal pressures of dominant groups and the state or external pressures 
of sanctions and military intervention.  It does though share a similar economic history 
with these states, one where the 1990s was a severe economic decline, which has affected 
its groups’ social proximity.  It was an early casualty of flawed IMF and World Bank 
structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 895) that were 
more coercive than incentivizing.  They did not realize Zambia did not have embedded 
political institutions conducive to economic and political reform (Van de Walle and 
Johnston 1996)—conditions such as a democratically elected government with regular 
term limits (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 911).  The Zambian economy, therefore, 
stagnated in the 1990s under these coercive external forces, until 1998, when it began 
having consistent incremental improvements in development.  Some of this growth was 
due to its increased trade relationship with China rather than successful structural 
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adjustment6, where it exports large amounts of copper for petroleum7.  This trade 
relationship is valuable enough to China to have also sent the Chinese National People’s 
Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004.  Many in Zambia consider modern 
Chinese influence to be kinder and gentler than Western structural adjustment 
(Afrobarometer 2016).  Even more than its burgeoning relationship with China, Zambia’s 
social network structure and resulting social proximity has shifted greatly due to the more 
coercive than incentivizing forces of economic inequality, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
regional differences, and religious syncretism.  Rapidly rising economic inequality has 
driven a class rift within and between ethnic groups, so that high-income and low-income 
Bemba and Tonga social networks are doubly isolated, now also by class.  HIV/AIDS has 
taken a physical and social toll on Zambians, isolating the infected from some in their 
groups and doubly so from other groups.  These three factors together make some 
segments of groups triply isolated from each other.  Another factor is regional 
differences.  Zambian in-group trust varies and is affected greatly by economic inequality 
between provinces.  Zambia’s Eastern Province populated by Nsenga, Senga, Nyanja, 
and Tubuka ethnic minority groups, has a deficiency of familial trust, while its Southern 
Province, almost totally populated by the Tonga ethnic group, has a deficiency of trust for 
those known personally.  Coercive and incentivizing development forces have produced a 
modernization path from the ethnic home areas to the Copperbelt, and finally to Lusaka.  
In this way, it is also driving a further urban-wealthy/rural-poor social divide.  Zambia’s 
                                                 
6 In the late 1990s, the IMF and World Bank did begin restructuring their incentivization structures, which did have some effect on 
Zambia’s economic reversal. 
7 Switzerland is the largest recipient of Zambian copper exports, three times more than China, the next largest. 
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highly religiously syncretistic Christian populations tend to reduce societal conflict 
because religious expansionism is lessened and because they share similar ideological 
foundations; however, it consequently decreases inter-group interaction.  Tie strength and 
duration (homophily) and intensity (propinquity) are breaking down within religious 
groups that once had high in-group trust, but this is not resulting in more weakly tied 
nodes that may connect group networks. 
Zimbabwe has a very different economic story than the other cases.  From 2001-
2008, the Zimbabwean economy severely declined and only regained less than half its 
size over the next eight years.  To maintain the post-independence Mugabe-Shona status 
quo, the Zimbabwean state coerced, isolated, and disempowered white farmers and their 
Northern Ndebele ethnic rivals.  As a result, many in the international community have 
heavily sanctioned Zimbabwe to coerce policy changes, leaving it with few allies.  China, 
however, has been an economic lifeline during this time being the recipient of large 
amounts of Zimbabwe’s iron exports (Watts and Meldrum 2005)8.  China values this 
trade relationship sufficiently to send the Chinese National People’s Congress Chairman, 
Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004 in addition to Nigeria and Zambia.  However, more than 
half of Zimbabweans regret modern Chinese influence, feeling it borders on a coercive 
mercantilist system (Afrobarometer 2016).  Zimbabwean development and innovation 
have suffered, not only due to coercive bureaucratic maladministration but also because 
ethnic groups are relatively closed networks.  Zimbabwean society is not a structurally 
                                                 
8 China is not Zimbabwe’s only or greatest trade partner.  South Africa has been a long-time trade partner, exchanging Zimbabwean 
tobacco and gold for South African petroleum.  Zimbabwe’s trade volume is almost six times greater with South Africa than with 
China. 
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cohesive network; instead the Shona and Northern Ndebele form relatively large 
disconnected networks.  While they are not so separate and insular that they are dense 
network cliques, they instead resemble structurally cohesive blocks.  HIV/AIDS has 
ravaged Zimbabwe over the last three decades, ranging between the third and sixth 
highest infection rate globally9.  Zimbabwe welcomed the new millennium with a quarter 
of its adult population HIV positive (Burkett 2000, 471) and “unemployment, inflation, 
poverty rates, and interest rates all running above 50 percent” (MacLean 2002, 513).  
This has taken a physical and social toll, particularly on the Northern Ndebele where 
infection rates are highest.  All Zimbabweans have altered their scripts to be more 
cautious of inter-group interaction, due to the stigma and not knowing who is infected, 
making the infected doubly or triply isolated from other groups.  Even if ethnic or 
religious groups are physically proximate (living in the same district or village), inter-
group interaction is less likely, decreasing their physical proximity’s effect.  In the 
absence of inter-group interaction, groups tend to devalue the lives of other group 
members they do not understand, leading to an ethical double standard, which is the case 
between the Shona and Northern Ndebele. 
Power Differential 
Table 53  
Social Network Composition: Power Differential 
Country  Hypothesis Result Support 
                                                 
9 Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, currently have the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates 
globally. 
Table Continued 
Burkina 
Faso 
Test 
Cases 
High Multipolar Strong 
Ethiopia  High Multipolar Mod 
Nigeria High Bipolar Mod 
 
Zambia Control 
Cases 
Low Multipolar Weak 
Zimbabwe Low Unipolar Strong 
 
Power differential is the seventh test criterion for narrowing or widening the 
GTR; its hypothesis is moderately supported.  Power differential explains the relative 
competitiveness of groups within a society assessing the distribution of power and 
relative access to and ability to obtain desired interests.  It is measured by groups’ size, 
duration, embeddedness, access to government, military, and the market, capital 
ownership, and overall ability to meet group interests.  This dissertation advances the 
trust literature’s understanding of how unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies affect 
the GTR.  Inter-group interaction (negative and positive) occurs most in multipolar 
societies and least in unipolar societies.  When inter-group interaction does occur in 
unipolar societies, it is at the command of the dominant group, and when inter-group 
inter-action occurs in bipolar societies, it is often more intense and conflictual. 
One test case (Burkina Faso) has a high power differential (multipolar) as 
hypothesized and the other two (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have moderate power differentials 
(multipolar and bipolar respectively), ensuring it is one of the factors affecting their wide 
GTR.  Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null 
hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate power differential has a positive effect on 
the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases.  All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving 
the low power differential alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.  
One control case (Zimbabwe) has a low power differential (unipolar) and a narrow GTR 
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as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has a moderate power differential 
(multipolar) and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit for Zambia. 
Multipolar societies such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia, which lack a 
dominant group, have the largest power differentials because there are many small groups 
of varying power, while bipolar societies such as Nigeria (parity of dominant groups) 
exhibit the next largest power differentials.  In the absence of a unipole in these states, 
groups may enter into either a fruitless competitive race for dominance (most common in 
bipolar societies) or pragmatic coalition building relationships (most common in 
multipolar societies).  Diffusion of power in these societies does not guarantee 
democracy.  To deal with high ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and a vast 
territory, Ethiopia and Nigeria have chosen different types of federal models of 
governance.  Both systems are intended to accommodate divergent interests through 
multiple parties, which enhance federal decision-making power of groups and provide 
increased regional autonomy.  Achievement of these goals is measurable by the presence 
of viable competing parties in both cases.  The presence of national parties crosscut by 
ethnicity and religion indicates the beginning of successful coalition building in Nigeria. 
Unipolar societies produce less inter-group interaction than bipolar and multipolar 
societies.  While the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the most intensely 
authoritarian region, SSA is the second most and has the largest number of authoritarian 
regimes (Kaufmann et al. 2009).  However, many SSA states are transitioning from 
unipolar and authoritarian to multipolar and democratic.  Unipolar societies such as 
Zimbabwe with a single dominant group are relatively stable and have the smallest power 
differential because minority groups are unable to challenge the unipole’s dominance.  
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Most authoritarian societies are unipolar, but not all unipolar societies are authoritarian.  
Unipolarity indicates that a society may be more homogenous where there is less 
opportunity to widen the GTR.  A centralized political system or a one-party state 
indicates a more homogenous society or unipolar power differential, which makes it 
easier and more efficient for the unipole to maintain the status quo.  Strongman leader 
longevity in all cases except Nigeria (e.g., President’s Mugabe, Compaoré, Zenawi, and 
Kaunda) results from the insufficient political will to establish term limits.  In this 
environment, the unipole may further sustain the status quo if it has support from an 
external state or non-state actor. 
Table 54  
Power Differentials 
Country Diff Identity Political 
System 
Party 
Structure 
Group(s) Political 
Longevity 
Enhanced 
Access 
Burkina 
Faso 
Multi Ethnic Unitary 
Semi-
Presidential 
Republic 
Single-
Party 
turned 
Multi-
Party 
Mossi 35 Years Military 
Ethiopia Multi Ethnic Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
Multi-
Party 
Tigray, 
Amhara, 
Oromo, 
Southern 
Nations 
17 Years Military 
and 
Market 
Nigeria 
 
Bi 
 
Religion Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
Multi-
Party (two 
dominant) 
Christian 
 
5 Years Market 
Muslim 34 Years Military 
Zambia Multi Ethnic/ 
Class 
Unitary 
Presidential 
Republic 
Single-
Party 
turned 
Multi-
Party 
(three 
dominant) 
Bemba/ 
Tonga 
Socialist/
Liberal 
27 Years Market 
Zimbabwe Uni Ethnic Unitary 
Presidential 
Republic 
Dominant 
Party 
Shona 37 Years Military 
Indicators of unipolarity include if a single ethnic or religious group: a) controls a one-party state; b) has held the highest civilian 
political office for more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; c) has held the highest military office for 
Table Continued 
more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; d) controls over 50 percent of trade; or e) has another state or 
non-state actor willing to intervene on its behalf if its power is challenged. 
 
Table 55  
Changing Power Differentials over Five Decades 
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Burkina Faso Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Multipolar 
Ethiopia Unipolar Unipolar Transitional Multipolar Multipolar 
Nigeria Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Bipolar 
Zambia Unipolar Unipolar Multipolar Multipolar Multipolar 
Zimbabwe Civil War Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar 
 
All cases’ histories (sans Ethiopia) are not their own because of their colonial 
experience.  The two types of leaders that have emerged from these cases are socialist 
revolutionaries who rail against neo-colonial intervention and pragmatic structural 
adjustment apologists who want to make the best of a bad situation.  Burkina Faso has 
produced both.  The most powerful of them, Presidents Sankara and Compaoré, both 
Christian Mossi military leaders, differed greatly in their ideology, Sankara a Mossi 
Christian Marxist and Compaoré a mixed Mossi-Fulani capitalist.  President Compaoré 
constructed a de facto single-party state through the unitary semi-presidential republican 
governance model from 1996-2014 to enact neo-liberal market reforms that President 
Sankara had opposed.  President Kaboré, also a Mossi Christian, is the first elected 
civilian leader in 50 years since President Yaméogo was deposed in a 1966 military coup 
d'état.  He has overseen the transition to a multi-party system and further market 
liberalization. 
Burkina Faso had been isolated and autonomous for a long time after its 
independence from France.  In a similar way that the United States benefited from 
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relative non-intervention in the years following the War of 1812, Burkina Faso has had 
time and space to choose its developmental path, albeit, not a highly growth-oriented 
one—nonetheless, its own path.  For most of its post-colonial history, it chose a unipolar 
power differential along with an assortment of military and civilian strongman leaders—
more of the former than latter—but even Burkina Faso’s authoritarianism has not been 
very coercive.  Even so, no minority groups alone or together were able to mount a strong 
opposition to Mossi dominance, so they did not try to do so, which produced a relatively 
static and peaceful Mossi ethnic unipolar power differential since independence.  During 
this time, Mossi institutions have isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities, in 
part, due to its dominance and status as one of the only ethnic groups that are native to 
the region, which has afforded it creditability and respect from surrounding groups. 
Jumping into market liberalization full force, late in the game, has begun 
developing state institutions and the economy and has transitioned the Mossi unipolarity 
into a multipolarity, reconfiguring group incentives for interaction.  Now, with a 
multipolar power differential, there are competing Mossi, Fulani, Bobo, Gurma, Mandé, 
Senufo, Gurunsi, Lobi, and Tuareg scripts.  This has increased opportunities to form ties 
between networks, making the likelihood of cooperative ties higher.  For sure, structural 
adjustment has been a difficult transition, yet the Burkinabé have benefited from 
watching neighboring countries inter into globalization first.  Recent structural 
adjustment tensions have served to unite more so than divide social networks, widening 
the GTR. 
Ethiopia has had an assortment of civilian leaders interrupted by a coercive 
Marxist military government, producing swings between multipolar and unipolar ethnic 
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power differentials for much of its history.  The most powerful of Ethiopian leaders, 
President Meles Zenawi (1995-2012), a Tigray, was both a Marxist revolutionary and a 
western reformer.  Since the fall of the derg in 1991, there were four years of Worker’s 
Party leadership followed by four years of transitional government led by the Amhara 
National Democratic Movement.  Since its ethnic-based federation was established in 
1995, Meles Zenawi of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front was reelected Prime 
Minister three times, dying in office, followed in leadership by his Deputy Prime 
Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn of the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic 
Movement. 
Following the derg, Ethiopians wanted a decentralized system that would provide 
minority groups greater regional autonomy because there are competing Oromo, Amhara, 
Tigray, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Welayta, Hadiya, Afar, and Gamo ethnic scripts.  The 
result was a de jure multipolar power differential and ethnic-based federalism with a 
parliament and multiple parties, but that allowed the four most powerful ethnic groups 
(Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray) to form a relatively coercive coalition, 
essentially locking out all other groups from federal decision-making processes.  This 
variation of ethnic-based federalism has allowed regional ethnic scripts to strengthen, 
enhancing ethnic identities, but none has taken on national significance, meeting one goal 
of the system.  The closest any one group has gotten is the Tigray that has locked in its 
place in the political structure by building a deeply connected social network throughout 
the military.  Although the Tigray ethnic group make up about six percent of the 
population, it constitutes 95 percent of the command posts in the military (Ginbot 7 
Report 2009). 
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The economic and conflict stakes are higher in Nigeria than the other cases.  It is 
a complex state composed of populations with competing religious, ethnic, and regional 
identities.  The strongest of these was ethnic but is now religious and only relatively 
recently has its power differential shifted from a strongly coercive unipolar military state 
to a highly tense bipolar federation based on politicized religious identities, where 
Christians and Muslims are hopeful they will each prevail to control the Nigerian script.  
Nigerian Christians and Muslims have two strong and opposing scripts and sets of norms 
and behaviors.  Their deeply embedded religious institutions have developed mostly in 
isolation from each other.  Therefore, isomorphic forces have not historically transferred 
between groups, instead have circulated within each group, strengthening institutional 
similarity, homophily, and propinquity within groups but not between them.  This is not 
to say there is not possible institutional likeness.  Christians and Muslims share the 
foundations of Abrahamic faith, which makes them substantially more similar than other 
world religions.  However, they have not proactively capitalized on this similarity to 
build inter-network ties until recently. 
Nigeria has had an assortment of military and civilian leaders, but more years 
under coercive military dictatorships.  In most cases, this would produce a unipolar 
power differential; however, in Nigeria the northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani have 
controlled politics and the military while the southern Christian Yoruba, Igbo, and many 
other minority ethnolinguistic groups have controlled the economy, producing a religious 
bipolar power differential.  A Muslim head of state has led Nigeria since the Second 
Republic in 1979 for 34 of 39 years.  Its history is one of numerous strongman military 
generals taking over “incompetent” civilian governments, but since the Fourth Republic, 
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civilian rule has been unbroken for 19 years.  Its current political party configuration has 
produced two religiously mixed parties.  Time will tell if the informal Christian-Muslim 
power-sharing agreement within the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) where the 
candidacy for president alternates between Christian and Muslim will hold if/when they 
regain the presidency. 
Nigeria’s federal system reflects extreme ethnolinguistic, religious, cultural, and 
regional diversity and differences and its presidential system reflects its culture’s desire 
for strongman leadership.  The Constitution prohibits the establishment of a state religion 
or parties that restrict ethnic and religious membership (Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999, Part III, Chapter VI, D. 222).  Its de jure multi-party structure 
and de facto two-party system reflect the complexity of aligning sufficient inter-faith and 
-ethnic political agreement to form cohesive and sustainable national political parties.  
While the Hausa-Fulani are highly Muslim and the Igbo and Ijaw highly Christian, the 
Yoruba are religiously mixed.  These majorities heavily influence the Nigerian political 
landscape and shape political institutions to their favor, coercing minority groups to 
cluster by religious allegiances.  With the expansion of federal sub-units (states and 
LGAs), states have been incentivized to form political alliances with religiously-similar 
states.  Nigeria has reached a near religious saturation point with its bipolar parity.  
Nigerians strongly identify as either Christian or Muslim.  For each to enlarge its network 
in this context, it must interact with and build ties with members of other religious 
groups.  This has resulted in differences in inter-group interaction across regions where 
these groups are driven together by economic incentives in southern urban centers, by 
coercive land policies in Middle Belt states, and lack any strong driving force in northern 
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rural Muslim regions where these groups are not in physical proximity.  Therefore, the 
GTR is narrowing in the Middle Belt, remaining the same in northern rural areas, and 
widening in southern urban centers. 
For much of Zambia’s unipolar post-colonial history, Bemba institutions have 
coercively isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities.  Now with a multipolar 
ethnic and class-based power differential due to high inequality, there are Bemba, Tonga, 
Nyanja-Chewa, Lozi, and many more competing scripts.  Having so many relatively 
small, dense, and cohesive ethnic groups provides many opportunities to form ties 
between ethnic networks, but this has not occurred.  Zambia’s extremely high inequality 
is primarily a product of the difference between its large agricultural sector, employing 
over 50 percent of the population and its small but profitable industrial and service 
sectors.  University educated Zambians (only 1 percent of the population) employed in 
the industrial and service sectors earn six times more than those with only a primary 
education (World Bank 2016); only they have access to banks and credit.  As agriculture 
continues to bring less value to countries’ GDPs and industry and service sectors 
increase, Zambian inequality may increase, further narrowing its GTR. 
This whole process formed under the watchful eye of strongman-unifier multi-
ethnic Protestant Christian and socialist President Kaunda (1964-1991).  Zambia was a 
one-party state from 1972-1990 under his leadership of the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP).  He was as much the Alexander Hamilton of Zambia (a man 
without a home) as he was known to be the “Gandhi of Africa,” for his non-violent 
strategies.  President Kaunda was not satisfied with the status quo of ethnic politics, so he 
instituted ethnic-based power sharing of military leadership so that no single ethnic group 
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could wrest power from the civilian government, hence its low instance of coup d'états.  
He was a son of a Malawian Tongas, meaning he should have been affiliated with the 
Zambian Nyanja ethnic group; instead, he grew up Bemba in Zambia.  Eventually, his 
political convictions put him at odds with Bemba leadership; he from there forward 
associated with the Nyanja of the Eastern Province (Posner 2005, 98).  Kaunda’s multi-
ethnic, syncretistic, and socialist Protestant Christian Zambian nationalism served him 
well in unifying a highly diverse society.  However, one leader does not often dictate the 
trajectory of a whole country. 
Modern Zambian politics under a unitary presidential republic is relatively 
competitive, yet this has not served to widen the GTR.  The only three parties to muster 
at least 10 percent of parliamentary seats include: the Bemba Democratic Socialist 
Patriotic Front (PF), which is critical of Chinese investment and intervention; the Bemba 
Democratic Socialist Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD); and the Tonga 
Liberal United Party for National Development (UPND).  Of twenty total parties, one-
third of them are newly formed.  These three dominant parties have settled into a 
competitive electoral convergence where bounds of each group are sufficiently broad to 
attract more voters if need be, but not so broad that the base’s core interests are at risk.  
Since 1991 when Zambia initiated its multi-party system, the MMD won the first five 
elections (1991-2011) until the PF split off from it and won the 2011 general election.  
Prior to the PF victory, the MMD margins of victory were in the 70s the first two election 
cycles, but as happens in multi-party systems, the people yearn for change, and in the 
subsequent two election cycles, the MMD retained the presidency with victory margins 
only in the 40s (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013, 9). 
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The Shona script drives Zimbabwe’s deeply embedded and widely disseminated 
coercive institutions.  In this context, isomorphic forces flow from the dominant Shona to 
the Northern Ndebele, Tswa, Kunda, Nsenga, Manyika, Ndau, Venda, Kalanga, Tswana, 
Lozi, Nambya, Tsoa, and Tonga ethnic minority groups.  These groups need the Shona to 
meet some of their interests, but the Shona do not.  Zimbabwe’s unipolar Shona ethnic 
power differential was established by the closure of the Rhodesian Bush War with a 
Mugabe-led Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) victory and Zimbabwean 
independence.  Robert Mugabe was Zimbabwe’s only leader under a unitary presidential 
republican, dominant party model of governance until he was pushed out in 2017.  He 
was a socialist revolutionary and a war hero and was one of the loudest African voices 
opposing neo-colonial intervention, which produced reverence among the Shona and fear 
among other ethnic groups.  His idealism and coercive tactics cost Zimbabwe dearly in 
the form of food insecurity and hyperinflation but were more hurtful to the Northern 
Ndebele and smaller ethnic minorities.  Mugabe was able to sustain his rule by entering 
into a symbiotic relationship with the military elite, ensuring they had conflicts to engage 
in and resources to expend.  The long-time hatred between Shona and Northern Ndebele 
has served to strengthen ethnic identities.  If the later were larger and more powerful, it 
could produce an explosive bipolar power differential, but it is not. 
 
 
Cross-Variable Comparative Analysis and Synthesis 
Theoretical generalizations gleaned from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis 
of these case findings suggest that individualistic multipolar societies in states with strong 
security and contract institutions, having greater trade and investment than remittances 
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and aid and that are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized and 
physically, technologically, and socially proximate, have wider GTRs.  This archetype 
society only exists theoretically as no past or current empirically observable society, least 
of all the control cases, meets all these requirements, not even developed Western states 
do.  However, some come closer than others.  While the empirical analysis of non-SSA 
states is not the focus of this dissertation, some conjecture on the theoretically optimal 
case type is useful for understanding trust development patterns in non-fragile states 
compared to fragile states. 
The societies with the top 10 widest GTRs globally (Sweden, Norway, France, 
United Kingdom, Finland, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Mali, and the United States) 
are all highly incentivized Western European and North American representative 
democracies, except Mali.10  Most also have effective security and contract institutions, 
are individualistic, have large inflows of trade and investment and small inflows of 
remittance and aid, have little ethnolinguistic fractionalization, appear to be physically, 
technologically, and socially proximate, and are multipolar, as would be hypothesized.  
The Scandinavian cases share a more consociational multipolarity, and the non-
Scandinavian ones are highly individualistic and have some of the most religiously 
fractionalized societies.  Fractionalization forms differently in non-fragile and fragile 
states environments.  All test and control cases are more ethnolinguistically fractionalized 
than any non-fragile states and nearly the opposite is true for their religious 
fractionalization.  Canada is the most ethnically fractionalized developed country—still 
                                                 
10 Mali would make an excellent follow-up study if reliable variable data can be found (it is not currently available). 
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less so than these cases—followed by Belgium and Switzerland, and the United States, 
which are only moderately so.  Canada, Israel, Switzerland, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands are the most linguistically fractionalized developed countries but are only 
moderately so and all less so than these cases.  The United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, and United Kingdom are the most religiously 
fractionalized developed countries, on par with Nigeria and more so than Burkina Faso 
and Ethiopia.  This indicates that non-fragile states allow for greater ideological diversity 
because of having trustworthy institutions for dealing with competing ideologically 
driven interests, a benefit fragile states do not have. 
The themes of incentivization and consociationalism have arisen in non-fragile 
state contexts that are transferable to fragile state environments.  Further, the theme of 
trust differential has arisen as a fragile state advantage for widening the GTR.  The above 
listed non-fragile states have also come closest to reaching their generalized trust 
differential saturation point, meaning they are close to reaching their potential, so any 
effort made to widen their GTR has diminishing returns, similar to the difference of 
economic growth rates between fragile and non-fragile states.  The ten narrowest GTRs 
globally are mostly North African countries (Peru, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine, 
Uzbekistan, Libya, Armenia, Mexico, and Morocco) with fragile security and contract 
institutions, collectivist societies, low trade and investment, and some of the lowest 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization.  They also appear to have low physical, 
technological, and social proximity and lean unipolar.  These countries have some of the 
largest trust differentials, indicating unmet potential—potential nonetheless.  Adjustments 
made to widen the GTR in these societies have a higher return on investment, yet are 
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more difficult to implement.  The most collectivist societies (Guatemala, Ecuador, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia) do not overlap with the narrowest GTR countries 
somewhat unexpectedly and are some of the least linguistically (e.g., Spanish) and 
religiously (e.g., Catholic) fractionalized societies and have moderate trust differentials.  
The SSA cases reside between these two extremes and share some of their features and 
not others.  They share many of the same GTR narrowing factors as the narrow GTR 
states and have similar trust differentials, yet have realized more of their potential. 
Control Cases 
This dissertation has established that all control and test cases have poor GTR 
widening environments, as was intended through the high bar set by the least likely 
deviant case selection design.  All cases’ security and contract institutions are only 
minimally functional, their societies are heavily collectivist, and the combination of their 
trade, investment, remittances, and aid flows negatively affect their economies and 
societies as the trust literature claims they should.  Also by design, the control cases 
reflect the typical case environment further where the SNC also has a GTR narrowing 
effect.  Further explanation is required for inconsistencies in control cases’ control and 
test variables. 
Ethnically, linguistically, and religiously low fractionalized country cases are 
difficult to find in SSA; therefore, minimal control case selection trade-offs were made to 
broaden the fractionalization boundary scope conditions.  While few trade-offs were 
required for Zimbabwe because its good control case fit, Zambia required more due to its 
high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.  This dissertation claims fractionalization 
captures only part of the social effect on the GTR; therefore, small inconsistencies in the 
 302 
fractionalization measures are not as concerning as ones are in proximity or power 
differential.  The high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of Zambia is insufficient to 
widen the GTR in the presence the GTR narrowing effects of all the control variables and 
physical, technological, and social proximity.  Zambia and Zimbabwe’s generation-long 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has reconfigured their physical and social proximities and both 
societies being homogenously Christian, even though there is sect and denominational 
differences, has decreased the likelihood of inter-group interaction.  Further, in 
Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s history of coercive governance and in Zambia, its extremely high 
economic inequality, also decrease the likelihood of inter-group interaction. 
Hypothesis Challenges.  Subsequent analysis synthesizes revealed variable 
patterns, and ambiguities and inconsistencies of case findings through the emergent 
incentivization, consociationalism, and trust differential themes.  Presented separately are 
within-case conclusions, theoretical inference from cross-case conclusions, and policy 
suggestions. 
Some hypotheses are better supported than others.  Having appropriate 
expectations set in the design of this study helps to weigh and interpret the findings 
accurately.  An intentionally high bar is set by employing a deviant, least likely case 
selection; however, this dissertation does not claim these test cases are critical cases (see 
Eckstein 2000, 119).  There is no expectation of the test variable passing a doubly 
decisive test for any or all test cases, nor that any would have exceedingly wide GTR. 
Smoking gun and hoop support for all cases and variables, excluding 
technological proximity either confirm or affirm the hypotheses.  All test cases have 
moderately wide GTR when compared across a global sample—which is not 
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recommended—and high when compared across SSA, a single socio-culturally similar 
region—which is a best practice.  There is little reason to assume these test cases would 
have high GTR compared to a global sample when facing so many institutional, cultural, 
and market challenges.  Therefore, achieving a moderate GTR in these complex trust 
environments with only fractionalization, proximity (sans technological), and power 
differential having a GTR widening effect, is a research accomplishment.  However, 
because technological proximity and power differential perform weaker than the other 
criteria, further explanation is required.   
Technological proximity increases inter-group interaction, but these test cases 
were unable to assess this empirically.  Infrastructure building is expensive, and 
communications and transportation infrastructures are more dependent on reliable state 
security and contract institutions than was initially assumed.  Even if these test cases 
build communications and transportation infrastructure, many projects fail over time due 
to inability or unwillingness to maintain them.  Even Nigeria, the most technologically 
proximate of all cases, has been unable to bring electricity to much of its rural regions.  
There are pockets of technological proximity in each case, generally in urban areas.  As 
the cases’ continue to urbanize, more of their populations will become technologically 
proximate, but they are not yet.  However, technological proximity is not simply a 
function of the level of development, but rather for Burkina Faso, it is also due to the 
timing of its development, as it began on its development path much later than other 
cases.  It may be that in another decade because its terrain is flat and size is small, that 
infrastructure will proliferate if there is a will, budget, and institutions to do so.  For 
Ethiopia, its fragile communications and transportation infrastructures are largely due to 
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the controlling nature of the federal government, which has hampered innovation.  As it 
becomes more de facto federal, rather than only de jure, its infrastructure will also grow, 
but not as rapidly, since its terrain is much more uneven and expansive making 
infrastructure projects much more expensive.  Communications technology, less 
dependent on physical infrastructure than transportation, has grown more in these cases.  
Mobile technology in Burkina Faso and Nigeria have increase in-group trust, while this is 
less a factor in Ethiopia.  Radio and television are uni-directional script enhancing 
technologies, that without the presence of physical proximity or principle monitoring 
systems increase miscommunication.  In Nigeria, script competition is high, and the radio 
and television market has grown to support it, extending religious conflict.  In Burkina 
Faso and Ethiopia, by contrast, their infrastructures are much smaller and more rigidly 
controlled by the government, especially in Ethiopia.  Therefore, it is most likely that 
Nigeria and Burkina Faso’s communications and transportation technological proximity 
will increase in the mid-term. 
The power differential hypothesis claims test cases should have multipolar and 
control cases unipolar societies.  Therefore, Nigeria’s bipolar and Zambia’s multipolar 
societies are not quite as hypothesized.  With a bipolar power differential and a coercive 
environment, Nigeria produces a wider than expected GTR.  The complexity of Nigeria 
has incentivized and coerced religious networks to form bipolarly and political networks 
multipolarly.  Nigerian Christian outsized access to economic resources and outsized 
Muslim access to the political system and military is diminishing.  The federal system is 
distributing petroleum revenues nationally, yet still unevenly.  This has increased 
resource conflict among Niger Delta ethnic minorities that feel they are subject to moral 
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hazard, deserving greater access to those revenues since they bear the majority of the 
environmental harms.   
The hypothesis for Zambia claims its narrow GTR should be associated with a 
unipolar power differential; however, it is a multipolar society and has been for longer 
than any other case.  Zambia’s early adoption of capitalism made it a guinea pig for 
unproven structural adjustment programs, which have institutionalized inequality11 that 
has established a unipolar class divide.  This suggests a combination of factors are 
converging in these two cases to form their power differentials.  Because they have the 
most enduring development paths of the cases, their power differentials are becoming 
more culturally, economically, politically, and socially segmented.  Nigeria features 
religious bipolarity and political multipolarity, while Zambia features political 
multipolarity and class unipolarity.  This suggests that as fragile states develop, they are 
more prone to power differential segmentation across their cultures, economies, political 
systems, and societies.  These findings suggest Nigeria is more multipolar than its 
apparent religious bipolarity suggests and Zambia is more unipolar than its political 
multipolarity suggests. 
Themes.  The most apparent patterns across test cases that explain their wider 
GTR include trust differential potential, multipolar consociationalism, and civil society 
incentivization and network structures.  These patterns do not occur in isolation but are 
instead interconnected.  Just as societies vary by all sorts of demographic measures (e.g., 
physical and population size, natural resources, human capital, and technology), so too 
                                                 
11 Zambia has the highest economic inequality (57.1) globally as measured by the World Bank’s GINI Index estimates for 2015. 
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trust composition, potential, and realization differ.  The trust differential measures these 
differences.  States may drive multipolarity through formal institutions, which is 
necessary, but not sufficient alone to produce wider GTR.  In some cases, even in the 
absence of a multipolar state, civil society incentivization and network structures are 
sufficient to widen the GTR.  The more autonomous a civil society is from its state and 
external forces, the less isomorphic forces affect its network structure and the freer it is to 
develop consociational informal institutions. 
Trust Differential Potential 
While the test cases are moving away from a unipolar power differential, this does 
not explain how or which of their formal and informal institutions are strengthening—
they have mixed records.  Institutional trust is a product of a society’s aggregate 
trustingness and the trustworthiness of its institutions.  The less trusting a society is and 
the more the state violates the principle-agent agreement, the less trust it credits to 
institutions.  Because fragile state institutions are less trustworthy, the isolation of 
generalized from institutional trust is more straightforward in that context, but because 
in-group trust remains high, it is more difficult.  In-group trust has a high and narrow 
global range (0.56 Peru to 0.86 Egypt) and case range (0.61 Zambia to 0.73 Ethiopia).  
Out-group trust has a low and broad global range with twice as much variation (0.20 Peru 
to 0.63 Sweden) and case range (0.31 Zimbabwe to 0.44 Burkina Faso) (Welzel and 
Delhey 2015, 885-6).  Descriptive network analysis is useful for separating in-group from 
generalized trust.  The more isolated group networks are from each other, the more in-
group trust and the more connected they are, the more generalized trust. 
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Out-group trust (an unweighted average of the WVS three stranger questions) is 
the trust literature’s best proxy measure for the GTR; however, two improvements are 
possible.  First, in its current form, it does not recognize that some strangers are stranger 
than others are, giving equal weight to the three sub-categories composing out-group 
trust: “People you meet for the first time,” “People of another religion,” and “People of 
another nationality.”  Weighting these measures differently to reflect the relationship 
between religion, ethnicity, and initial versus sustained inter-group interaction may 
provide a more accurate measure.  Second, in out-group trust’s current form, in-group 
trust is not entirely separated from it.  Identifying and isolating derivative trust based on 
cultural attraction from transcendent trust based on instrumental interests produces a 
more analytically pure measure of generalized trust.  Transcendent out-group trust is 
what widens the GTR (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 883).  The more socio-culturally similar 
groups are, the more derivative and the less transcendent out-group trust they generate 
when interacting.  Therefore, inter-group interaction is easier the more similar groups are, 
but there is more GTR widening potential between more different groups.  Welzel and 
Delhey (2015) recognize this limitation of the current measure and attempt a sweeping 
quantitative separation of derivative and transcendent out-group trusts through their 
highly aggregated Human Empowerment proxy measure.  They rightly identify 
derivative out-group trust capturing social separation and transcendent out-group trust 
capturing religious pluralism, yet they confuse derivative out-group trust with 
institutional trust when claiming strong security institutions are captured by derivative 
and the absence of a repressive state is captured by transcendent.  They claim their 
findings are preliminary and that further work in this area should be a trust literature 
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research priority (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 893).  This dissertation’s theoretical 
framework identifies and separates cultural attractors qualitatively on a case-by-case 
basis.  Once derivative and transcendent out-group trusts are separated, the GTR and trust 
differential may be analyzed more accurately. 
Every society has an upper and lower range of experienced in-group, generalized, 
and institutional trust measurable at different times and units of analysis.  Predicting a 
society’s potential trust levels is more complicated.  In-group trust is always higher than 
generalized trust, lest a society atomizes and institutional trust is a function of a society’s 
legitimization of its institutions, sometimes regardless of their merit.  The most 
fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the highest potential 
transcendent generalized trust and GTR; non-fragile states have reached more of their 
GTR trust potential than fragile states; therefore, fragile states have the most unrealized 
GTR potential.  The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe have 
the highest in-group trust levels globally, while the former has the lowest out-group trust 
levels and the later have the highest.  This means MENA has the most unrealized GTR 
widening potential of all regions and Western Europe is closer to its generalized trust 
saturation point.  The trust differential and GTR are usefully analyzed together; the 
former identifies states’ GTR widening potential and the GTR identifies states’ actualized 
potential.  Cases with high trust differentials and high GTR are of most interest as 
archetype cases that may provide a model for GTR widening in low GTR cases.  The 
cases perform as follows: 
• Burkina Faso has above average realized out-group trust (0.4408) 20th 76 globally 
and highest of the cases and in-group trust (0.6840) 59th of 76, that is average for 
SSA, but below the global mean.  This makes its trust differential (0.2432) 66th of 
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76, the lowest of the cases, and second lowest in SSA, meaning it has the most 
realized GTR potential of the cases and lowest potential growth. 
 
• Ethiopia has above average realized out-group trust (0.3998) 35th of 76 globally 
and above average in-group trust (0.7310) 40th of 76 globally and highest of the 
cases.  This makes its trust differential (0.3312) 39th of 76, average, meaning it 
has an average amount of realized GTR potential and growth. 
 
• Nigeria has average realized out-group trust (0.3693) 42nd of 76 globally and 
average in-group trust (0.7179) 51st of 76 for SSA and globally.  This makes its 
trust differential (0.3486) 31st of 76, average, meaning it has an average amount of 
realized GTR potential and growth. 
 
• Zambia also has low realized out-group trust (0.3280) 51st of 76 globally and the 
lowest in-group trust (0.6098) 73rd of 76, of the cases and in SSA.  This makes its 
trust differential (0.2818) 54th of 76, the second lowest of the cases, meaning it 
has the second most realized GTR potential of the cases and the second lowest 
growth potential. 
 
• Zimbabwe has the lowest realized out-group trust (0.3064) 58th of 76 globally and 
lowest in SSA, while its in-group trust (0.6825) 60th of 76, is average for SSA and 
below the global mean.  This makes its trust differential (0.3761) 22nd of 76, the 
highest of the cases, meaning it has the least realized GTR potential of the cases 
and the highest potential growth. 
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Figure 20. Trust Differential. 
Note: High potential (over 0.7); Low potential (under 0.7); High realized (over 0.4); Low realized (under 0.4). 
Source: Delhey et al. (2011) 
 
 
Figure 21. Trust Differential: Potential versus Realized. 
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Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe form the bookends of the five cases.  The top of 
each bar represents the society’s in-group trust level and the bottom its out-group trust 
level.  In-group and out-group trust levels are higher for each test case than for each 
control case.  The length of the bar represents its trust differential.  The shorter the bar is, 
the more of its GTR potential has been reached (Burkina Faso), which makes it an 
excellent example for other cases, but also the less GTR potential remains because it is 
closer to its generalized trust saturation point.  Oppositely, the longer the bar is less of its 
GTR potential has been reached (Zimbabwe), which makes it a poor example for other 
cases, but means it has more potential to be reached.  Zambia has the least absolute GTR 
potential.  Its in-group trust level (0.6098) is so low—nearly two SD below the global 
mean (0.7288)—that it will reach its generalized trust saturation point much sooner than 
the other cases.  Ethiopia and Nigeria’s in-group, generalized, and trust differential scores 
are average-above average and similar.  They have realized more of their GTR potential 
than the trust literature suggests they should and have plenty of room for growth. 
Multipolar Consociationalism 
Institutional structures differ between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies, 
with multipolar institutions, generally being more flexible, responsive, and equitable.  
Institutions are purposed to reduce uncertainty in the social contract (North 1988, 15).  
Their primary function in multipolar societies is not efficiency, but instead the weighing 
of competing interests—they are therefore consociational compromises (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991, 4).  The extension of co-operative norms does not come easily in any of 
these highly fractionalized test cases.  They are not like Botswana where reciprocity, 
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social sanction, contracts, and collective action come more easily due to a homogenous 
society. Instead, they require greater effort as there are many competing scripts in the 
absence of a unipole.  However, in this environment, the values of compromise and 
coalition building are more likely to embed as social scripts than in unipolar societies. 
The post-independence political models constructed in these test cases reflect 
some of Lijphart’s consociationalism goals, such as multiple balances of power, 
socioeconomic equality, flexible and accommodating elites that can rise above group 
allegiances (1969, 216), small population, nationalism stronger than regionalism, 
isolation of ethnic groups, and the presence of a common external threat (Kerr 2006, 27).  
In all cases, the implementation of these goals has been flawed.  Burkina Faso reflects 
typical ethnic consociationalism, Nigeria, more of a religious confessionalism, and 
Ethiopia, in its goal to produce segmental autonomy for ethnic minority groups, has 
produced consociationalism bordering on corporatism.  In Ethiopia, Horowitz’s (1985, 
575) nightmare is being realized in the strengthening of ethnic identities when the goal 
was regional ethnic autonomy, and in Nigeria, the fragile states literature is surprised by 
its strong transition from ethnic to religious identity formation. 
Table 56  
Achievement of Consociational Goals 
Country Multiple 
Balances 
of Power 
Socio-
economic 
Equality 
Flexible 
Elites 
Small 
Population 
Nationalism 
Valued over 
Regionalism 
Isolation 
of Ethnic 
Groups 
External 
Threat 
Burkina 
Faso 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Mod Mod (Malian 
spillover) 
Ethiopia Mod Yes Mod No No Mod Mod 
(Somalian 
spillover) 
Nigeria Yes Mod Mod No No Mod No 
Table Continued 
Zambia Mod No Mod Yes Mod Mod No 
Zimbabwe No Mod No Yes No No Mod 
(Sanctions) 
Note: Goals come from Lijphart (1969, 216). 
 
The test cases share many similarities.  Burkina Faso and Ethiopia have a 
multipolar ethnic system; Ethiopia and Nigeria have a federal system; Burkina Faso and 
Nigeria have a presidential system and share a slave trade and colonial history, and 
structural adjustment has shaped all of them.  Even though Burkina Faso is a multipolar 
society, the Mossi ethnic group remains dominant, though not coercive.  Nigeria is 
divided Christian and Muslim, but because religious political parties are made illegal in 
the Constitution, a couple of dominant Christian-Muslim coalition parties have formed.  
This has allowed isomorphic forces to begin to flow between these groups, serving to 
increase their network transitivity slowly.  Urban Christians and Muslims involved in 
Nigerian party politics are diversifying their religious identities with other slightly less 
intense identities (e.g., regional, ethnic, and linguistic) or much less intense (e.g., 
professional associations and economic interests).  Perhaps this could begin breaking the 
stronghold that religious identity has on Nigerians.  Ethiopia has two tiers of ethnic 
groups, the Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations who form a coalition and then 
all the rest.  Balance theory provides a way to understand the triadic relations of 
Ethiopian ethnopolitics.  Ethiopian politics has transitioned into a three-cycles 
relationship where one majority ethnic group favors one group over the other.  The fall of 
the derg placed the Amhara in a weakened position due to its association with it, which 
allowed the Tigray to subsume some of its political capital to gain a position where it 
could play the Oromo and Amhara off each other to its advantage.  This has set off a 
chain reaction throughout ethno political networks forming a closed cycle of reciprocity 
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(see Salehyan et al. 2012; Snijders 2009) between the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray.  What 
has not fully formed is an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” (Strogatz 2010) temporary 
coalition between the Amhara and Oromo against the Tigray.  The Tigray have instead 
been able to institutionalize its political position through an alliance with the Southern 
Nations. 
The more connected multipolar societies are to other multipolar societies, the 
greater the isomorphic effect on their institutions is.  Institutions growing out of structural 
adjustment will share some similarities because they were formed in similar coercive and 
incentivized isomorphic environments.  Structural adjustment has a mixed record; while 
many SSA economies have grown absolutely, most are also more unstable.  Therefore, 
the more Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria integrate into the global community of 
states, the more their formal institutions will reflect others.  If these cases become more 
integrated as equals into the global community, their institutions will become more 
aligned with peer institutions through normative isomorphism.  Instead, what occurs most 
often in fragile states is memetic isomorphism where their institutional environments are 
so uncertain, that they seek successful models to mimic, not always transferring well to 
their unique local conditions.  Isomorphic forces may induce inter-group interaction 
prematurely causing conflict, between groups that do not typically interact where 
structurally equivalent nodes could have formed ties.  There are often unparalleled 
hierarchies (one vertical and the other horizontal) between interacting groups making the 
selection of structurally equivalent agents more difficult (Gopin 2000, 200).  In this 
environment, powerful agents can shape networks to their advantage and sabotage 
cooperative opportunities if they stand to gain little from them (Druckman 2005, 297).  
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This is particularly a problem between Christian and Muslim groups.  Christians and 
Muslims are often portrayed and often buy into scripts and behave as if they have little in 
common.  However, they share some commonalities that are rarely capitalized on for 
building positive network ties: Abrahamic monotheism, absolute truth, religious 
expansionism, treatment of the poor (17:26 – 27 Quran; Bukhari, Hadith; Luke 3:10-11; 
Mark 10:21).  They also have some differences in how their religious texts encourage or 
command adherents to treat the “other” that has often been capitalized on to generate 
conflict (5:51 Quran; Matthew 25:35-40; Romans 12:13). 
Transitioning away from a unipolar power differential is necessary, but not 
sufficient to widen the GTR.  This transition has not occurred quickly or cleanly in these 
cases.  The longevity of strongman military leadership sustained unipolar power 
differentials in each test case.  However, none of the test cases remains unipolar today, in 
part, because these leaders were also market reformers.  How dominant a unipole is may 
influence its transition away from unipolarity.  The Mossi are a long-time dominant 
ethnic group that is not so dominant that it does not have to consider minority interests, 
nor is it so wealthy that it does not need to interact with them.  In Ethiopia, since the fall 
of the derg, it has benefited from having a leader that was not from one of the two largest 
ethnic groups (Amhara and Oromo)—not from the Amhara because of its association 
with the derg and not from the Oromo because of its Muslim majority status in a non-
Muslim majority country.  Each test case has a sparking event that marks its transition 
away from unipolarity—yet they are only sparking events, and the transitions have begun 
long before and will continue long after them.  For Burkina Faso, the most recent 
transition, it was the 2014 Burkinabé uprising and subsequent removal of President 
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Compaoré from office and reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament.  Because Burkina 
Faso’s transition is the most recent, there is concern that it has yet to experience the full 
adverse effect in these early stages.  Nigeria’s transition occurred in 1999 with the sudden 
death of military dictator President Abacha in 1998 and subsequent revision of the 
Constitution.  While many of its institutions are fragile, its Constitution is reasonably 
well crafted, safeguarding from unipolar reemergence.  Because of this, Nigeria has a 
living generation that has not experienced military leadership.  Ethiopia’s transition 
occurred in 1991 when it rid itself of the derg.  In subsequent years, its civil society has 
grown in uneven spurts as the federal government seeks to contain it. 
Civil Society Incentivization through Network Structures 
Many of the cases’ formal institutions are the result of global isomorphism but 
have not been legitimized by the culture, producing a misalignment of de jure encoding 
of laws and de facto enforcement; this is true for unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar cases.  
It produces a corruption-rich environment and zombie institutions that outlive the original 
purpose of their creators (see Zucker 1986).  These institutions can become so embedded 
in the formal structure of a state that the cost of changing them substantially or quickly is 
too high (see North 1988).  In this institutional environment, there is a threshold of 
institutional dysfunction that when crossed, civil societies may decide to disengage from 
formal institutions to go it alone; this has occurred in many regions of Nigeria. 
Incentivization structures differ between the state, the market, and civil society, 
yet the trust literature rarely distinguishes between them for analysis.  Individuals are 
rarely incentivized to seek the common good in any state type, but rather seek rents from 
and loopholes around competitors (Putnam 1993, 176 quoting Olson 1971, 28).  Because 
 317 
fractionalized non-fragile states have strong security and contract institutions, 
information asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazard are reduced.  In these cases, 
there are not trustworthy institutions, but the more socially proximate their civil society 
is, the shorter network distance exists between nodes of different groups and the easier it 
is to transmit information between them for collaboration. 
Fragile state government and market behavior are better understood than that of 
civil society.  The state uses coercion more often than market or civil society actors do 
because it has a monopoly on the use of force and security stakes are higher than those of 
economic growth or social cohesion.  In heavily coercive environments (e.g., the Soviet 
Union and Zimbabwe), the market and civil society contract.  These tend to be fragile 
states with a strong authoritarian veneer where there is little institutional trust.  Civil 
society is most often the mechanism through which individuals enact their agency in 
fragile states since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances and aid) rather 
than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can do little to 
change coercive state institutions.  Typical fragile state civil societies are segmented 
along ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, or class lines due to their higher than average 
in-group trust and lower than average generalized trust.  The test cases are low 
institutional trust environments that exhibit greater network connectivity and wider GTR 
than typical fragile states.  The choices civil society actors make in these cases are 
affected by their location within their networks (Hanneman and Riddle 2011, 367) and by 
the number of nodes between them and other nodes (geodesic distance) (2011, 343).  
Even if states remain coercive and markets weak, there may be consociational forces 
acting within civil society.  This is mostly a function of civil society’s network structure. 
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Burkinabé, Ethiopian, and Nigerian civil society environments are more 
incentivized than the trust literature assumes.  Burkina Faso and Ethiopia are some of the 
poorest countries globally; therefore, many individuals do not have all of their basic 
needs met.  This makes these civil societies inter-group interaction rich environments due 
to this pushing force, leading to conflict or cooperation and more clearly narrower or 
wider GTR.  Because the Burkinabé have so many interests unmet by their groups, it is 
the easiest case to demonstrate that incentivized inter-group interaction produces civil 
society cooperation despite a fragile state.  Burkinabé civil society, emerging most 
recently of the cases from a unipolar power differential, is young, but active.  Ethiopia 
and Nigeria’s high conflict societies make it more challenging to isolate incentivizing 
forces from coercive.  Ethiopian civil society was nearly non-existent because of derg 
policies until 1991, so it is also young, but less active.  In 2009, the Charities and Society 
Proclamation Act prohibited NGOs from political engagement and created extraneous 
bureaucratic hoops with the purpose of thinning the large number of NGOs that had 
become unrestrained, channeling large amounts of capital while producing very little 
development.  Ethiopia remains a violent place.  Ethiopian civil society is learning how to 
push back against government coercion through peaceful protest, but the government is 
slow to respond through incentives rather than coercion.  Nigerian civil society is active, 
yet chaotic and largely religiously segmented (Rosenblum and Post 2001, 15), creating 
many service inefficiencies and miscommunication.  Nigerians think highly of their civil 
society, but it is likely they have only either Christian or Muslim segments of civil 
society in mind.  Nigeria and Burkina Faso are becoming more urbanized than Ethiopia.  
Having a greater diversity of identity formation in urban areas increases initial conflict as 
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has been observed in Nigeria, but leads to more incentivized and diversified inter-group 
interaction based on civil society coalition forming in the mid- and long-term. 
Incentivization and coercion are dependent on proximity.  Because these cases are 
not highly technologically proximate, physical and social proximity have a greater effect 
on the GTR.  Each case has strong incentivizing and coercive forces centripetally pulling 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups into greater physical and social proximity, 
producing greater multiplexity and transitivity of network ties between groups.  For 
Burkinabé it is the long-time Mossi, for Ethiopians, it is the ambitious Tigray, and for 
Nigerians, it is the two-pronged ambitiousness of Christians and Muslims forming a 
bipolar parity.  Each of these cases has highly religious Christian and Muslim civil 
societies, which are different from each other, but not nearly as different as many other 
world religions.  Many drivers of inter-group interaction push and pull Christian and 
Muslim civil societies together into greater proximity.  Ethiopian Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims have a relatively peaceful shared inter-religious history, while a similar 
parity has stoked religious competition in Nigeria.  Burkina Faso’s peaceful history has 
allowed its many highly syncretistic religiously mixed ethnic groups to form weak 
network ties through which information may flow, helping to deinstitutionalize out-group 
myths (Varshney 2002, 21).  Sustained network connections rather than temporary are 
more effective in information transmittal that combats inter-group myths and alters 
behavior and scripts (Svensson and Brouneus 2013, 573).  Christian and Muslim civil 
societies in Nigeria’s Middle Belt have high physical proximity, but low social proximity 
with few sustained network connections and fewer options for backchanneling to 
dissipate violence when interaction does occur.  It is much easier to anticipate and 
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dissipate conflict in civil society when religion is not highly associated with the 
interaction (see Varshney 2000, 266). 
Nigerian Middle Belt states, Ethiopian Oromo and Amhara farming areas, and 
Burkina Faso’s Malian and Ivoirian border areas are subject to high fractionalization and 
fragile institutions, while urban centers tend to be more physically and socially proximate 
with stronger multipolar institutions.  Pluralized identities and many weak ties rather than 
few strong ones in urban centers help civil societies to reduce in-group trust in these 
highly religious societies.  Urban civil society interaction is more incentivized than rural.  
It is a good sign that these cases have some of the highest urbanization rates globally, 
meaning their physical proximity will only increase in the short- and mid-term.  The 
increase of physical and social proximity is essential for managing inter-group interaction 
in these fragile state environments where institutions are ill-equipped to monitor 
principles and manage moral hazard.  Past coercive forces of war and famine have driven 
Ethiopians and Nigerians together physically, while Burkina Faso has been subjected to 
fewer of these coercive forces.  While unipolar societies (e.g., Zimbabwe) exhibit an 
obvious coercive power differential between dominant and minority groups, in multipolar 
and bipolar societies (our test cases), there is regional or sectoral variation of 
incentivization and coercion on civil society. 
The social networks of the poor are one of the primary resources they have 
for managing risk and vulnerability, and outside agents therefore need to 
find ways to complement these resources, rather than substitute for them – 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 17) 
 
Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together explain how civil 
society principles and agents embedded in thick webs of social relations (Borgatti et al. 
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2009, 892) apply incentivizing and coercive pushing and pulling forces to meet their 
interests.  These forces are applied through the levers of formal and informal institutions 
within and across dynamic networks, which influences their outcomes, often different 
from what was intended (Marin and Wellman 2011, 17).  Fragile states tend to rely on 
coercive force while coercion and incentivization are utilized in inter-state market forces 
and civil society.  Social capital is a much more critical incentivization tool in these 
cases’ civil societies because other forms of capital are less available.  Civil societies 
must expand their social networks and become more socially proximate to gain access to 
their human and physical capital interests.  Social proximity indicates sustained inter-
group interaction and sustained positive inter-group interaction indicates mutual interests 
are being met between civil societies.  The more different their scripts are, and the more 
coercive forces, the more conflictual and violent the interaction will be.  Oppositely, the 
better structurally equivalent nodes understand their civil society counterparts’ scripted 
behavior and expectations, the more likely positive inter-group interaction is to result 
(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 571). 
In these heterogeneous societies, civil society actors have to adapt to changing 
institutional configurations.  As they do this, nodes from other civil societies with similar 
structural environments learn similar coping mechanisms (Erickson 1988, 175) making 
them more structurally equivalent and accessible (see Lorrain and White 1971; Burt, 
1976).  With sufficient understanding of fragile state civil society network structures, it 
may be possible to map out potential network paths per society to anticipate fragile state 
behavior or even induce isomorphism across very different religious or ethnic-based civil 
society segments to produce connections between structurally equivalent bridging nodes 
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(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 581).  This dissertation is the first step in that 
direction. 
 
 
Conclusions 
It seems plausible, therefore, that the secret of the economic and political 
success of small and open countries, like Switzerland, Austria, Denmark 
or the Netherlands, lies precisely in their ability to conduct policy 
discourses that are based on a realistic understanding of their own 
capabilities and constraints… 
—Visser and Hemerijck, A Dutch Miracle 
 
Trust is the fuel and the glue of society.  In-group trust drives communal 
solidarity; institutional trust drives state legitimacy and national cohesion, and 
generalized trust unlocks new network connections through which interests may be met.  
This research asks what most affects the GTR in fragile states, which has proved to be a 
critical question.  The trust literature’s answer to this question has included the control 
variables and fractionalization.  This dissertation has demonstrated that there are more 
social pushing and pulling forces acting on the GTR than the trust literature assumes.  
These forces come in the form of groups’ physical, technological, and social proximity 
and society’s power differential.  Together, the control and test variables provide greater 
explanatory power for how the GTR functions in fragile states broadly, more specifically 
in SSA, and clearly in the five cases analyzed.  This dissertation has demonstrated the 
value of SNC’s effect on the GTR and has explained in detail how each control variable 
affects the GTR. 
This dissertation has produced an enhanced theoretically generalizable model that 
captures narrowing and widening forces on the GTR in five fragile SSA states.  The three 
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GTR models presented simulate societies with increasing, decreasing, and static inter-
group interaction, incentivization, and coercion leading to narrower or wider GTR.  They 
also are flexible to allow changes in society’s trust composition through increasing or 
decreasing in-group and institutional trust.  Moving from model two or three to one 
requires changes in these inputs and time.  Outside of post-World War II Germany and 
Japan, post-Cold War South Korea, the Asian Tigers, and perhaps Botswana and South 
Africa, there are few examples of short- to mid-term development success.  Most 
developed non-fragile countries have been so for many decades or centuries and exhibit 
long-term economic and political development models.  Most fragile states will remain 
so; therefore, their pragmatic goals and models and processes should differ from those of 
non-fragile states.  There is not only one development trajectory for all states at all times, 
but instead many depending on their history and potential.  Therefore, an archetype 
model for non-fragile states’ trust composition differs from that for fragile states as 
follows: 
Non-Fragile States 
• Strong, trustworthy, and legitimated formal state institutions 
• Individualist society, though not at risk of social atomization 
• Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade 
• Large bi-directional flows of FDI and FPI and minimal amounts of remittances 
and aid 
• Increasing religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization 
• Communications and transportation infrastructures place the whole society in 
greater proximity 
 
Fragile States 
• State security institutions provide a safe environment for diverse civil society 
groups to interact 
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• The state does not take advantage of principles when managing principle-agent 
transactions 
• Land tenure institutions designate ownership and are legitimated by society 
• Collectivist society learns how to build network ties through civil society 
interaction 
• Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade 
• Increasing FDI inflows and evenly spread remittances and aid 
• Static religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization 
• Increasing honest messaging through uni-directional radio, television, and internet 
media 
• Increasing whole society proximity through access to affordable public 
transportation 
• Groups meet members’ basic needs in the absence of a strong state, but not other 
interests 
 
These goals may be categorized as economic, political, or cultural.  Economic 
goals are more quickly addressed and achieved; therefore, the one goal fragile and non-
fragile states have in common is diversifying imports and exports and trade partners with 
fair terms of trade.  They nearly share a fractionalization goal, but since many fragile 
states are already highly religiously fractionalized, increasing it further would only serve 
to increase conflict in an insecure environment.  Since cultural institutions change slowly, 
it is unlikely fragile state societies will quickly transition from highly collectivist to 
individualist, and if they did, it would likely be highly conflictual and disruptive.  These 
societies will remain collectivist for the foreseeable future; therefore, the best that can be 
achieved is for collectivist groups to gain skills for connecting their civil societies.  
Fragile states are not going to strengthen their institutions quickly; therefore, effort 
should concentrate on increasing safe environments for groups to interact and minimizing 
agent corruption, so at least the state is not the cause of conflict between groups.  The 
most pragmatic solution to managing land tenure conflict is through the establishment of 
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an enforceable bureaucratic process.  This may take the form of a coercive institution that 
forces all stakeholders into a standardized system of land transactions based on market 
value.  This, however, risks angering ethnic leaders and hurting poor landowners and the 
landless.  Many rural populations are not physically proximate; therefore, increasing the 
truthfulness of the media they use will serve to reduce myth building and demonizing of 
other groups.  Fragile states rarely have sufficient financial and human capital to produce 
a well-integrated transportation infrastructure, which results in many poorly constructed 
and maintained projects.  Fragile states should concentrate efforts on the least expensive 
and easily maintainable public transportation options, which will increase groups’ 
proximity.  The overreaching under-resourced state is a typical fragile state model that 
does not widen the GTR.  Limiting state goals to ensuring all groups’ basic needs are met 
gives fragile states an achievable goal that does not invite additional corruption of the 
principle-agent relationship.  With basic needs met, groups are more likely to work out 
their additional interests within and between groups. 
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CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of government is to enable the people of a nation to live in 
safety and happiness. Government exists for the interests of the governed, 
not for the governors. 
—Thomas Jefferson 
 
More than one-third of all states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little 
interest in explaining the variability of generalized trust in this context and still less 
interest in determining its social causes.  Instead, it has been more motivated to explain 
the consequences of the expansion of generalized trust, namely social capital, in non-
fragile states.  This oversight has led to a poor understanding of the social causes of 
generalized trust in states where institutions are untrustworthy, populations collectivist, 
and market forces unstable.  This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by 
presenting a model for the analysis of the GTR in fragile states, which includes group 
proximity and power differential. 
The trust and fragile states literature agree, for fragile states to become less so, 
they must trade some of their high in-group trust for more generalized and institutional 
trust, to balance their trust compositions.  The development of institutional trust in fragile 
states is resource-intensive, yet these literature and development practitioners have 
chosen to focus their efforts there.  Prioritizing the development of generalized trust is a 
more pragmatic approach in fragile states.  The case analysis in this dissertation has 
explained which incentivization and coercion mechanisms and structural configurations 
are most effective in producing wider GTR in fragile states. 
Fragile states require unique development models for infrastructure, economic 
growth, the rule of law, and trust compositions.  These literature assume correctly that 
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most fragile states have narrow GTR; however, they have not attempted to explain 
generalized trust variation among fragile states.  This dissertation agrees with the 
literature that has attempted to explain generalized trust variation that state security and 
contract institutions, individualism-collectivism, inter-state market forces, and social 
fractionalization have substantial influence.  However, fractionalization is only part of the 
social effect on generalized trust. 
This dissertation’s principal objective is to demonstrate that a society’s social 
network composition is the missing component for explaining how trust between 
strangers increases in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile state institutions 
and unstable markets.  This dissertation’s social explanation begins with the 
fractionalization hypothesis to construct a more holistic social cause of the GTR that 
includes proximity and power differential and considers a society’s incentivization-
coercion structure.  This dissertation advances the trust literature through an enhanced 
theoretically generalizable model for examining structural determinants of the GTR in 
scripted fragile SSA states, specifically Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.  It is a 
unique and original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and 
trust, which fills a crucial gap in the trust literature. 
Findings 
These findings provide strong support for the control claims found in the trust 
literature as well as the SNC test variable proposed in this dissertation.  Rival 
institutionalist and non-institutionalist explanations do not sufficiently account for 
isomorphism’s ability to institutionalize state fragility or the dedication with which 
groups adhere to their scripts.  Further, they misunderstand the function of in-group, 
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institutional, and generalized trust and do not address the difference between derivative 
and transcendent out-group trust nor the trust differential.  The sociological 
institutionalism-social capital theory theoretical framework makes clear that each control 
variable narrows the GTR, ensuring the SNC effects are what is causing wider GTR in 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.  The aggregate hypothesized effects of 
fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials of the test cases widen their GTR 
while narrowing it in control cases.  Technological proximity is the lone SNC indicator 
that performs poorly in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia and moderately in Nigeria because it 
is challenging to test variation in communications and transportation infrastructures in 
fragile states that lack them.  These test and control cases represent all fragile states well, 
sharing weakened security and contract institutions that are minimally functional; 
societies that are highly collectivist; and common roles as attractors of remittances and 
aid rather than trade and investment.  There are plenty of control cases to be found but are 
also likely other deviant cases in SSA and other regions from which to learn. 
No state, not even the United States or Scandinavian countries, exhibits an 
archetype trust composition; instead, each has unique limitations.  The surest way to 
transition typical fragile states to the archetype fragile state model is by applying the 
lessons learned from the interlinked patterns of trust differentials, multipolar 
consociationalism, and civil society incentivization found in deviant test cases.  The 
United States is the ultimate deviant case in its unexpected democratic development and 
rise to global prominence, and yet many other countries have learned from its unique 
experiment.  So, too, these test cases’ deviance from the typical fragile state offer lessons 
for coping with fragility.  Since independence, these test cases have exhibited a pattern of 
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revolutionary strongman leaders who are also structural reformers.  While this has 
extended the longevity of unipolarity in Burkina Faso and does little to improve 
institutional fragility in the short-term, it has eventually resulted in modest market 
reforms, unexpected civil society strengthening, and trust composition balancing in all 
test cases, which allows their civil societies to function within a context of dysfunction. 
These chaotic, yet relatively civil society-friendly environments have allowed their civil 
societies to make a fuller transition from coercive unipolar authoritarianism to 
incentivized multipolar consociationalism than have their states or the control cases’ 
states and civil societies. 
Limitations 
This dissertation has addressed the inherent bounding limitations, self-imposed 
delimitations, and methodological concerns related to this research.  Knowing the current 
sophistication of the trust and fragile states literature has allowed for the appropriate 
limitation of the research questions asked to ensure this dissertation fills a crucial gap in 
the literature.  It was deemed most appropriate at this early stage of working with the 
WVS new trust battery question and related generalized trust measurement to delimit the 
bounds to SSA, which has ensured claims are not overgeneralized as past trust research 
did with the old “standard” trust question.  This results in the limitation of appropriate 
methods.  This research is also limited by data availability, a common feature of fragile 
states.  Fragile states have a poor record of producing reliable and trustworthy data; 
hence, the reliance on global data sources such as the WVS and the World Bank.  With 
the eventual emergence of more reliable fragile states data, there will be future research 
opportunities to expand the available methodologies.  This research is limited to the 
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theoretical generalization of types of fragile states and empirical generalization across the 
five cases analyzed.  However, it is reasonable to assume these fragile state types exist 
globally and therefore may be examined using the theoretical framework and model 
presented here.   
The potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and reverse causation concerns 
identified in the methodology chapter are addressed satisfactorily.  First, the construction 
of the SNC variable improves the long-standing omitted social variable bias in the trust 
literature.  Second, the several valid endogeneity concerns do not positively measurably 
affect the dependent variable and, therefore, do not weaken the test variable claims.  
Contract institutions and investment through FDI and FPI are endogenous through states’ 
foreign capital management policies.  However, because the test cases have little 
investment inflow and their contract institutions are fragile, there is little positive 
interaction between these independent variables affecting the dependent variable.  
Additionally, collectivism and social proximity are endogenous through highly 
collectivist groups having high network density, which decreases groups’ social 
proximity.  However, because this does not affect the hypothesis positively, it does not 
weaken the test variable claim.  Third, because in-group, generalized, and institutional 
trust are also causes of social and political phenomena, reverse causation is a concern.  
Fragile states have untrustworthy institutions and resulting low institutional trust; 
therefore, the tests cases’ wider GTR is not positively affecting state institutions.  Their 
wide GTR may also have a small effect on their societies’ movement from collectivism to 
individualism.  Once again, these societies are all highly collectivist, and this does not 
change quickly, so there is no measurable effect.  Wider GTR could also have a positive 
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effect on making states more attractive trade partners and investment magnets.  This does 
not appear to affect the test cases strongly enough for investment, as they all remain quite 
low and not the case for trade in Ethiopia and Nigeria, as they also remain quite low.  
Wide GTR may have a small positive effect on Burkina Faso’s increasing attractiveness 
as a trade partner. 
Implications of Findings 
The findings validate the selection the research question, hypotheses, variables, 
theoretical framework, and method.  The fragile states literature has long assumed there 
is variation among fragile states but has struggled to agree on typologies to categorize 
them.  This dissertation successfully categorizes and then models different trust 
environments in fragile states.  By inter-connecting the trust, fragile states, 
institutionalism, and social capital literature, this dissertation has helped them move 
closer to sharing a common analytical language and unified theoretical framework 
through which to examine trust in fragile states. 
The narrowing or widening of the GTR largely hinges on whether groups are 
forced or incentivized to interact to meet their interests.  Identifying and understanding a 
society’s incentivization and coercion environment, trust differential, and GTR makes 
explaining its likely trust trajectory more possible.  Societies with many unmet interests 
(fragile states) have different trust needs than societies with trustworthy institutions (non-
fragile states) or few to no functioning institutions (failed and collapsed states).  
Generalized trust cannot expand in failed or collapsed states because groups never move 
beyond their preoccupation with survival.  Oppositely, when societies credit trustworthy 
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institutions in non-fragile states with too much trust, it breeds dependence on institutions 
and reduces opportunities for generalized trust. 
The transition from in-group to generalized trust in fragile states is complicated.  
It is human to take the perceived path of least resistance; however, fragile state 
populations rarely choose the most efficient path.  The benefits of inter-group interaction 
are not readily apparent in fragile states because it requires vulnerability and the ability to 
monitor principles.  The monitoring of group members is much easier than strangers, 
especially when the state is not an honest agent; therefore, the interest a stranger can meet 
must overcome the additional effort it takes to ensure mutually positive inter-group 
interaction.  Without inter-group interaction, group members rarely question their strong 
preference for intra-group meeting of interests.  However, windows of opportunity open 
for inter-group interaction in civil society when groups cannot meet all of their members’ 
interests.  In fragile states, civil society is most often the mechanism through which 
individuals enact their agency since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances 
and aid) rather than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can 
do little to change coercive state institutions. 
The trust differential and the GTR are useful conceptual tools when used jointly 
to assess societies’ trust compositions.  Every fragile state has an optimal, yet unrealized, 
trust composition; the methodology presented here provides a process for examining it 
and hypothesizing on its structural effects.  Because in-group trust is always greater than 
generalized trust, there exists a generalized trust ceiling, resulting in a measurable trust 
differential, a measurement introduced in this dissertation for understanding the 
difference between potential and realized generalized trust.  The four categories of trust 
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differential measurement include low potential/high realized, low potential/low realized, 
high potential/high realized, and high potential/low realized.  The trust differential is an 
important measure because societies with large and small trust differentials function 
differently than ones with high and low generalized trust and ones with high and low in-
group trust.  This research makes it easier to isolate in-group, institutional, and 
generalized trust in fragile states for this analysis.  Knowing societies and even sub-
regions’ trust differentials, GTR, and generalized trust saturation points will help craft 
more effective policies for managing civil society, market, and the state and for widening 
the GTR.  Civil society is the underestimated conduit for widening the GTR in fragile 
states. 
Recommendations 
The three trust composition models presented capture all theoretically possible 
types of fragile states, making this research design replicable in other socio-culturally 
similar regions of the developing world where sufficient fragile states exist (e.g., Latin 
America, Middle East, and Asia).  This dissertation set a high standard of reliability for 
its data.  Replicating this research design in other regions or expanding it in SSA requires 
further data.  Several ways of accomplishing this include proxy measures and waiting for 
improved data.  The individualism-collectivism variable presents the tightest restriction 
of all independent variables.  Future research could loosen these requirements marginally 
to expand the case selection.  Instead of limiting individualism-collectivism data to the 
literature standard Hofstede (2003) and House (2004) data, the aggregation of several 
WVS individualism and collectivism related questions may be able to serve as a lesser 
proxy.  However, this would reduce the construct validity since this data would come 
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from the same source as the dependent variable.  Future releases of the WVS will provide 
more cases and questions related to the dependent variable.  The WVS Wave 7 survey 
(available in early 2020) increases its emphasis on the topics of social capital, trust and 
organizational membership (49 of 290 questions) (World Values Survey 2018), which is 
the most of any thematic category in the WVS.  The survey will expand from 76 to 80 
countries; expand its presence in 11 SSA countries (including four of this dissertation’s 
five cases); add six new SSA countries and 16 globally.12  Using additional available data 
may address related research questions.  For future research in SSA and Latin America, 
additional data on social conflict events using the Social Conflict Analysis Database 
(SCAD) and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) datasets would be 
useful for examining the relationship between violent conflict and generalized trust. 
Cookie cutter structural adjustment programs implemented prior to the 
Washington Consensus have proven largely unsuccessful, wasteful, and even hurtful.  
Modern development policies increasingly recognize that states have unique 
combinations of dysfunctions requiring specifically tailored policy solutions.  This 
dissertation identifies common trust composition patterns across the test cases and 
suggests specific policy solutions for improving their trust environments.  Fragile state 
leaders and the development industry need to realize that these states do not have the 
same development nor trust potential as most non-fragile states and likely never will.  
                                                 
12 The World Values Survey Wave 7 will provide greater detail for the SSA countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Rwanda; Latin American countries of Guatemala, Panama, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela; Central Asian countries of Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; North 
African/Middle East countries of Algeria, Libya, Israel, Lebanon, and Iran; and Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Indonesia. 
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There are too many isomorphic forces keeping fragile states’ institutions fragile.  
Therefore, fragile states should scale down their development goals to providing basic 
needs and simple security and contract gains that provide their segmented civil societies a 
place to have mutually positive interaction.  It is a broad enough goal for fragile states to 
ensure the state is not its own worst enemy when it comes to building its trust 
composition. 
When considering fragility-reversing policy solutions that affect the GTR, one 
may address cultural, economic, or political institutions.  While economic solutions are 
not as effective in widening the GTR as providing stable security and contract 
institutions, moving from collectivism to individualism, and increasing the SNC, they are 
easier and quicker to implement and so should be prioritized in the short-term, while also 
making progress on cultural and political policy solutions.  Economically, increasing 
trade and investment and lowering remittances and aid, widen the GTR.  This dissertation 
has demonstrated that these five cases are fragile, but they are not only fragile, they are 
also poorly developed.  All but Zambia reside in the UN Human Development Index 
(HDI) “Low Human Development” category (United Nations Development Programme 
2018).  Fragile state institutions are the primary determinant of economic decline for 
fragile states and their neighbors.  Fragile institutions drop initial GDP by five times and 
0.65 times due to violence.  “Neighbours lose around 0.6 percentage points of growth 
each year” (Chauvet et al. 2007, 6).  Others claim fragile SSA states “lose an opportunity 
to double their initial GDP per capita after a period of 20 years” (Ncube et al. 2014, 2). 
Two economic issues that may be addressed by fragile states and the global 
community jointly is ensuring fair terms of trade for fragile states and the diversification 
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of their exports.  Some, but not all fragile states suffer from unbalanced and unfair terms 
of trade.  Making terms of trade fairer may be addressed through the World Trade 
Organization, perhaps in partnership with the IMF or World Bank.  Diversifying a 
country’s exports is more challenging.  While most fragile states have high ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious fractionalization, many do not have diversity in the areas of 
natural resources, industry, education, innovation, and agricultural products; instead, 
many have become single commodity exporters.  Modern structural adjustment programs 
that have learned from mistakes of the past may appropriately leverage some of the 
dysfunctional institutions in these areas to expand into industries that are a good fit and 
will diversify tradable products.  Finding niches where fragile states have and can keep a 
competitive advantage is no easy task in a dynamic global market.  For these cases and 
others like them to become more than single product raw material exporters, policies 
must focus on reorganizing the Clientist cycle of Western product design and ownership, 
African mineral extraction, and Asian manufacture.  The first step to doing this is 
attracting FDI, which may establish an innovation-friendly environment.  However, 
innovation is wasted if these populations’ are not educated to receive and translate it into 
production and further innovation.  Keeping their educated populations from being swept 
away in the brain drain to join the diaspora or incentivizing them to return after receiving 
their education requires an innovation-friendly environment that most fragile states lack.  
Therefore, policy should also focus on security and contract institutions providing 
innovation-friendly environments for the market and civil society. 
Security will always remain the preeminent concern of fragile states; therefore, 
immediate political policy solutions should focus on ensuring state security and contract 
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institutions do not drop below their current minimally functional status to slip into failure 
or collapse.  Incremental gains are possible to ensure their segmented civil societies have 
a safe enough environment and understood rules for engagement to produce mutually 
positive interactions.  Civil society can be quite resilient and has the potential to advance 
in effectiveness and connectedness in a minimally secure contracting environment.  Inter-
group myths and demonizing diminish when groups are proximate in a safe contract 
environment.  However, in fragile states, resources spent over-and-above what it requires 
to produce minimally functional security and contract institutions risk waste and 
corruption.  The policy-budget question is how fragile states allocate more of their 
severely limited resources to GTR widening policies without becoming more fragile in 
other areas.  Moving fragile states from coercive to incentivized policies requires 
substantial effort.  In the short-term, it may be pragmatic to identify currently 
institutionalized coercive policy solutions that have the potential to lead to wider GTR.  
The state’s coercive force may be useful as it has in other places (e.g., Singapore) to 
produce understandable and enforceable principle-agent relationships.  Through coercion 
fragile states may enforce land tenure systems that can capitalize on its second and first 
most valuable resources respectively, placing land in the hands of its most productive and 
responsible citizens without hurting their most vulnerable populations. 
Cultural policy solutions—the slowest moving, but most effective—should focus 
on the diversification of highly religious identities and the slow transition from 
collectivism to individualism.  States’ attempts to social engineer massive culture shifts 
quickly usually fail (e.g., Soviet Union and China).  Coercing a rapid shift from 
collectivism to individualism would be detrimental to fragile states.  In-group trust serves 
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an essential stabilizing function in highly fractionalized fragile states and should only be 
decreased slowly.  Fragile states civil societies will remain collectivist, but this does not 
mean it is impossible to incentivize positive network connections between ethnic and 
religious groups.  Rather than focusing on policy that weakens the core foundations of in-
group trust, which would likely destabilize groups in an already dysfunctional 
environment, they should focus on increasing transcendent out-group trust, which entails 
incrementally and strategically increasing the difference of groups interacting. 
Since fragile states are dysfunctional, who then implements effective policy 
solutions?  There is a place for external engagement of the international community in the 
specific policy areas addressed here.  The international business community, for example, 
may help establish industry associations that cross ethnic, religious, and political lines.  
This is needed because many fragile state populations are highly religious; this may help 
to diversify their identities to include market- and trade-based vocational identities.  
Indigenous civil society leaders that can leverage international civil society to locate what 
Fox (1992) calls “pockets of efficiency in the state” may construct limited iron triangles 
to attempt policy reform (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 236). 
Contribution 
The growing generalized trust research program initiated by the new WVS trust 
question battery and advanced by Delhey et al. (2011) to Welzel and Delhey (2015) and 
many in between, has made possible many new research avenues and produced a 
framework for accurately measuring, defining, and conceptualizing generalized trust.  
This dissertation builds on this progress and advances it further through identifying, 
measuring, and explaining the full social effect on the GTR in the fragile SSA states of 
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Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.  Progress is most needed on this question in SSA 
because it is the region most negatively affected by the old “standard” trust question’s 
misassumption about cultural perceptions of trust.  Due to this inaccuracy, a whole 
generation of SSA and Asian generalized trust literature findings warrant reexamination 
and should make those who conducted global analysis using the old “standard” trust 
question reconsider doing so with the new trust question. 
This dissertation has embarked on the first of many regional analyses using the 
new GTR measure.  Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together 
provide a holistic, well defined, and flexible theoretical framework for explaining the 
GTR in fragile states, revealing clear consociationalism and civil society incentivization 
trends among the test cases that may apply to other fragile states.  This is accomplished 
through a mixed methodology that considers and weighs quantitative and qualitative 
findings, selects clear boundary conditions, produces strong construct and internal 
validity and moderate external validity, addresses rival explanations, and transparently 
reveals limitations and concerns.  Framing the bounds of the study to a specific type of 
state in a single region increases its external validity.  Selecting cases that are least likely 
and deviant increases its internal validity because hypothesis claims are more difficult to 
confirm.  The use of multiple data sources for variables gives it strong construct validity.  
The well-specified and defined boundary conditions for cases and variables allows for 
reliable replication of this research design.  Future research using this design may be 
conducted in SSA using additional cases as data allows to enhance theoretical 
generalizability or in other regions of socio-culturally similar states where there exist 
 340 
sufficient fragile states present.  Subsequent analyses in Latin America, Asia, and the 
Middle East are the best candidates. 
The development industry has been asking, how much institutional re-engineering 
is required to reverse fragile states.  Some development optimists claim much is needed 
and much is possible for increasing their stability and prosperity (see Kaplan 2008, 11).  
However, state security and contract institution and market composition fixes are difficult 
to implement, and those tried have a mixed record.  While institution-building efforts 
should continue—to cut them off now would be detrimental—this dissertation suggests 
there are opportunities to address the internal condition of fragile state civil societies 
through better understanding their complex trust environments.  Even while fragile state 
security and contract institutions and high remittances and aid persist in these highly 
collectivist societies, gains are possible in bridging network divides through appropriate 
incentivization structures, for increasing positive inter-group interaction leading to a 
wider GTR.  In this way, civil societies may develop wider GTR even while their states 
remain fragile.  States such as Burkina Faso with greater realized GTR may have less 
potential growth remaining but may serve as a model for states with little realized GTR 
potential like Zimbabwe.  Cases with higher than expected GTR potential and growth 
(Ethiopia and Nigeria) are of most interest for proposing and implementing policy 
solutions. 
This dissertation has woven together the interrelated concepts of trust, self-
interest, incentivization, strangers, inter-group interaction, and generalized trust in fragile 
states to produce a unique and original contribution to the trust and fragile states 
literature.  It has addressed the research questions regarding the effects on the GTR in 
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deviant, least likely fragile SSA states by thoroughly testing research hypotheses for each 
variable through within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions 
through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, confirming or affirming most 
hypotheses.  The successful testing of the SNC test variable should provide optimism for 
the application of this model elsewhere. 
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B. Figure 11. Zambian Linguistic Groups 
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C. Figure 12. Zambian Ethnolinguistic Groups 
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D. Figure 14. Zimbabwean Ethnolinguistic Groups 
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E. Figure 16. Zimbabwean Food Insecurity – June 2008 
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F. Figure 18. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Seats - 2017 
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